La verità(???), mi spiego(?!?), sui mercati(...)

  • Ecco la 72° Edizione del settimanale "Le opportunità di Borsa" dedicato ai consulenti finanziari ed esperti di borsa.

    È stata un’ottava ricca di spunti per i mercati, dapprima con l’esito delle elezioni europee, poi con i dati americani incoraggianti sull’inflazione e la riunione della Fed. L’esito delle urne ha mostrato uno spostamento verso destra del Parlamento europeo, con l’avanzata dei partiti nazionalisti più euroscettici a scapito di liberali e verdi. In Francia, il presidente Macron ha indetto il voto anticipato dopo la vittoria di Le Pen e in Germania i socialdemocratici del cancelliere tedesco Olaf Scholz hanno subito una disfatta record. L’azionario europeo ha scontato molto queste incertezze legate al rischio politico in Francia. Oltreoceano, i principali indici di Wall Street hanno raggiunto nuovi record dopo che mercoledì sera, la Fed ha mantenuto invariati i tassi nel range 5,25-5,50%. I dot plot, le proiezioni dei funzionari sul costo del denaro, stimano ora una sola riduzione quest’anno rispetto a tre previste a marzo. Lo stesso giorno è stato diffuso il report sull’inflazione di maggio, che ha mostrato un rallentamento al 3,3% e un dato core al 3,4%, meglio delle attese.
    Per continuare a leggere visita il link

I bond secolari vengono emessi per gli investitori istituzionali.

Poi passano ai traders e soccombono alle leggi della domanda e dell'offerta, condizionate anche da fattori imponderabili.

Vedi se questo trova il tuo interesse:
Euro yield curve evolution and real long-term rates

Sante parole, sono curiosissimo di vedere cosa succederà, per il momento si porta a casa qualcosa (e anche di più) ma temo che prima o poi il cerino rimarrà in mano a qualcuno.

Grazie ancora
 
Un secolare ha come inflazione attesa implicita il target delle banche centrali.
A questa va aggiunto un tasso reale che dipende dalle prospettive di crescita economica; che a loro volta sono legate solo indirettamente ai movimenti dei tassi a breve termine.
Questo post della settimana scorsa su FED St Louis lega i tassi reali a lungo termine alle aspettative future sulla politica economica delle banche centrali.

Has the U.S. Economy Transitioned to a Higher Long-run Real Interest Rate Regime?

Negli ultimi anni i tassi reali sono stati insolitamente bassi perché, dopo tanti QE, la politica economica delle banche centrali non avrebbe potuto far altro che diventare più restrittiva.
 
Ultima modifica:
Questo post della settimana scorsa su FED St Louis lega i tassi reali a lungo termine alle aspettative sulla politica economica delle banche centrali.

Has the U.S. Economy Transitioned to a Higher Long-run Real Interest Rate Regime?

Bene, non resta che auspicare che l'Europa possa sganciarsi dalla politica della FED accelerando la riduzione dei tassi, visto che già i dati dell'inflazione vanno in quella direzione. Vorrà dire che in tal caso ci sarà un dollaro più forte e potrebbero avvantaggiarsene le esportazioni.
Ma con la materia prima quotata in dollari, il rischio di successivo revamping dell'inflazione in Europa non è affatto irrisorio.
E' proprio un bel rompicapo.
 
Bene, non resta che auspicare che l'Europa possa sganciarsi dalla politica della FED accelerando la riduzione dei tassi, visto che già i dati dell'inflazione vanno in quella direzione. Vorrà dire che in tal caso ci sarà un dollaro più forte e potrebbero avvantaggiarsene le esportazioni.
Ma con la materia prima quotata in dollari, il rischio di successivo revamping dell'inflazione in Europa non è affatto irrisorio.
E' proprio un bel rompicapo.
Ho colto gli spunti della discussione dei giorni scorsi sull'argomento da te introdotto.
Ti lascio questi link:
What does instantaneous forward mean?
Yield curve terminology and concepts
Yield curves
 

Safe Haven Deep Dive​

For whatever reason, it really bugs me when people describe bitcoin as a safe haven. Yes, it’s a hedge against loose monetary policy, but it usually trades more like a tech proxy than a safe haven. This got me thinking about safe havens in general and the lack of suitable assets fitting the bill these days. I decided to go through the major safe havens (and bitcoin) and see how they have performed over time. This might shed some light on a) what used to be a safe haven b) what was never a safe haven and c) what is still a safe haven.

I constructed my study as follows: Look at how various assets perform in weeks when the NASDAQ is up or down one standard deviation or more. I consider NASDAQ to be the ultimate risky asset and I don’t think I need to worry about anyone arguing with that. It’s high-beta equities—the definition of a risky asset.

The red line in the charts is the performance of the asset when NASDAQ is down. The green line is the performance of the asset when NASDAQ is up. A perfect safe haven, then, would have the red line going up (it rallies when NASDAQ sells off) and the green line going down. Let’s start with bonds, because they are easy to understand, and they were a great safe haven when we lived in a world of low inflation.

bonds-1.png


Chart shows total return of bonds for each week where NASDAQ up or down condition is met, summed over time

You can see that bonds were a great safe haven until COVID, but then the inflationary kaboom led to many instances of bonds down / NASDAQ down (just like we’ve seen over the past week or so after the strong CPI reading). Verdict: Bonds used to be a safe haven, but they don’t perform when inflation is high.

Next, let’s look at gold.

gold-1.png


Is it a safe haven? Not really. When stocks go up, gold goes up and when stocks go down, gold does nothing. So, it’s not terrible! But it’s more a liquidity thermometer than a safe haven. Perhaps more importantly, its behavior is wildly inconsistent and therefore it’s not a reliable safe haven. At all. Verdict: Gold is part risky asset, part liquidity thermometer, part safe haven.

The JPY and CHF used to be great safe havens as they represented the funding side of cyclical currency trades, so specs sold them when things were good. They saw unwinds and repatriation when scary stuff happened, so specs bought them when times were less good. This gave them a safe haveny vibe, but much of that came from their correlation to yields. So, when the yields / NASDAQ correlation broke, the JPY and CHF stopped working as well. Significant government interventions in JPY and CHF have also muddied the waters. Here are the charts.

jpy-and-chf-one-chart.png

You can see the JPY was a great safe haven during and after the GFC but has not performed that role since 2020 (the red line is down since then, indicating NASDAQ down = weaker JPY). The CHF chart is a mess because they pegged it for ages and EUR is 70% of the Swiss TWI. Again, you can see that CHF was an OK safe haven from 2002 to 2011 then lost its haven characteristics. Verdict: CHF and JPY are not safe havens when bonds are positively correlated with stocks and/or their central banks are distorting the FX market.

Moving to things that people sometimes think are safe havens, but are actually risky assets… The first one to look at is silver. The results for this one are so remarkable I asked Justin to run it independently to make sure I didn’t screw up the xls. He confirmed the chart looks like this:

silver-1.png


Verdict: Silver is a risky asset. As risky as they get. It’s a liquidity thermometer and debasement hedge. Same thing as NASDAQ.

Next, we look at bitcoin. This chart from Tavi Costa probably tells you everything you need to know. And this analysis I did comparing TQQQ to BTC takes the same analysis in a more quantitative direction.

bitcoin-TQQQ.png


But just to confirm, here’s the chart of what bitcoin does when the NASDAQ is up or down more than one standard deviation.

bitcoin-1.png


This confirms the idea that big down moves in NASDAQ tend to see big down moves in bitcoin at the same time, and vice versa. That said, bitcoin did show some independence through the ETF announcement and launch period as down moves in NASDAQ were absorbed by pre-ETF and post-ETF launch buyers. That does not change my overall impression that bitcoin is a risky asset, but it does show that idiosyncratic flows matter. Verdict: Bitcoin is a hedge against loose monetary policy, and a risky asset.

And finally, what about the USD? It’s a good safe haven, generally.

DXY-1.png


You can see that during dotcom, the USD was not a good safe haven as the tech bubble flows were a big driver of the dollar in both directions. Then, in 2008, the USD was a great safe haven. It lost that role once the eurozone crisis ended but reaffirmed it in COVID. There is no guarantee that the USD will be a safe haven in the next recession. Debts and deficits are huge and the tech inflows and vibes this cycle are similar to 1999/2000. This cycle, like then, there was no alternative to US assets. Until everyone wanted out, then there was.


Conclusion​

The biggest takeaway here is that there are not many good liquid safe havens in a time of rising inflation. Bonds don’t work, JPY and CHF don’t work, and risky assets like silver and bitcoin obviously don’t work. If you are worried about a lower stock market, the best hedge is cash. Especially when T-bills are yielding north of 5.3%.
 

The future of inflation (forecast) targeting​

Keynote speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the thirteenth conference organised by the International Research Forum on Monetary Policy, “Monetary Policy Challenges during Uncertain Times”, at the Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.​

Washington, DC, 17 April 2024
Since the early 1990s, many central banks worldwide have adopted a framework for monetary policy known as “inflation targeting”.[1] In this framework, central banks announce a target rate or range for medium-term inflation, typically 2%, and adjust short-term interest rates to steer actual inflation towards the target.[2]
The rise of inflation targeting was a response to the turbulent inflation episodes of the 1970s and 1980s when most central banks were only loosely committed to price stability. Inflation targeting was an acknowledgement that monetary policy was most effective when it was given a clear mandate.
Inflation targeting went hand-in-hand with a discernible increase in central bank independence and transparency. Central banks operating outside the influence of political election cycles played a critical role in making inflation targeting credible and feasible. Political independence, in turn, required central bank officials to publicly explain and justify their actions as a manifestation of democratic accountability.
Greater transparency was also needed to operationalise inflation targeting. The reason is that, given the lags in monetary policy transmission, central banks can only affect future inflation. As such, inflation targeting has typically been formulated in terms of inflation forecast targeting where the central bank adjusts policy to offset deviations of its projection of medium-term inflation from the target.[3]
Inflation forecast targeting requires the central bank to provide a coherent narrative to the public that links its current decisions to the way it expects economic activity and inflation to evolve over the policy-relevant horizon, typically over the next two to three years.
Inflation forecast targeting has been implemented differently across the central banking community.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Norges Bank and Sveriges Riksbank, for example, publish inflation forecasts that are conditional on a policy rate path consistent with delivering inflation in line with the target over the policy-relevant horizon. Similarly, the US Federal Reserve System provides policy rate forecasts through its Summary of Economic Projections.
While these interest rate paths do not constitute a formal commitment on the part of policymakers, they do provide forward guidance, which potentially raises the ability of central banks to manage interest rate and inflation expectations.[4]
Other central banks, including the ECB and the Bank of England, publish inflation projections based on financial market participants’ expected path for short-term interest rates.[5] In this case, the public typically expects policy to deviate from the market-implied path if the medium-term inflation forecast is inconsistent with the target.
At the ECB, the link between policy decisions and inflation projections was deliberately diluted, as projections are “owned” by staff and not the Governing Council.[6] In practice, however, inflation projections, whether owned by the committee or not, have over time become the main communication vehicle for most central banks worldwide, including the ECB.

Inflation forecast targeting and the surge in inflation​

Inflation targeting has generally been a success.
Before the pandemic, inflation had been low and stable over three decades (Slide 2). And by providing a clear yardstick for the public to measure the central bank’s success in delivering on its mandate, inflation targeting has made monetary policy more transparent and accountable.
Yet, while changes to monetary policy frameworks had been important in bringing about benign inflation outcomes since the late 1980s, there is broad agreement that during that period, central banks benefited from a decline in macroeconomic volatility and globally subdued price pressures.[7]
In this environment, even systematic forecast errors by central banks had only limited impact on their credibility.[8] In the euro area, for example, HICP inflation excluding energy and food was persistently over-projected between 2013 and 2019 (Slide 3, left-hand side).[9]
But since these forecast errors were small in absolute terms, and the public was not concerned about a limited undershooting of inflation targets, the appropriateness of central banks’ broader policy frameworks was not questioned, and neither was their ability to maintain price stability.
However, the pandemic changed all of this.
Inflation forecast errors rose measurably and remained persistent.[10] This was not because central banks were particularly bad at projecting inflation. After all, significant forecast errors were made by professional forecasters and international institutions alike (Slide 3, right-hand side).
Rather, it was because the size of the shocks hitting our economies increased sharply, with some of them entailing fundamental structural changes to the economy, making inflation forecasting an extremely difficult undertaking. These forecast errors, in turn, arguably contributed to central banks’ delayed reaction to the surge in inflation.

Data dependence challenges inflation forecast targeting​

Central banks are currently trying to draw the right lessons from recent experience.
Perhaps the most important one is that the post-pandemic surge in inflation has validated rather than refuted the inflation targeting framework. Despite inflation often reaching double-digit levels, long-term inflation expectations have remained broadly anchored around 2% across advanced economies (Slide 4).
This is a strong vote of confidence in the central bank’s determination and ability to restore price stability. By keeping inflation expectations anchored, central banks managed to significantly reduce the persistence of inflation, thereby helping avoid the output losses that had been necessary in the 1980s to bring inflation down from elevated levels.
A second area of reflection relates to the role central bank projections should play in calibrating and communicating monetary policy.
In response to the outbreak of the pandemic in 2020, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the ECB adjusted the way it presented and used economic forecasts in its decision-making process. Alternative scenarios and extensive sensitivity analyses complemented the baseline and helped to convey the considerable increase in uncertainty regarding the future path of the economy.
In addition, in early 2023, when interest rates had already been raised considerably, we clarified that the large prevailing uncertainty about the medium-term inflation outlook required a data-dependent approach to monetary policy, where the observed dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary transmission would serve to cross-check the inflation projections.[11]
These measures effectively marked a departure from “textbook” inflation forecast targeting. As projection errors, even over short horizons, rose to unprecedented levels in the wake of the recent energy crisis, the baseline scenario was no longer a sufficient summary indicator for calibrating and communicating monetary policy actions.
Breaking this link was not entirely new. Already in 2019, following a long period of subdued price pressures, the ECB adopted rate forward guidance that conditioned its future actions not only on the inflation outlook but also on the actual progress in underlying inflation dynamics. This was also intended to ease financing conditions further.
But in the high-inflation period, the stakes were arguably higher. Consider the June 2022 Eurosystem staff projections as an example. These projections were the first opportunity to fully reflect on the impact of the war in Ukraine on activity and prices in the euro area. They foresaw inflation to average 3.5% in 2023, almost two percentage points below the actual outcome of 5.4%, with interest rates being markedly higher than expected in 2022.

Should we return to strict inflation forecast targeting?​

The question we are facing today is whether, in view of the recent normalisation of forecast errors, central banks should return to the strict inflation forecast targeting that prevailed most of the time before the pandemic.
This question is not about whether central banks should use model-based forecasts or not. Good policymaking will always have to rely on models about how the economy works and how our policy decisions affect central macroeconomic variables. In other words, models are indispensable.
It is not about whether central banks should be forward-looking, either. Again, there is no question that a central bank must focus on medium-term inflation. It should not form its decisions by looking only in the rear-view mirror.
Instead, the question is whether we should give the baseline projections a weight in policy calibration and communication, so that deviations of projected medium-term inflation from the target would almost mechanically trigger expectations of policy adjustments.
Clarity on how central banks intend to conduct policy over the medium term is certainly important for predictability and hence transmission. During the past few months, financial markets have repeatedly repriced the future expected path of short-term interest rates in different directions, thereby affecting actual financing conditions (Slide 5).[12]
These swings do not necessarily imply a lack of understanding of central banks’ reaction functions, as there was often a wedge between the medium-term inflation outlook expected by investors and central banks.
But they do suggest that investors expect policymakers, at least for now, to continue to pay more attention to actual inflation outcomes, or to the tails of the forecast distribution, than what a typical inflation forecast targeting central bank would do.
Putting less weight on the baseline forecast in the decision-making process has two drawbacks.
First, it may lead to excessive volatility if financial markets overreact to individual data prints. The sensitivity of short-term interest rates to surprises in the most relevant macroeconomic indicators is currently at elevated levels (Slide 6).
Second, it could increase the risk that, should the central scenario materialise, monetary policymakers may have waited too long to adjust the stance in their search for “sufficient confidence”. In the current context, being behind the curve can be costly in terms of lost output.
At the same time, despite the reduction in forecasting errors, there are a number of reasons suggesting that it could be prudent to continue to consider the baseline forecast as just one input to policy decisions, or to consider other changes to the framework, including in communication, even as inflation continues to fall.

Central forecasts create a false sense of precision​

First, while central forecasts are easy to communicate, they convey a false sense of precision.
At the ECB, significant resources are constantly devoted to improving the set of models used for forecasting.[13] After the global financial crisis, for example, credit and banking gained prominence in our workhorse models. More recently, we made important changes to the assumptions about the pass-through of energy prices to consumer prices in the presence of large cost-push shocks.[14]
But no matter how much we improve our models, projections will always be surrounded by a significant degree of uncertainty.
Take energy inflation as an example.
During the recent inflation surge, errors in the conditioning assumptions for energy prices – based on market futures prices – explained, on average, about three-quarters of the Eurosystem and ECB staff projection errors for inflation four quarters ahead (Slide 7).
While other forecasting techniques, such as using random walk assumptions, may sometimes yield superior outcomes, there is no one method that consistently outperforms the others.
Uncertainty is even greater when estimating and forecasting unobservable variables, such as the output gap or the natural rate of interest. While being of first-order importance for assessing inflationary pressures or the restrictiveness of monetary policy, neither concept can be pinned down in real time with any reasonable degree of precision.
In addition, forecasts of models estimated on historical time series tend to revert to the mean towards the end of the projection horizon.
This mean reversion is an integral part of inflation targeting, based on the assumption that long-term inflation expectations are firmly anchored at target. This approach is reasonable for as long as this assumption is confirmed by surveys and market prices.
But when shocks are large and persistent, and inflation expectations are at risk of de-anchoring, mean reversion can make monetary policy procyclical.
Consequently, there is a risk that policymakers react too late when the economy is hit by a more persistent inflation shock, and that policy is loosened too early when inflation falls again. In other words, mean reversion introduces an easing bias during inflation shocks and a tightening bias during disinflation shocks.
Biases may also occur due to the incremental approach typically used in forecasting when new projections start from the most recent vintage. This may lead to an excessive degree of inertia, especially at turning points, which models typically have a hard time anticipating given the lack of tools to identify changes in the trajectory of key economic variables in real time.
The use of judgement can partly compensate for such shortcomings. However, the line between technical and policy judgement is often blurred. And in a large monetary policy committee, such as the Eurosystem, where the projection process has deliberately been delegated to staff, policy judgement should ideally be the outcome of deliberations rather than an input to the baseline scenario.

Supply-side shocks make inflation forecasting more difficult​

Second, inflation forecast targeting typically relies on the assumption that supply side shocks are transitory, meaning changes in economic activity result predominately from changes in aggregate demand along a balanced steady-state growth path.
As monetary policy works mainly on the demand side, it can be optimally adjusted to offset the impact of expected changes in activity on prices and wages, taking into account the lags in policy transmission. This is the “divine coincidence” at work.
However, these might not be the kind of conditions facing central banks in the foreseeable future.[15]
Last year, in her speech at the Jackson Hole symposium, ECB President Christine Lagarde laid out the significant potential for pervasive and persistent shocks to affect the supply side and hence wages, inflation and interest rates.[16] Examples are climate change, the rapid ageing of our population and the rise of generative artificial intelligence.
In addition, the nature of globalisation is changing fundamentally. Not only are firms reconsidering the robustness of their value chains in the light of significant geopolitical uncertainties, they are also facing fiercer global competition in many areas.
China, in particular, is transitioning away from being the world’s manufacturing base towards becoming a major player in high-tech industries, such as electric vehicles. Over the past few years, Chinese firms have rapidly gained global market shares (Slide 8, left-hand side).
These developments are unfolding alongside the persistent effects of the recent shocks to our economies. It is becoming increasingly clear that the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine are having long-lasting, if not permanent, effects on the euro area economy.
For example, despite the significant drop in energy prices, the output of energy-intensive industries, such as chemicals and basic metals, has dropped considerably more than that of other sectors over the past two years (Slide 8, right-hand side).
The pandemic, meanwhile, has exacerbated the secular decline in hours worked per person employed. Today, people are working on average 2% fewer hours compared with the five-year average before the pandemic, contributing to labour shortages (Slide 9, left-hand side).
At the same time, we are seeing a strong rebound in the labour force, owing largely to the contribution from foreign workers (Slide 9, right-hand side).[17] However, over time this increase in the labour force may be countered, and possibly more than offset, by the projected decline in the domestic working-age population.
Overall, these supply-side shocks are difficult to anticipate and can have very different effects on wages and inflation than shocks triggered by changes in aggregate demand, making inflation forecast targeting considerably more challenging.

State-dependent monetary policy transmission complicates policy calibration​

Finally, inflation forecast targeting relies on a stable and effective transmission of monetary policy, so that changes in the monetary policy stance have the desired and predicted effects on projected inflation.
The experience over the past ten years, however, has challenged our understanding of the way changes in short- and long-term interest rates affect output and inflation.
Before the pandemic, record low, and even negative, interest rates failed to provide sufficient stimulus to lift the economy out of a low-growth, low-inflation environment.
Evidence is pointing increasingly towards monetary policy transmission to activity and prices being highly non-linear, with diminishing returns when financing conditions are very loose.[18]
Today, researchers are trying to reconcile the surprising resilience shown by parts of the economy with the sharpest tightening cycle in decades.
This resilience is most evident in the United States where growth remains surprisingly buoyant. But questions about the strength and lags of policy transmission have emerged across a broad range of economies.
Evidence from the euro area, for example, is increasingly consistent with the view that monetary policy transmission is highly state-dependent.
During the current tightening cycle, large cash positions held by firms, a rotation of spending from goods to services, a high share of fixed-rate mortgages, comparatively healthy borrower balance sheets and resilient employment amid persistently tight labour markets may all have dampened policy transmission.
Even though a considerable amount of effort is made to understand all these channels, anticipating them in real time is inherently difficult. They typically only become visible once transmission is at a more advanced stage, making policy calibration based narrowly on projections a difficult exercise. This is even more the case if structural shocks also affect the natural rate of interest, creating uncertainty about the degree of restrictiveness of current monetary policy.[19]

Dot plots and alternative scenarios could offer solutions​

The question, then, is how policy frameworks can be adjusted to deal with these challenges for calibrating policy and communicating decisions to the public.
Last week, Ben Bernanke presented possible solutions in his review of the Bank of England’s forecasting framework.[20] Some of the points he raised could also be of relevance to the ECB.
One area of reflection relates to whether policymakers’ views on their expected future path of short-term interest rates should be made more transparent, akin to the “dot plot” used by the Federal Reserve System.[21]
The distribution of these paths could help signal the risks members of the committee attach to the baseline scenario built by staff. The narrower the distribution, the stronger the implied endorsement by policymakers, and vice versa.[22]
A dot plot can therefore help convey the uncertainty about the future path of the economy and simultaneously provide greater clarity about where policymakers see interest rates moving in the future, potentially working against excessive market volatility.
A downside to the publication of interest rate paths is that they may overly condition market pricing, thereby de facto reducing its informational content. Recent research shows that the dot plots may have lowered US real long-term bond yields by around 130 basis points over the last decade.[23]
A second, and complementary, option is to systematically include alternative scenarios to communicate the uncertainty around central bank projections more directly. By looking at different and potentially equally realistic paths for growth and inflation, there may no longer be a central scenario.
The ECB conducts scenario analyses frequently. The most recent projection report looked at how an escalation of disruptions in the Red Sea could affect output and inflation in the euro area.[24]
Our technical assumptions are also subject to regular sensitivity analysis. At present, for example, the option-implied gas price distribution indicates pronounced upside risks to the March 2024 baseline scenario.
These alternative scenarios and sensitivity analyses, however, are currently not receiving the weight and attention they deserve among central bank watchers, with most focusing narrowly on the point forecast of inflation two to three years ahead.
One reason for this might be that the scenarios we consider are, in most cases, partial rather than general equilibrium, or restricted to tail events, meaning that they do not seriously challenge the main narrative underlying the baseline scenario.
To signal more clearly the significant uncertainty surrounding the baseline, realistic alternative scenarios – possibly presenting the range of views within the committee – could test some of the main assumptions feeding the baseline.
The challenges currently facing the euro area demonstrate how this could be done.
In one scenario, monetary policy is expected to succeed in creating conditions such that firms will absorb large parts of current high unit labour cost growth in their profit margins alongside a recovery in labour productivity growth. In this case, underlying price pressures would gradually abate, and inflation would return to, or even undershoot, the target over the projection horizon.
This is broadly the narrative underlying the current ECB and Eurosystem staff projections. Such a scenario could be augmented with additional sensitivity analysis, examining, for instance, by how much inflation could undershoot the target if the effects of monetary policy were stronger than usually.
In an alternative scenario, productivity growth would remain depressed over the projection horizon and demand for less interest-rate sensitive services could remain sufficiently strong to allow firms to pass a larger share of the increase in labour costs on to consumers. This scenario would take into account that the capacity of firms in the services sector to absorb rising input costs is more limited than in other sectors, such as industry or agriculture, where profits have been rising much more forcefully over the past years and where falling input prices have created space to absorb other cost increases. Overall, in this scenario, underlying price pressures could be stickier and the return of inflation to the 2% target delayed.
The regular and consistent use of such scenarios could better convey the uncertainty facing central banks and contribute to making policy decisions more robust by considering a range of plausible outcomes.

Conclusion​

All this suggests, and with this I would like to conclude, that returning to the pre-pandemic policy framework, which relied heavily on central banks adjusting and communicating policy around a central inflation forecast, may come with risks. This framework may thus require a deeper re-think, even if inflation is getting closer to levels consistent with price stability.
As part of this re-think, central banks will need to carefully evaluate the role the central forecast should play in an environment characterised by higher macroeconomic volatility and persistent supply-side shocks, and how projections could be made more robust in order to place policymaking on a firmer footing, while allowing for clear and transparent communication about the inherent uncertainty.
Thank you.
Annexes
17 April 2024
The future of inflation (forecast) targeting
ENGLISH
  1. To date, 35 of the 36 OECD members have adopted some form of inflation targeting. See Rose, A. (2020), “iPhones, iCrises and iTargets: inflation targeting is eradicating international financial crises in the iPhone era”, CEPR Policy Insight No 100.
  2. See, for example, Bernanke, B. and Mishkin, F. (1997), “Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No 2, pp. 97-116.
  3. Svensson, L. (1997), “Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets”, European Economic Review, Vol. 41(6), pp. 1111-1146.
  4. Svensson, L. and Woodford, M. (2005), “Implementing optimal policy through inflation-forecast targeting”, in Bernanke, B.S. and Woodford, M. (eds.), The Inflation-Targeting Debate, University of Chicago Press, pp. 19-83; Rudebusch, G.D. and Williams, J. (2008), “Revealing the secrets of the temple: the value of publishing central bank interest rate projections”, in Campbel J.Y. (ed.), Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, pp. 247-289; and Eusepi, S. and Preston, B. (2010), “Central bank communication and expectations stabilization”, American Economic Journal, Vol. 2, pp. 235-271.
  5. Some central banks, including the Bank of England, also publish inflation projections based on the assumption of constant interest rates.
  6. The projections are published four times a year: March and September projections are produced by ECB staff, while June and December projections are produced jointly by Eurosystem and ECB staff.
  7. In the academic literature, this distinction is known as the “good policy” versus “good luck” hypothesis. See Bernanke, B. (2004), “The Great Moderation”, remarks at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, DC, 20 February; Perez-Quiros, G. and McConnell, M. (2000), “Output Fluctuations in the United States: What Has Changed since the Early 1980's?”, American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No 5, American Economic Association, pp. 1464-1476; Stock, J. and Watson, M. (2002), “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 17.
  8. The advance of inflation targeting is believed to be a prime reason why the global financial crisis of 2008 merely interrupted the Great Moderation. Afterwards, macroeconomic volatility quickly dropped back to its previous low levels. See, for example, Waller, C. and Crews, J. (2016), “Was the Great Moderation Simply on Vacation?”, The Economy Blog, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; and Clark, T. (2009), “Is the Great Moderation over? An Empirical Analysis”, Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Vol. 94, Issue Q IV, pp. 5-42.
  9. Lambrias, K. and Page, A. (2019), “The performance of the Eurosystem/ECB staff macroeconomic projections since the financial crisis”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 8, ECB.
  10. Chahad et al. (2022), “What explains recent errors in the inflation projections of Eurosystem and ECB staff?”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 3, ECB; Chahad et al. (2023), “An updated assessment of short-term inflation projections by Eurosystem and ECB staff”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 1, ECB; and Chahad et al. (2024), “An update on the accuracy of recent Eurosystem/ECB staff projections for short-term inflation”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 2, ECB.
  11. Lagarde, C. (2024), “Building confidence in the path ahead”, speech at The ECB and its Watchers XXIV Conference, organised by the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 20 March.
  12. In October of last year, for example, markets priced in a high-for-longer environment before pivoting sharply to expecting significant policy easing, taking comfort from the sharp decline in observed inflation. The subsequent slowdown in the pace of disinflation contributed to a partial reversal of these moves, even though central bank forecasts were increasingly signalling that inflation was expected to fall towards the target over the medium term and to remain near that level thereafter.
  13. See, for example, Ciccarelli et al. (2024), “ECB macroeconometric models for forecasting and policy analysis”, Occasional Paper Series, ECB, No 344.
  14. The past few years have demonstrated that firms are unlikely to change their prices at regular intervals over time, as our models typically assume. Rather, firms tend to adjust their prices more frequently when faced with large cost-push shocks, while being slower to pass cost savings on to consumers, affecting monetary policy transmission.
  15. For earlier considerations on this, see Faust, J. and Leeper, E. (2015), “The Myth of Normal: The Bumpy Story of Inflation and Monetary Policy”, paper presented at the annual Economic Policy Symposium "Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy" organised by Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole.
  16. Lagarde, C. (2023), “Policymaking in an age of shifts and breaks”, speech at the annual Economic Policy Symposium "Structural Shifts in the Global Economy" organised by Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, 25 August.
  17. Consolo et al. (2023), “The euro area labour force: recent developments and drivers”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 6, ECB.
  18. Schnabel, I. (2020), “COVID-19 and monetary policy: Reinforcing prevailing challenges”, speech at The Bank of Finland Monetary Policy webinar: New Challenges to Monetary Policy Strategies, Frankfurt am Main, 24 November.
  19. Schnabel, I. (2024), “R(ising) star?”, speech at The ECB and its Watchers XXIV Conference session on: Geopolitics and Structural Change: Implications for Real Activity, Inflation and Monetary Policy, Frankfurt am Main, 20 March.
  20. Bernanke, B. (2024), “Forecasting for monetary policy making and communication at the Bank of England: a review”, Bank of England, 12 April.
  21. For the Bank of England, Ben Bernanke recommends leaving decisions on this issue to future deliberations.
  22. As individual policy paths are based on a member’s own forecast of the economy, the dot plot is a summary indicator of the dispersion of views about the economy.
  23. Hillenbrand, S. (2023), “The Fed and the Secular Decline in Interest Rates” Working Paper, Harvard Business School, March.
  24. European Central Bank (2024), ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, March.
 
slide dell'intervento sopra

spiega le difficoltà di questi anni avute da parte delle banche centrali nel calibrare le risposte e la comunicazione, a partire dall'"infamous transitory"
 
Sempre a proposito di tassi:
Screenshot_107.png

Nell'epoca del paper money i tassi si tagliano, in modo consistente, in caso di recessione telefonata o durante una stessa.
Se quanto scritto su questa ricerca corrisponde al vero (Prometheus research, una delle tante tra le varie società/blog/individui che ne pubblicano)....
  • The trend in housing data remains consistent with a cyclically stable economy, with building permits, starts, and completions maintaining their levels.
  • Without a downshift in housing, housing employment or nominal investment is unlikely to enter a self-reinforcing downturn. The latest trends continue to signal the opposite, i.e., improving residential investment.
  • Relative to these expectations, equity markets have moved to price in improving earnings expectations in a manner that now exceeds the fundamental macro impulse.
  • Our Alpha Strategies find equities modestly ahead of the ongoing fundamental impulse and are modestly short. Our asset allocation strategies continue to view risk-controlled exposure to equities as appropriate.
This short exposure from our Alpha Strategies does not reflect a bet on recessionary conditions but on modest macro mispricing. These signals are modest in magnitude and have the potential to be resolved quickly. Thus, while our strategies are modestly short equities at this junction, cyclical dynamics remain largely inconsistent with a recession. As such, our asset allocation strategies continue to view the economic backdrop as one suitable for beta-capture for equities. Most recent housing data are consistent with these signals.

Inoltre:
Screenshot_108.png


Screenshot_109.png
 
Ultima modifica:
Sempre a proposito di tassi:
Vedi l'allegato 3007347
Nell'epoca del paper money i tassi si tagliano, in modo consistente, in caso di recessione telefonata o durante una stessa.
Se quanto scritto su questa ricerca corrisponde al vero (Prometheus research, una delle tante tra le varie società/blog/individui che ne pubblicano)....
  • The trend in housing data remains consistent with a cyclically stable economy, with building permits, starts, and completions maintaining their levels.
  • Without a downshift in housing, housing employment or nominal investment is unlikely to enter a self-reinforcing downturn. The latest trends continue to signal the opposite, i.e., improving residential investment.
  • Relative to these expectations, equity markets have moved to price in improving earnings expectations in a manner that now exceeds the fundamental macro impulse.
  • Our Alpha Strategies find equities modestly ahead of the ongoing fundamental impulse and are modestly short. Our asset allocation strategies continue to view risk-controlled exposure to equities as appropriate.
This short exposure from our Alpha Strategies does not reflect a bet on recessionary conditions but on modest macro mispricing. These signals are modest in magnitude and have the potential to be resolved quickly. Thus, while our strategies are modestly short equities at this junction, cyclical dynamics remain largely inconsistent with a recession. As such, our asset allocation strategies continue to view the economic backdrop as one suitable for beta-capture for equities. Most recent housing data are consistent with these signals.

Inoltre:
Vedi l'allegato 3007350


Aggiungo una mia personale riflessione: molto di quanto scritto sopra è legato ad una specifica fase dell'economia USA in cui l'immobiliare e l'indotto erano al centro della crescita e delle attenzioni della FED e del Tesoro USA.

La relazione tra immobiliare, debito e tassi è molto chiara, definita, studiata e in qualche misura modellata.

E' innegabile che da qualche anno il settore immobiliare nel suo complesso sia quanto meno secondario, così come, per esempio, l'auto o l'industria pesante o le utilities. Secondario non tanto nel suo peso nell'occupazione o nella capacità di creare valore (o perdita di valore) in ambito locale, ma secondario nella sua potenziale partecipazione alla crescita del GDP e nel rischio di creare shock di mercato. Minore è anche la necessità di attenzione da parte dei regolatori e della politica dei tassi.

Per contro la crescita dei giganti del "tech-quasi value" dove magari non ci sono p/e bassi ma assoluta stabilità finanziaria e patrimoniale e stabili prospettive di crescita e, soprattutto, cosa quasi mai verificata prima se non al tempo della Standard Oil, scarsissima dipendenza diretta dai tassi di interesse, viene a mancare la necessità di interventi decisi sui tassi di interesse.

Quindi, per farla breve, alcune valutazioni generali di andamento futuro dell'economia basate sui tassi possono avere meno incisività avendo un effetto indiretto (minor potere d'acquisto dei consumatori) piuttosto che diretto come impatto dei costi finanziari sul bilancio aziendale.
 
Per contro la crescita dei giganti del "tech-quasi value" dove magari non ci sono p/e bassi ma assoluta stabilità finanziaria e patrimoniale e stabili prospettive di crescita e, soprattutto, cosa quasi mai verificata prima se non al tempo della Standard Oil, scarsissima dipendenza diretta dai tassi di interesse, viene a mancare la necessità di interventi decisi sui tassi di interesse.
È un dato di fatto che i colossi tecnologici del "tech-quasi value", noti per il loro smisurato valore di borsa, possiedano risorse finanziarie considerevoli. Questo li rende indipendenti dai tassi di interesse, permettendo loro di crescere senza essere influenzati dalle fluttuazioni economiche tradizionali.

Negli Stati Uniti, così come in Europa, si sta osservando una tendenza inedita: i tassi di interesse elevati non sembrano più rappresentare un ostacolo per l’economia.

I consumatori, infatti, beneficiano di rendimenti finanziari molto elevati, come dimostra il caso del BTP Valore, che offre un rendimento tre o quattro volte superiore alla crescita prevista del PIL e nessuno ha il coraggio di affermare questo scandalo che compromette la crescita futura.

Di conseguenza, le persone tendono a integrare i propri redditi con questi rendimenti finanziari e di capitale, e in Italia anche con quelli derivanti dal settore immobiliare (affitti da Airbnb soprattutto si legge in questo forum).

Questo fenomeno contribuisce a generare inflazione, neutralizzando così gli sforzi delle banche centrali volti a controllarla. Mi sembra impossibile venirne a capo.
 
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I consumatori, infatti, beneficiano di rendimenti finanziari molto elevati, come dimostra il caso del BTP Valore, che offre un rendimento tre o quattro volte superiore alla crescita prevista del PIL e nessuno ha il coraggio di affermare questo scandalo che compromette la crescita futura.
..
P.A.T. mi sbaglierò qui mi sembra che la semplificazione sia un pelo eccessiva..che poi contribuisca addirittura a generare inflazione.. :eek:
 
P.A.T. mi sbaglierò qui mi sembra che la semplificazione sia un pelo eccessiva..che poi contribuisca addirittura a generare inflazione.. :eek:
Ah, i pensionati italiani ... :) Sono reduci da anni di repressione finanziaria, schiacciati sotto il peso di rendimenti finanziari risibili dal Covid.

Ma ecco che ora, come per magia, si trovano a poter godere di un interesse nominale del 3-4%. E cosa fanno con questi soldi che piovono loro addosso da uno stato con le casse in disgrazia? Beh, non solo si concedono costosissime visite mediche private (un mio zio ha pagato 400 Euro per una visita oculistica, perche' tutti i pensionati benestanti vogliono il meglio per le loro patologie), ma si lanciano in cene fameliche in trattoria, gite fuori porta e, per quei fortunati con in mano quel gioiello del BTP Valore, :angel:persino crociere sponsorizzate dal dottor Jacovoni, il nuovo beniamino dei pensionati italiani che ha preso il posto della celeberrima Maria Cannata.

Dove butto l'occhio la domenica, vedo solo pensionati, pensionati e ancora pensionati. E sono ovunque: nei ristoranti, nei parchi, in fila per i gelati, tutti intenti a vivere la bella vita. E chi paga il conto? :rock:I giovani, naturalmente, a cui hanno sottratto ogni speranza di un futuro roseo. Lo conferma anche l'Istat: la fascia di famiglie over 56 detiene oltre il 50% della ricchezza nazionale, mentre le famiglie sotto i 35 anni arrancano con un misero 3%.

Tenere i tassi elevati non ha più il magico effetto di un tempo. Con questa folla di pensionati che si gode la vita grazie alla munificenza della signora Lagarde e alle pensioni indicizzate della signora Meloni, i giovani restano al palo. E intanto, nei settori marginali come commercio, distribuzione e servizi, i contratti dei giovani non vengono nemmeno rinnovati. Ma i nostri pensionati? Loro continuano a sbafare, imperterriti, in un mondo dove solo loro sembrano aver trovato l'elisir della felicità finanziaria.
 
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Ah, i pensionati italiani ... :) Sono reduci da anni di repressione finanziaria, schiacciati sotto il peso di rendimenti finanziari risibili dal Covid.
..
La situazione citata non è certo solo nostrana, anzi.. in tutta europa si registrano denatalità ed innalzamento dell'età media degli investitori privati, ovvero dei detentori di risparmio (non di ricchezza economica, quella è nella quasi metà del campione che hai lasciato fuori..). Non credo tu sia un pivello e non so se - come me - sei rimasto trombato fuori dalla "cuccagna pensionistica" oppure parli da pensionato "pentito", ma ancora una volta non vedo cosa tappo c'entrino le signore da te citate. :rolleyes:

Uno dei miei figli vive da anni a Lisbona con famiglia e nipotini e nonostante una prestigiosa e ben remunerata attività imprenditoriale non riesce ad acquistare casa perchè i fondi (e non i pensionati esteri esentasse o i freelance..) hanno fatto esplodere e il mercato immobiliare che viaggia a valori innaturali impedendo sia agli indigeni che hai giovani di accedere ad un bene primario.
Gli affitti spinti dalla speculazione citata sono stratosferici per i pochi alloggi disponibili per contratti lunghi (2.000 euro/mese per 2 camere..) e questa inflazione VERA non viene certo dagli attori citati ma dai capitali senza frontiere interessati al business degli affitti brevi.

Qui si che la patrimoniale immobiliare è d'obbligo a mio avviso, altro che ICI, servono strumenti punitivi per la speculazione cattiva, altro che pensionati..

p.s. dopo oltre 50 anni di lavoro sono ancora attivo e verso alla gestione separata (unica possibilità "concessa" - bontà loro - agli amministratori di srl , dal governo Prodi nel 1996.. e prima buco previdenziale totale); se dovessi contare sulla pensione totalmente contributiva starei fresco.. quindi sentirmi dire che le mie cedole - che stentano a preservare il potere d'acquisto di una vita di risparmi - generano inflazione mi lascia perplesso..:)
 
Ah, i pensionati italiani ... :) Sono reduci da anni di repressione finanziaria, schiacciati sotto il peso di rendimenti finanziari risibili dal Covid.

Ma ecco che ora, come per magia, si trovano a poter godere di un interesse nominale del 3-4%. E cosa fanno con questi soldi che piovono loro addosso da uno stato con le casse in disgrazia? Beh, non solo si concedono costosissime visite mediche private (un mio zio ha pagato 400 Euro per una visita oculistica, perche' tutti i pensionati benestanti vogliono il meglio per le loro patologie), ma si lanciano in cene fameliche in trattoria, gite fuori porta e, per quei fortunati con in mano quel gioiello del BTP Valore, :angel:persino crociere sponsorizzate dal dottor Jacovoni, il nuovo beniamino dei pensionati italiani che ha preso il posto della celeberrima Maria Cannata.

Dove butto l'occhio la domenica, vedo solo pensionati, pensionati e ancora pensionati. E sono ovunque: nei ristoranti, nei parchi, in fila per i gelati, tutti intenti a vivere la bella vita. E chi paga il conto? :rock:I giovani, naturalmente, a cui hanno sottratto ogni speranza di un futuro roseo. Lo conferma anche l'Istat: la fascia di famiglie over 56 detiene oltre il 50% della ricchezza nazionale, mentre le famiglie sotto i 35 anni arrancano con un misero 3%.

Tenere i tassi elevati non ha più il magico effetto di un tempo. Con questa folla di pensionati che si gode la vita grazie alla munificenza della signora Lagarde e alle pensioni indicizzate della signora Meloni, i giovani restano al palo. E intanto, nei settori marginali come commercio, distribuzione e servizi, i contratti dei giovani non vengono nemmeno rinnovati. Ma i nostri pensionati? Loro continuano a sbafare, imperterriti, in un mondo dove solo loro sembrano aver trovato l'elisir della felicità finanziaria.

dalle mie parti vedo tanti pensionati e buona parte dei figli di imprenditori girare come non ci fosse un domani ( anche se dichiarano come un dipendente medio ).
Detto questo quel che mi fa girare le @@ è la continua burocrazia che creano dal nulla per creare problemi al cittadino normale che deve affidarsi a questo o quell'ente per gestire il tutto.
Poi ad oggi stan ancora sperperando soldi con questo o quel contributo e se non ci sono si creano come quanto fatto ieri...

Approvato dall’UE regime di aiuti italiano per produrre elettricità rinnovabile - Confindustria Ancona

ma dico se un investimento per il privato o per la ditta fosse redditizio non serve alcun aiuto perchè costui faccia la spesa a fronte di x guadagni negli anni.
Gli incentivi, le detrazioni andrebbero abolite tutte con aumento buste paga/riduzione cuneo fiscale e tasse aziendali.
Uno ha i soldi e vuole fare la spesa bene la fa, altrimenti se li spende come meglio crede.
 
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Approvato dall’UE regime di aiuti italiano per produrre elettricità rinnovabile - Confindustria Ancona

ma dico se un investimento per il privato o per la ditta fosse redditizio non serve alcun aiuto perchè costui faccia la spesa a fronte di x guadagni negli anni.
Gli incentivi, le detrazioni andrebbero abolite tutte con aumento buste paga/riduzione cuneo fiscale e tasse aziendali.
Uno ha i soldi e vuole fare la spesa bene la fa, altrimenti se li spende come meglio crede.
ahhh l'europa :nono:

in teoria è bello.. La Germania guiderà nel 2024 il boom del fotovoltaico europeo

in pratica, prima di costruire si fanno simulazioni o no ?

La Germania è alla saturazione solare. Troppi pannelli, prezzi in negativo ed è un problema

LSD ovvero Lassismo,Debito e Sussidi e l'europa delle ideologie incapace di indispensabile pragmatismo (e prima ancora di senso pratico..)
 
Non credo tu sia un pivello e non so se - come me - sei rimasto trombato fuori dalla "cuccagna pensionistica" oppure parli da pensionato "pentito", ma ancora una volta non vedo cosa tappo c'entrino le signore da te citate. :rolleyes:
Non sono ancora pensionato, anzi non ho alcuna intenzione di diventarlo e lascero' la mia pensione al raggiungimento dell'eta' pensionistica a chi ne avra' piu' bisogno di me. Chi pensa alla pensione, come diceva l'ing. Vacca, e' un uomo morto.

Non a caso le statistiche indicano nei primi 6 mesi della pensione il periodo piu' pericoloso della propria esistenza.

Non sono nemmeno lavoratore, perche' secondo molti la Costituzione andrebbe riscritta, in particolare nel punto in cui si sostiene che la nostra e' una Repubblica fondata sul lavoro. L'economista Geminello Alvi ha sostenuto che quel punto del 1948 andrebbe radicamente cambiato, integrando l'articolo che cita il lavoro con ...
"L’Italia è una repubblica democratica fondata sulla rendita immobiliare e finanziaria e sulle pensioni e, per chi non puo' accedervi, anche sul lavoro"

Tutti i governi dell'Italia repubblicana a partire da Craxi hanno disatteso il principio equo, solidale e democratico di adeguare le paghe all'inflazione, mentre ad essere adeguate all'inflazione sono state le sole pensioni. Infatti i pensionati votano tutti in massa alle elezioni politiche, mentre i giovani raramente lo fanno. Il risultato di un mancato rispetto dell'importanza sociale del lavoro e' che le paghe italiane sono rimaste negli anni al livello piu' basso europeo.

Questo comportamento dei governi si e' dimostrato essere un ignobile tradimento dell'articolo 1 della Costituzione, perpetrato a favore dei rentier e dei pensionati.

P.S. Io comunque vivo di bot
P. 2 I bot non sono la cosa a cui pensano i pensionati quando attivano l'euristica di disponibilita' e rappresentativita' sollecitata con le crociere promesse dal dottor Jacovoni, che ha preso il posto della celebre Maria Cannata che e' stata a lungo la beniamina dei pensionati italiani.
 
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Non sono ancora pensionato, anzi non ho alcuna intenzione di diventarlo e lascero' la mia pensione al raggiungimento dell'eta' pensionistica a chi ne avra' piu' bisogno di me. Chi pensa alla pensione, come diceva l'ing. Vacca, e' un uomo morto.

Non a caso le statistiche indicano nei primi 6 mesi della pensione il periodo piu' pericoloso della propria esistenza.
..
Onore al merito, se hai risorse per permettertelo è una scelta profondamente altruista
Certo sul "potere di acquisto" si ciancia molto ed in tutte le salse; e non di meno sul diritto al lavoro, sacrosanto da enunciare ma apparentemente fastidioso da applicare se "dequalifica" l'interessato.
Da imprenditore ho visto e vivo un decollo verticale dei salari (piccola industria privata, ramo automazione industriale) ed una drammatica mancanza di personale con un minimo di qualifica e capacità a cui far riferimento per un percorso di crescita aziendale.
Non si trovano collaboratori e le agenzie speculano sui pochi profili disponibili esacerbando RAL ed approcci..
So di essere fortunato, opero al nord e non in terra amara, ma ho chiaro ricordo di tanti miei parenti partiti per Francia, Germania ed Americhe in cerca di lavoro; il mio secondogenito, figlio dell'europa, dopo un semestre al MIT si è laureato a Oslo e da oltre dodici anni vive all'estero con famiglia.
Non conosco l'esimio Ing. Vacca ma a mio parere chi non pensa - per tempo - alla pensione non è un uomo morto ma un futuro parassita o ancora un rentier come un altro.. ma questa è solo la mia opinione.
A proposito di giovani, pensioni e di una fra le tante promesse europee mancate, segnalo che sono a tutt'oggi latitanti i fondi previdenziali europei PEPP che normati nel 2022 rimangono un miraggio per i tanti nostri ricercatori impiegati all'estero e senza possibilità di crearsi una carriera contributiva.

Punti di vista, sistemi di credo e fonti a parte, la confusione regna sovrana:

Per gli stipendi si parla di un -4,5% in 10 anni (se guardo la mia azienda vedo un segno positivo ben più grande..)
In 10 anni crolla del 4,5% il potere di acquisto dei salari - Ultima ora - Ansa.it

Per le pensioni, fra grida e lamenti vattelapesca.. (non è telemeloni, l'articolo è - volutamente - datato)
Crolla il potere di acquisto dei pensionati

Nulla di nuovo sotto il sole, tra chi vive di rendita, chi aspetta il babbonatale di cittadinanza (ma non ho mai capito perchè lo danno anche a chi la cittadinanza italiana non ha.. è uno ius soli monetario?) e chi - e non è la minoranza degli abili - lavora onestamente per mantenere se stesso e famiglia
 
Per gli stipendi si parla di un -4,5% in 10 anni (se guardo la mia azienda vedo un segno positivo ben più grande..)
In 10 anni crolla del 4,5% il potere di acquisto dei salari - Ultima ora - Ansa.it
Desidero contestare questa statistica: il potere d’acquisto è diminuito in misura molto maggiore rispetto al -4,5% illustrato dai dati aggregati Istat. Nel calcolo aggregato sono inclusi sia i settori protetti (come i contratti dei dipendenti bancari che ottengono tipicamente aumenti ben superiori all’inflazione) sia i settori veramente produttivi del Nord Italia, a cui fai riferimento nel tuo caso personale e che sono anch'essi ben superiori all'inflazione. Ma nella media nazionale questi casi sono sicuramente minoritari.

Se considerassimo la perdita del potere d’acquisto degli stipendi su uno stipendio mediano, anziché sugli stipendi medi, vedremmo che la diminuzione nel decennio sarebbe ben superiore al -4,5%. Purtroppo, l’ISTAT, per il suo dovere informativo verso il popolo italiano, sembra sempre più influenzato da figure politiche. Ricordo il caso Blangiardo con le sue periodiche esternazioni accese, sebbene non abbia ancora approfondito la figura di questo nuovo presidente Chelli anch'esso di nomina politica.

Insomma, l'istat non e' piu' quello dei tempi di Corrado Gini e di De Finetti, cioe' l'Istat non e' piu' quell'istituto di cui il mondo intero ci invidiava la preparazione statistica e le metodologie inoppugnabili. Mentre un tempo godeva di una reputazione invidiabile per la sua preparazione statistica e le metodologie robuste, ora sembra aver assunto un ruolo diverso. Le sue elaborazioni, sebbene basate su dati impeccabili, richiedono un’attenta valutazione per comprendere gli eventuali obiettivi che l’istituto si prefigge di volta in volta attraverso la comunicazione. Questo atteggiamento può riguardare la preservazione della stabilità sociale, economica e finanziaria del paese.
 
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Ricordiamoci il prof. Tremonti, che una volta disse: " con la cultura non si mangia".
Ma ricordiamoci anche le parole di Mario Seminario, che una volta disse: " L'Italia si avvia a diventare un paese di camerieri"
 
Desidero contestare questa statistica: il potere d’acquisto è diminuito in misura molto maggiore rispetto al -4,5% illustrato dai dati aggregati Istat.
..
Fra l'opinione di un pur illustre forumer ed il rapporto ISTAT - con tutto il rispetto - non ho molti dubbi su quale considerare "veritiero" (concedo le parentesi, i dubbi sull'asservimento al potere contemporaneo dell'istituto non li condivido e nel caso "interpretazioni brillanti" non sono certo cosa di oggi visto che il primo ad abusarne fu Dalema molti anni fa sui dati degli occupati; da li in poi piegare un dato a proprio favore è sport nazionale ma la media è media e - ipse dixit - in media veritas)
Da cameriere di lungo corso , qual mi assimilo, rivendico a pieno titolo il diritto ad un lavoro onesto e mi inca%%o non poco pensando ai troppi che ancor oggi dai tavoli serviti si alzano e se ne vanno senza pagare.. per giunta vantandone diritto.. :rolleyes:

p.s. contesto Tremonti, con la cultura si mangia eccome, basti vedere il flusso turistico in crescita esponenziale; la nostra storia ci ha donato giacimenti culturali di incommensurabile valore, a noi il valorizzarli, preservarli e trasmetterli ai nostri posteri. In francia in ogni posto dove ha orinato Napoleone (o forse il suo cavallo..) ci hanno piantato un museo e creato posti di lavoro.. non sarebbe ora di far crescere il nostro popolo di tombaroli facendoli partecipare alla custodia e - perchè no - allo sfruttamento dei queste immense risorse?
 
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Indietro