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General Electric: +4% utile trimestrale a 6,7 miliardi di dollari

Finanzaonline.com - 18.1.08/12:44

Crescono gli utili trimestrali di General Electric. Il colosso statunitense ha terminato l'ultima frazione del 2007 registrando profitti pari a 6,7 miliardi di dollari, 66 cents ad azione, grazie ad una crescita del fatturato pari al 18% a quota 48,59 miliardi di dollari. L'utile su base comparabile ha evidenziato un valore pari a 68 centesimi per azione, in linea con le stime, mentre i ricavi sono risultati migliori del consensus fermo a 47,28 miliardi di dollari. Il management ha detto di attendersi nel 2008 utili continuativi almeno pari a 2,42 dollari per azione, mentre nel primo trimestre l'eps dovrebbe attestarsi tra 50 e 53 centesimi di dollaro.
 
LONDON (MarketWatch) -- Industrial bellwether General Electricreported a 4% rise in fourth-quarter net income to $6.7 billion, or 66 cents a share, with revenue up 18% to $48.59 billion, after 26% profit growth from the company's infrastructure arm. From continuing operations, it earned 68 cents a share, meeting Thomson Financial-compiled analyst estimates, and its revenue surpassed estimates of $47.28 billion. GE's total orders were up 18% to $27 billion for the quarter. It expects 2008 earnings from continuing operations of at least $2.42 a share, with first-quarter continuing earnings between 50 and 53 cents a share. Analysts forecast earnings per share of $2.43 for 2008 and 51 cents for the first quarter.


[GE] GE Money profit up 7% in Q4 to $957M6:37 AM ET, Jan 18, 2008 - 17 minutes ago
08. [GE] GE Healthcare profit down 4% to $1.035B in Q4
6:37 AM ET, Jan 18, 2008 - 17 minutes ago
09. [GE] GE infrastructure profit up 26% in Q4
6:36 AM ET, Jan 18, 2008 - 18 minutes ago
10. [GE] GE says industrial margins improved in Q4
6:34 AM ET, Jan 18, 2008 - 20 minutes ago
11. [GE] GE confirms 2008 guidance
6:33 AM ET, Jan 18, 2008 - 21 minutes ago
12. [GE] GE Q4 total orders up 18% to $27B
6:33 AM ET, Jan 18, 2008 - 21 minutes ago
13. [GE] GE Q4 EPS 66c vs 62c
6:32 AM ET, Jan 18, 2008 - 22 minutes ago
14. [GE] GE Q4 revenue up 18% to $48.6B


Nonostante questo non sono convinto, non so quanto sia esposta nel ciclone americano. Vediamo come reagirà oggi il titolo, in ogni caso aspetterei che si siano calmate le acque, sarà un giorno di volumi imponenti per GE...

:bye:
 
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Qualcuno sa la composizione geografica dei ricavi di GE?? :mmmm:
 
Qualcuno sa la composizione geografica dei ricavi di GE?? :mmmm:

Guarda ..quando hai un attimo di tempo dai un'occhiata alla sezione IR del sito.
E' fatta molto bene e contiene un sacco di informazioni.
Io la seguo da un po'... è una splendida azienda impegnata in una miriade di settori e business...pochi mesi fa ha dismesso il settore delle plastiche per concentrarsi su settori a più alto margine.
Da tempo sta puntando molto sulla divisione ecomagination investendo nelle energie alternative e nella ecosostenibilità.
Come molte altre big ha in corso un mega buy back ed il dividendo è di tutto rispetto.
Tutti i mesi viene pubblicata una specie di lettera agli azionisti contenente le informazioni e i fatti del mese...molto carina.
Se andate nel sito leggete anche l'articolo di Barron's che spiega quanto potrebbe valere GE.
 
prese un pacchettino a 34,31. C'e' sempre una prima volta....
 
Eccolo http://www.ge.com/investors/index.html ho guardato anche l'ultimo rapporto ma non ho trovato il "revenue by region", non ho cercato bene? Oppure è nascosto? :mmmm:

Intendi questo?

GLOBAL REVENUES BY REGION in million


Europe $ 39,700
Pacific Basin 18,000
Americas 9,600
Other Global 7,000
Exports from the U.S. to external customers 13,100

Total 87.400

Lo trovi sull'annual report 2006.
Fattelo spedire a casa... è molto carino... e c'è una bella lettera agli azionisti del grande Immelt.
 
Intendi questo?

GLOBAL REVENUES BY REGION in million


Europe $ 39,700
Pacific Basin 18,000
Americas 9,600
Other Global 7,000
Exports from the U.S. to external customers 13,100

Total 87.400

Lo trovi sull'annual report 2006.

Esatto questo, peccato non avere i dati aggiornati al 2007! Sono davvero sorpreso 54% dall'europa, 13% dalle americhe....:eek:
Tuttavia restano vaghi nel resto:

24% Pacific Basin....??? Non facevano prima a chiamarlo Asia??:mmmm:
 
Esatto questo, peccato non avere i dati aggiornati al 2007! Sono davvero sorpreso 54% dall'europa, 13% dalle americhe....:eek:
Tuttavia restano vaghi nel resto:

24% Pacific Basin....??? Non facevano prima a chiamarlo Asia??:mmmm:

Mah..io ho preso i primi dati che ho trovato..probabilmente nell'annual report poi è spiegato meglio...
 
Mah..io ho preso i primi dati che ho trovato..probabilmente nell'annual report poi è spiegato meglio...

Si si, sono quelli dell'annual report pagina 59...:yes:

GE è una delle pochissime società con rating "AAA", credo però sia difficile valutare un'azienda così diversificata e complessa...:mmmm:

Devo capire come sia possibile un 54% europa a un 13% americhe...:mmmm:
 
in un momento di follia mi è venuta l'idea di tradurre alcune parti dei celebri capitoli 8 e 20 dell'Intelligent investor di Graham, tralasciando volutamente esempi, dati, indicazioni pratiche,ecc e selezionando quei passi che descrivono l'attegiamento mentale giusto per un value investor o più semplicemente per quello che Graham chiamava appunto investitore intelligente (e ovviamente c'è Mr Market ;) ). Ci sono sicuramente anche errori, imprecisioni e libertà per adattare le frasi di Graham all'italiano, spero che il maestro non si rivolti troppe volte nella tomba.

.....

:bow: grazie molte per il contributo.
giugin :bye:
 
Si si, sono quelli dell'annual report pagina 59...:yes:

GE è una delle pochissime società con rating "AAA", credo però sia difficile valutare un'azienda così diversificata e complessa...:mmmm:

Devo capire come sia possibile un 54% europa a un 13% americhe...:mmmm:
Il dollaro debole ha aiutato le vendite e utili degli assett europei.


General Electric Co. said Friday that solid demand for its aviation, oil and gas and transportation equipment helped lift its fourth-quarter profit 4%, with steady overseas growth so far showing no sign of abating in 2008 evens as the U.S. economy cools off.


Stamina in overseas markets has been a recurring theme for the back half of 2007 as companies with diversified, international portfolios have so far been able to weather multiple headwinds in the U.S. Additionally, as the domestic economy weakens, so does the dollar, often helping to increase sales and revenues from overseas markets.
 
Se penso al regalo che tramite Eni abbiamo fatto a GE....



Nuovo Pignone, parte di General Electric Power Systems, è leader mondiale nell´industria dell´Oil & Gas: la sua vasta gamma di prodotti copre l´intero mercato, dalla produzione di petrolio e gas, al trasporto e alla raffinazione degli stessi, fino alla distribuzione di carburante. Produce compressori centrifughi, assiali e alternativi, turbine a gas e a vapore, pompe e valvole, apparecchiature e recipienti in pressione, sistemi di regolazione e di misura, distributori di carburante, contatori di gas. Oltre alla fornitura di macchinari, Nuovo Pignone realizza soluzioni integrate chiavi-in-mano: stazioni di reiniezione, stazioni di compressione, sistemi modularizzati, unità e impianti per la generazione di energia elettrica.






Le cifre parlano da sole, le dà l´amministratore delegato della divisione GE Energy Oil&Gas di cui il Pignone è capofila, Claudi Santiago: 1,5 milioni di dollari di fatturato nel 2000 che salgono a 2,8 nel 2003, 1,7 milioni di ordini che diventano 3,1. Oil&Gas crescerà ancora, promette Santiago. «Il Nuovo Pignone - dice - ha triplicato in 10 anni e ha un potenziale di mercato di 12 miliardi di dollari». GE, spiega sempre Santiago, investirà 155 milioni di dollari (69 entro il 2004 e 85 nel 2005) in nuove tecnologie.
 
Schloss , uno dei superinvestitori citati da Buffett nel suo famoso discorso del 1984 a 91 anni e' ancora vivo e compra azioni!


Experience
Bernard Condon 02.11.08, 12:00 AM ET

Walter Schloss








At 91, the man Warren Buffett famously dubbed a "superinvestor" is still picking unloved stocks.
Walter Schloss has lived through 17 recessions, starting with one when Woodrow Wilson was President. This old-school value investor has made money through many of them. What's ahead for the economy? He doesn't worry about it.

A onetime employee of the grand panjandrum of value, Benjamin Graham, and a man his pal Warren Buffett calls a "superinvestor," Schloss at 91 would rather talk about individual bargains he has spotted. Like the struggling car-wheel maker or the moneylosing furniture supplier.

Bushy-eyebrowed and avuncular, Schloss has a laid-back approach that fast-money traders couldn't comprehend. He has never owned a computer and gets his prices from the morning newspaper. A lot of his financial data come from company reports delivered to him by mail, or from hand-me-down copies of Value Line, the stock information service.

He loves the game. Although he stopped running others' money in 2003--by his account, he averaged a 16% total return after fees during five decades as a stand-alone investment manager, versus 10% for the S&P 500--Schloss today oversees his own multimillion-dollar portfolio with the zeal of a guy a third his age. In a day of computer models that purport to quantify that hideous and mysterious force called risk, listening to Schloss talk of his simple, homespun investing methods is a tonic.

"Well, look at that," he says brightly, while scanning the paper. "A list of worst- performing stocks."

During his time as a solo manager after leaving Graham's shop, he was a de facto hedge fund. He charged no management fee but took 25% of profits. He ran his business with no research assistants, not even a secretary. He and his son, Edwin (who joined him in 1973), worked in a single room, poring over Value Line charts and tables.

In a famous 1984 speech titled the "The Superinvestor of Graham-and-Doddsville," Buffett said Schloss was a flesh-and-blood refutation of the Efficient Market Theory. This hypothesis holds that no stock bargains exist, or at least ones mere mortals can pick out consistently. Asked whether he considers himself a superinvestor, Schloss demurs: "Well, I don't like to lose money."

He has a Depression-era thriftiness that benefited clients well. His wife, Anna, jokes that he trails her around their home turning off lights to save money. If prodded, he'll detail for visitors his technique for removing uncanceled stamps from envelopes. Those beloved Value Line sheets are from his son, 58, who has a subscription. "Why should I pay?" Schloss says.

Featured in Adam Smith's classic book Supermoney (1972), Schloss amazed the author by touting "cigar butt" stocks like Jeddo Highland Coal and New York Trap Rock. Schloss, as quoted by Smith, was the soul of self-effacement, saying, "I'm not very bright." He didn't go to college and started out as a Wall Street runner in the 1930s. Today he sits in his Manhattan apartment minding his own capital and enjoying simple pleasures. "Look at that hawk!" he erupts at the sight of one winging over Central Park.

One company he's keen on now shows the Schloss method. That's the wheelmaker. Superior Industries International (nyse: SUP - news - people ) gets three-quarters of sales from ailing General Motors (nyse: GM - news - people ) and Ford. Earnings have been falling for five years. Schloss picks up a Value Line booklet from his living room table and runs his index finger across a line of numbers, spitting out the ones he likes: stock trading at 80% of book value, a 3% dividend yield, no debt. "Most people say, 'What is it going to earn next year?' I focus on assets. If you don't have a lot of debt, it's worth something."




Schloss screens for companies ideally trading at discounts to book value, with no or low debt, and managements that own enough company stock to make them want to do the right thing by shareholders. If he likes what he sees, he buys a little and calls the company for financial statements and proxies. He reads these documents, paying special attention to footnotes. One question he tries to answer from the numbers: Is management honest (meaning not overly greedy)? That matters to him more than smarts. The folks running Hollinger International (other-otc: HLGAF.PK - news - people ) were smart but greedy--not good for investors.

Schloss doesn't profess to understand a company's operations intimately and almost never talks to management. He doesn't think much about timing--am I buying at the low? selling at the high?--or momentum. He doesn't think about the economy. Typical work hours when he was running his fund: 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., only a half hour after the New York Stock Exchange's closing bell.

Schloss owns a prized 1934 edition of Graham's Security Analysis he still thumbs through. Its binding is held together by three strips of Scotch tape. In the small room he invests from now, across the hall from his apartment, one wall contains a half-dozen gag pictures of Buffett (the Omaha sage with buxom cheerleaders or with a towering stack of Berkshire Hathaway (nyse: BRKA - news - people ) tax returns). Each has a joke scribbled at the bottom and a salutation using Schloss' nickname from the old days, Big Walt.

Schloss first met that more famous value hunter at the annual meeting of wholesaler Marshall Wells. The future billionaire was drawn there for the reason Schloss had come: The stock was trading at a discount to net working capital (cash, inventory and receivables minus current liabilities). That number was a favorite measure of value at Graham-Newman, the investment firm Schloss joined after serving in World War II. Buffett came to the firm after the Marshall Wells meeting, sharing an office with Schloss at New York City's Chanin Building on East 42nd Street.

Schloss left the Graham firm in 1955 and with $100,000 from 19 investors began buying "working capital stocks" on his own, like mattressmaker Burton-Dixie and liquor wholesaler Schenley Industries. Success drew in investors, eventually rising to 92. But Schloss never marketed his fund or opened a second one, and he kept money he had to invest to a manageable size by handing his investors all realized gains at year-end, unless they told him to reinvest.

In 1960 the S&P was up half a percentage point, with dividends. Schloss returned 7% after fees. One winner: Fownes Brothers & Co., a glovemaker picked up for $2, nicely below working capital per share, and sold at $15. In the 1980s and 1990s he also saw big winners. By then, since inventory and receivables had become less important, he had shifted to stocks trading at below book value. But the tempo of trading had picked up. He often found himself buying while stocks still had a long way to fall and selling too early. He bought Lehman Brothers (nyse: LEH - news - people ) below book shortly after it went public in 1994 and made 75% on it in a few months. Then Lehman went on to triple in price.

Still, many of his calls were spot-on. He shorted Yahoo (nasdaq: YHOO - news - people ) and Amazon before the markets tanked in 2000, and cleaned up. After that, unable to find many cheap stocks, he and Edwin liquidated, handing back investors $130 million. The Schlosses went out with flair: up 28% and 12% in 2000 and 2001 versus the S&P's --9% and --12%.

The S&P now is off 15% from its peak, yet Schloss says he still doesn't see many bargains. He's 30% in cash. A recession, if it comes, may not change much. "There're too many people with money running around who have read Graham," he says.

Nevertheless, he has found a smattering of cheap stocks he thinks are likely to rise at some point. High on his watch list (see table) is CNA Financial, trading at 10% less than book; its shares have fallen 18% in a year. The insurer has little debt, and 89% of the voting stock is owned by Loews Corp. (nyse: LTR - news - people ), controlled by the billionaire Tisch family. He says buy if it gets cheaper. "I can't say people will get rich on it, but I would rather be safe than sorry," he says. "If it falls more, I won't worry about it. Let the Tisches worry about it."

Schloss flips through Value Line again and stops at page 885: Bassett Furniture, battered by a lousy housing market. The chair- and tablemaker is trading at a 40% discount to book and sports an 80-cent dividend, a fat 7% yield. Schloss mutters something about how book value hasn't risen for years and how the dividend may be under threat.

His call: Consider buying when the company cuts its dividend. Then Bassett will be even cheaper and it eventually will recover.

If only he had waited a bit to buy wheelmaker Superior, too. It's been two years since he bought in, and the stock is down a third. But the superinvestor, who has seen countless such drops, is philosophical and confident this one is worth book at least. "How much can you lose?" he asks.
 
grande! Un ragazzino :D
Greenwald nel suo libro ("Value Investing. From Graham to Buffett and beyond") dedica un capitolo agli Schloss.
 
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grazie del link, avevo notato anche io che B. ne parlava recentemente ed è diventato diffusamente conosciuto (Pabrai), ed è una di quelle notizie che da una parte mi rallegrano, dall'altra però mi fanno "temere"... sia per la sua performance (Pabrai) che per coloro che si affidano a lui, io avevo letto il suo primo libro "Mosaic", una raccolta di articoli che aveva scritto su MF e altrove dal 1999, molto intelligenti e interessanti e penso anche questo libro sia un insieme di pensieri e strategie che ha applicato in questi anni.
Sono almeno 5 anni che "seguo" il soggetto, veramente brillante e intelligente, ma ahime(!) temo che anche lui caschi o sia cascato nella trappola che attanaglia tutte le gestioni...
se sei bravo ed hai successo, diventi famoso, tutti ti vogliono e più che investire inizi a "vendere", nel frattempo gestisce circa 600 milioni $, lui non vuole andare oltre il miliardo di gestione, ma comunque è molto. Segno dell'affezione che ormai lo travolge è il fatto che per il suo fondo offshore ha inalzato la soglia minima che era di 100 k$ a 2,5 milioni di $!!!

Purtroppo il suo HF nell'ultimo semestre ha avuto un'amdamento "disastroso", si era imbarcato su DCF una società del subprime e gli è andata male, una mossa che invece negli anni precedenti gli era andata bene 2 volte, e questo è anche un segno, per me, di quanto sia seria e profonda la "crisi" attuale sul mercato...purtroppo non c'è ancora la percezione di questo...

Io lo seguo, spero in lui:D e di essere smentito nei prossimi semestri, ma ho un certo timore, purtroppo i tempi dove uno come warren o schloss o altri potevano lavorare in pace e silenzio per anni sono passati...
gioia23
 
un corto riassunto dell'annual meeting del 2007 del suo hedge fund, da www.fwallstreet.com


gioia23


Why Ask Me? Ask Mohnish.
Oct
1I went to the Pabrai Funds annual meeting on Saturday, armed with some of your questions. It is often good to bounce ideas and questions off other business investors, and you can't argue this Buffett disciple's 30+% average annual return for the last eight years. Mohnish Pabrai—manager of a $600 million hedge fund, lunch guest of Warren Buffett, business investor, and generally nice (and accessible) guy.

Here's what he had to say.


Sphere Of Competence
James asked:

"How do you know your sphere of competence?" From my limited experience, what you think you know about a business as a consumer or simply a student of business is far different than really understanding the business.
I asked Mohnish why he feels comfortable investing in steel manufacturers, oil refineries and car seat manufacturers, but not in Google, corn and gold. His response was the same I would have given James.

Look for simple businesses in slow-changing industries. Mohnish doesn't pretend to understand the daily operations of a car seat manufacturer; still, he can rip apart the annual reports and uncover that Lear is a leader and that its business is generally independent of the cyclical nature of the auto manufacturing business.

Look for opportunities that jump out at you, and then try to learn the business. You don't need to know everything there is to know about an industry or business. Instead, see if you can figure out the companies strengths and weaknesses. Admittedly, I don't pretend to know the intricate details of how Johnson & Johnson, Wal-Mart, or Coca-Cola work; still, they're simple. And with a little digging into their annual reports, they're generally understandable.

In the end, Mohnish, you and I all have difference spheres—and they seem to be wired into us (and you). Still, straight-forward businesses in slow-changing industries are much easier to value than complex businesses in rapidly changing fields. Take a look at those, keeping in mind what matters in business, and you'll find that you'll understand a ton of businesses you originally knew nothing about.

Buy-and-hold Vs. Activity
AF posted:

If the stock is severely overpriced, you should sell it and buy when drops back to a reasonable price (as long as the fundamental business hasn't changed).
Mohnish commented on the gross difference between today's Buffett and the Buffett of the early partnerships. In the early days, Buffett was much more active in trading securities. Why? His asset base allowed him to do so. It is easy to dance in and out of positions when you are managing $1 million or $100 million. In the early days, Buffett had more ideas than cash.

Today, the situation is reversed—Buffett now has more cash than ideas. A $1 million investment has such a small impact on the Berkshire portfolio that it doesn't make sense to him.

Should you sell when the company is overpriced? That depends on your goal. If you want to invest for the long-term and achieve moderate returns above the markets (e.g., your 15% vs. 11% for the S&P 500), you can buy and hold. If you want to crush the markets on a long-term basis, you'll likely need to find $0.50 dollars and sell them when they are worth $0.90. Then, go find more $0.50 dollars.

One strategy is not better than the other. The question is: How hard do you want to work to achieve high returns? The harder you work, the higher your potential returns. Answer that, and you'll know what to do.

Discounted Cash Flow
Mohnish and I (and Buffett) agree—the value of a business is the discounted amount of cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. Sometimes that comes in the form of future owner earnings; sometimes it comes in the form of assets. It depends on the situation.

One example of this is Pabrai's past holding—Tesoro Corporation. Here's a company that went from $7 to $0.80 to $46 in five years. He bought around $4.50 and sold (for a loss) around $3. A year later, the company was trading for 4 times what he had paid.

Tesoro at $5 was one of those no-brainer asset plays. Looking at the company's 2001 financials, you would see that Tesoro could have been broken up for roughly $16-$17 a share. It was trading at less than half of that. But Tesoro wouldn't be broken up—at least it wasn't likely. Instead, Pabrai realized the value of the business was at least the value of its assets, and possibly any cash that it might be able to generate.

(He jokingly lamented having sold Tesoro for a loss when he could have been slightly more patient and had a huge gain.)

What Books Do I Recommend?
I'll do a full Strategy Review on Pabrai's book, but you have to add The Dhandho Investor to your shelf. You won't get his exact method for every investment ever made; still, you'll get insight and it is a must read for business investors.

More Gems To Come
As I am getting long winded, I'll cut it short and continue tomorrow. As an aside, the event was wonderful. There were about 200 people in total. We had an hour long meet-and-greet where Mohnish floated around the room and talked with people (and had to constantly re-answer the question, "What do you think about [this stock, gold, real estate, etc.]?"

After the meet-and-greet, we sat in an auditorium where he discussed some past performance and investments for about 20 minutes, and then opened it up for an hour of Q&A. After the Q&A, there was a cocktail hour followed by dinner (which I missed).

All-in-all, I was honored to be invited and had a great time.
 
Indietro