Settore oil e materie prime in generale

  • Ecco la 68° Edizione del settimanale "Le opportunità di Borsa" dedicato ai consulenti finanziari ed esperti di borsa.

    La settimana è stata all’insegna degli acquisti per i principali listini internazionali. Gli indici americani S&P 500, Nasdaq e Dow Jones hanno aggiornato i massimi storici dopo i dati americani sui prezzi al consumo di mercoledì, che hanno evidenziato una discesa in linea con le aspettative, con l’inflazione headline al 3,4% e l’indice al 3,6% annuo, allentando i timori per un’inflazione persistente. Anche le vendite al dettaglio Usa sono rimaste invariate su base mensile, suggerendo un raffreddamento dei consumi che hanno fin qui sostenuto i prezzi. Questi dati, dunque, rafforzano complessivamente le possibilità di un taglio dei tassi a settembre da parte della Fed (le scommesse del mercato sono ora per due tagli nel 2024). Per continuare a leggere visita il link

  • Due nuove obbligazioni Societe Generale, in Euro e in Dollaro USA

    Societe Generale porta sul segmento Bond-X (EuroTLX) di Borsa Italiana due obbligazioni, una in EUR e una in USD, a tasso fisso decrescente con durata massima di 15 anni e possibilità di rimborso anticipato annuale a discrezione dell’Emittente.

    Per continuare a leggere visita questo LINK

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How Big Oil Can Swing Big Dividends - WSJ

Someone forgot to tell Exxon Mobil and Chevron that aristocrats are supposed to live on the other side of the pond. Not only did the stock market doff its hat to both companies on Friday when they reported third-quarter results that handily beat expectations. It is signaling that it doesn’t mind those companies putting on airs—for now, at least.
Integrated oil and gas companies the world over are tightening belts by slashing staff and spending and even contemplating selling the family silver as oil prices remain low. But the two big U.S. supermajors still can call themselves “dividend aristocrats” by surpassing the quarter century mark in raising their dividends annually. Though neither Royal Dutch Shell nor BP are in the S&P 500, disqualifying them from that distinction, their payout policies would have kept them from becoming peers anyway.
The fear is that the peasants may become restless on both sides of the Atlantic if big oil companies continue to distribute more cash than they earn while allowing opportunities to pass them by. All are committed to multiyear projects, but the cost of obtaining a barrel of oil or a cubic foot of gas reserves is cheaper than it has been in years through the checkbook than the drill bit. An index of oil and gas exploration companies maintained by S&P Dow Jones Indices is off by 56% since June 2014.
Doing deals and maintaining chunky dividends may be difficult for some, though. Moody’s said in September that integrated oil producers globally will have an $80 billion cash shortfall this year. Even so, Shell’s chief said recently he was “pulling out all the stops” to protect the payout and Chevron’s chief said Friday that the producer’s “first priority is to maintain the dividend.” In that respect, the U.S. majors would appear to be at a disadvantage since they actually are committed to raising and not just maintaining dividends. But appearances can be deceiving.
Their growing reliance on share buybacks in recent years means slashing those—Chevron stopped them entirely and Exxon has cut them by about 85%—can preserve cash and the favor of coupon-clippers. Between 1995 and 2000, a weak period for energy prices, Exxon and Chevron paid about 30% of operating cash flow as dividends. In the past 10 years both averaged under 20%. Assuming cost savings and a slight rebound in prices, both will pay out a third of operating cash flow as dividends in 2016.
Noblesse oblige is less of a burden than it seems.
 

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Why Exxon Is the Get-Rich-Slow Oil Play - WSJ

Investors buying beaten-down energy stocks have been repeatedly bitten by renewed, vicious plunges in oil. A safer and possibly more-rewarding approach is to put a tiger in their tank with Exxon Mobil.
Value seekers might balk at how little Exxon actually has been affected by the industry rout. While dozens of energy-related companies fetch under half or even a 10th of their peak 2014 values, often due to fears of financial distress, the integrated giant is off by less than a third. On Thursday, when a quickly discredited Russian news report of an emergency meeting of oil producers briefly sent crude surging, Exxon shares rallied by a little over 3%. An index of pure-play exploration and production companies jumped 7%.
So buying Exxon shares, even if an investor timed the bottom in oil prices perfectly, hardly would be a get-rich-quick move. But investors shouldn’t lose sight of the get-rich-slow nature of a company that seems to emerge from each industry washout a bit stronger.
Since 1970, through four booms and four busts in petroleum prices, $100 invested in Exxon has turned into $33,000, including dividends, nearly four times the gain of the S&P 500. Part of that success has been due to Exxon’s penchant for shoveling cash to shareholders rather than investing aggressively during booms. So far this century, it has paid out over $380 billion through buybacks and dividends, enough to buy rivals BP, Chevron and Total combined at today’s values and have $30 billion left over.
Those capital returns left less for investing in its business. True, in 2014 Exxon marked the 21st consecutive year in which it added more hydrocarbon reserves than it produced, averaging a replacement ratio of 123%. Much of that growth has come through the checkbook, though, not the drill bit. It has mostly done so when oil prices were near a trough such as its merger with Mobil announced in 1999 and the acquisition of XTO Energy in 2009.
With the industry in a rut again, it is only natural to speculate that Exxon will once again pull the trigger. Another reason is that its reserve base isn’t as attractive as it seems.
Of 25 billion barrels of oil equivalent at the end of 2014, less than nine billion is in liquids and nearly five billion is in high-cost bitumen and synthetic crude. And, highlighting that Exxon isn’t quite so prescient, the XTO deal added plenty of natural gas at a time when the fuel was cheap and continued to get cheaper.
Raising the odds of a cash deal is that Exxon’s preference for buybacks in recent years over dividends gives it some financial flexibility. At its recent pace, it has been paying out just $2 billion annually to repurchase its own shares, down from nearly $13 billion in 2013.
While its cash flows are much lower, too, Exxon has the ability to write larger checks than anyone in the industry. The main constraints are retaining its status as one of three U.S. companies with a triple-A credit rating and as a dividend aristocrat, a group that has managed to boost payouts annually for at least a quarter century. But those constraints also are attractions that have helped Exxon’s share price hold up better than any other large, integrated oil company globally. And that has preserved the value of its stock as an acquisition currency.
Targets discussed by analysts include EOG Resources, Anadarko Petroleum and Whiting Petroleum, down between 45% and 90% from peaks hit in 2014. This tiger may be preparing to pounce again. Investors can, too.
 
e XOM ha tagliato il buyback (su seeking alpha c'è la trascrizione della conference call):
Exxon Mobil: When Bad Oil News Isn

It wasn’t much of a surprise party for Exxon Mobil shareholders—a reminder that not everything is relative.
Following downbeat results from fellow supermajors BP and Chevron, the granddaddy of them all reported profits on Tuesday that beat analyst expectations for the fourth quarter and full year. Its stock promptly fell by more than 3% as the 10%-plus drop in oil prices so far this week trumped any sense of relief. Shareholders suffered the further ignominy of learning that Exxon, once the most valuable company on the planet, was overtaken by Facebook for fourth place overall on Monday.

The fact that Exxon, even in an awful 2015, earned more than twice as much as the social media company has in its entire history is small solace. It is the direction of those profits—down 58% in the fourth quarter from a year earlier—that has set the tone.
The first quarter should be even bleaker. Exxon indicated it is further battening down the hatches, eliminating already reduced net share buybacks. It paid out nearly $13 billion that way in 2013.
Management minces no words about what it can and can’t control and commodity prices clearly fall into the latter category. In the fourth quarter alone, it earned a whopping $4.6 billion less than a year earlier in its upstream business and similar plunges lie ahead. At these prices, even eliminating buybacks won’t allow it to meet its cash needs without borrowing or touching its sacrosanct dividend.

But no oil company can thrive, and some can’t survive, at $30-a-barrel crude. What is striking about Exxon is how well it can cope. That relative distinction may make an absolute difference for its shareholders when the environment improves for oil companies. Chevron is reeling from its worst quarterly loss in 13 years, BP from its worst annual loss ever, and Shell from a credit-rating downgrade. Exxon, one of three triple-A-rated U.S. companies in any industry (though it was placed on credit watch with negative implications Tuesday by Standard & Poor’s) doesn’t just have staying power. It also has buying power in what may turn into the sale of the century for hydrocarbon reserves.
The party hasn’t even started.
 
e XOM ha tagliato il buyback (su seeking alpha c'è la trascrizione della conference call):
Exxon Mobil: When Bad Oil News Isn

It wasn’t much of a surprise party for Exxon Mobil shareholders—a reminder that not everything is relative.
Following downbeat results from fellow supermajors BP and Chevron, the granddaddy of them all reported profits on Tuesday that beat analyst expectations for the fourth quarter and full year. Its stock promptly fell by more than 3% as the 10%-plus drop in oil prices so far this week trumped any sense of relief. Shareholders suffered the further ignominy of learning that Exxon, once the most valuable company on the planet, was overtaken by Facebook for fourth place overall on Monday.

The fact that Exxon, even in an awful 2015, earned more than twice as much as the social media company has in its entire history is small solace. It is the direction of those profits—down 58% in the fourth quarter from a year earlier—that has set the tone.
The first quarter should be even bleaker. Exxon indicated it is further battening down the hatches, eliminating already reduced net share buybacks. It paid out nearly $13 billion that way in 2013.
Management minces no words about what it can and can’t control and commodity prices clearly fall into the latter category. In the fourth quarter alone, it earned a whopping $4.6 billion less than a year earlier in its upstream business and similar plunges lie ahead. At these prices, even eliminating buybacks won’t allow it to meet its cash needs without borrowing or touching its sacrosanct dividend.

But no oil company can thrive, and some can’t survive, at $30-a-barrel crude. What is striking about Exxon is how well it can cope. That relative distinction may make an absolute difference for its shareholders when the environment improves for oil companies. Chevron is reeling from its worst quarterly loss in 13 years, BP from its worst annual loss ever, and Shell from a credit-rating downgrade. Exxon, one of three triple-A-rated U.S. companies in any industry (though it was placed on credit watch with negative implications Tuesday by Standard & Poor’s) doesn’t just have staying power. It also has buying power in what may turn into the sale of the century for hydrocarbon reserves.
The party hasn’t even started.

Ecco questa cosa non la capisco..ok ..ridurre al massimo le uscite visto il momento pessimo,prezzo del petrolio ecc.
Però è proprio quando il titolo è sui minimi che andrebbe fatto il buy back..
 
Ecco questa cosa non la capisco..ok ..ridurre al massimo le uscite visto il momento pessimo,prezzo del petrolio ecc.
Però è proprio quando il titolo è sui minimi che andrebbe fatto il buy back..

Tecnicamente si, però se devi scegliere fra investire le risorse liquide e mantenere in vita l'attività, credo che sia più che normale scegliere la seconda. Anche perchè i prezzi delle azioni basse non lo puoi sapere per quanto ci resteranno e se scenderanno ancora. Meglio a quel punto puntare per salvaguardare l'attività.
Io la vedo cosi
 
Conoco Phillips

ConocoPhillips, maggiore compagnia petrolifera indipendente americana, nel quarto trimestre ha visto salire notevolmente le perdite, complice il ribasso dei prezzi delle materie prime. La societa' ha dunque abbassato i dividendi da 74 a 25 centesimi per azione e ha tagliato le guidance sugli investimenti in conto capitale per l'anno in corso da 7,7 a 6,4 miliardi di dollari e quelle sui costi operativi da 7,7 a 7 miliardi. "Non sappiamo quanto dureranno la crisi e il calo delle materie prime, quindi riteniamo prudente fare programmi ipotizzando che dureranno a lungo", ha detto l'amministratore delegato Ryan Lance. Nei tre mesi ConocoPhillips, che non ha fornito indicazioni sul fatturato trimestrale e annuale, ha riportato perdite nette per 3,5 miliardi di dollari, -2,78 dollari per azione, contro il rosso da 39 milioni, -3 centesimi per azione, dello stesso periodo del 2014. Escudendo le voci straordinarie, le perdite sono state di 90 centesimi per azione, piu' dei 64 centesimi attesi dagli analisti. Nell'intero anno la societa' ha riportato perdite nette per 4,4 miliardi di dollari, -3,58 dollari per azione, contro l'utile per 6,9 miliardi, 5,51 dollari per azione, del 2014. Escludendo le voci straordinarie, le perdite 2015 sono state di 1,7 miliardi, contro il profitto di 6,6 miliardi dell'anno precedente.

Conoco Phillips - Oil Major (Failure) - ConocoPhillips (NYSE:COP) | Seeking Alpha
 
Ecco questa cosa non la capisco..ok ..ridurre al massimo le uscite visto il momento pessimo,prezzo del petrolio ecc.
Però è proprio quando il titolo è sui minimi che andrebbe fatto il buy back..

se però devi salvaguardare la liquidità di breve per a) sostenere la tua attività operativa (aka quella che ti fa portare a casa soldi) e b) mantenere il rating di emissione delle tue obbligazioni (altrimenti dovresti riconoscere uno spread più alto), che diavolo ti metti a fare buyback?
 
se però devi salvaguardare la liquidità di breve per a) sostenere la tua attività operativa (aka quella che ti fa portare a casa soldi) e b) mantenere il rating di emissione delle tue obbligazioni (altrimenti dovresti riconoscere uno spread più alto), che diavolo ti metti a fare buyback?

che domanda...:o

servono a "pagare" i bonus miliardari elargiti al management della società...la societa garantisce i bonus ai managers come stock options...quasi sempre "backdated"...finito l'anno in questione queste azioni "extra" (milioni) andranno a diluire il capitale degli azionisti...cosa si fa opportunamente?
s'inizia (o si continua) un piano di buyback ( a i massimi delle quotazioni)...quindi le azioni circolanti ritornano a livelli "accetabili", nel frattempo il management diventano dei "billionaires" e il resto dei dipendenti si "arrangia" sempre come puo...con il solito stipendio

brillante! no? :o

poi, sui media lo stesso management decanta tutte le minc.hiate possibili...riguardo a questi buyback...di quanto creano "valore", la bonta e quanto siano "convenienti" per tutto il resto dell'azionariato; perchè è come pagare un dividendo "extra" (tax free) per gli azionisti, ecc...

perchè meglio non pagare un divendo "normale" o aumentare quello esistente? vi domanderete voi...semplice! perchè c'e il rischio di dover pagare una cifra molto più elevata di quella disponibile con tutte le "nuove" azioni in giro e questo porterebbe a uno "sbilanciamento" delle proviggioni.

non a caso, in america il divario tra chi non ha niente e chi ha di tutto aumenta sempre a dismisura e rispetto a decenni fa ora le aziende (controllate dal management) si focalizzano sempre più in fare buybacks piuttosto che pagare dividendi...i dirigenti aziendali utilizzano la stessa richezza dell'azienda per arrichirsi sulle spalle del resto degli azionisti
 
Ultima modifica:

e qui c'è la risposta alla domanda di Nemo (ancora con numeri pre Q4 '15):

"Anche Big Oil ha poco da festeggiare: è vero che la situazione è migliore in termini di FCF (per lo meno i flussi operativi coprono il capex, grazie soprattutto alla maggiore diversificazione delle loro attività), ma i flussi di cassa sono comunque negativi dopo le distribuzioni agli azionisti (dividendi e buyback). Queste distribuzioni sono necessarie per supportare il prezzo delle azioni (sono infatti considerate aziende mature dalle quali aspettarsi buoni dividend yield, a maggior ragione in tempi di bassi tassi d’interesse): ma sono state possibili solo grazie all’aumento esponenziale del debito, ed i buyback stanno infatti cominciando a ridursi.
E stanno anche pagando di più per ottenere di meno: escludendo ENI, per le Big 5 la produzione annuale è diminuita di 12% dal 2010 al 2014, da 6,2 milioni di barili a 5,5 milioni; ed il costo al barile è cresciuto di 82%, da circa $16/barile a quasi $30/barile. Infine, il reserve replacement ratio (il rapporto tra nuova riserve e produzione) è sceso a 76% nel 2014, il livello più basso dal 2007. Le super-majors sembrano in una fase di auto-liquidazione, visto che stanno restituendo agli azionisti più di quello che l’attività operativa genera."
 

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Royal Dutch Shell’s decision to sell electricity direct to industrial customers is an intelligent and creative one. The shift is strategic and demonstrates that oil and gas majors are capable of adapting to a new world as the transition to a lower carbon economy develops. For those already in the business of providing electricity it represents a dangerous competitive threat. For the other oil majors it poses a direct challenge on whether they are really thinking about the future sufficiently strategically. The move starts small with a business in the UK that will start trading early next year. Shell will supply the business operations as a first step and it will then expand. But Britain is not the limit — Shell recently announced its intention of making similar sales in the US. Historically, oil and gas companies have considered a move into electricity as a step too far, with the sector seen as oversupplied and highly politicised because of sensitivity to consumer price rises. I went through three reviews during my time in the industry, each of which concluded that the electricity business was best left to someone else.
What has changed? I think there are three strands of logic behind the strategy. First, the state of the energy market. The price of gas in particular has fallen across the world over the last three years to the point where the International Energy Agency describes the current situation as a “glut”. Meanwhile, Shell has been developing an extensive range of gas assets, with more to come. In what has become a buyer’s market it is logical to get closer to the customer — establishing long-term deals that can soak up the supply. Given its reach, Shell could sign contracts to supply all the power needed by the UK’s National Health Service or with the public sector as a whole as well as big industrial users. It could agree long-term contracts with big businesses across the US. To the buyers, Shell offers a high level of security from multiple sources with prices presumably set at a discount to the market. The mutual advantage is strong. Second, there is the transition to a lower carbon world. No one knows how fast this will move, but one thing is certain: electricity will be at the heart of the shift with power demand increasing in transportation, industry and the services sector as oil and coal are displaced.
Shell, with its wide portfolio, can match inputs to the circumstances and policies of each location. It can match its global supplies of gas to growing Asian markets while developing a renewables-based electricity supply chain in Europe. The new company can buy supplies from other parts of the group or from outside. It has already agreed to buy all the power produced from the first Dutch offshore wind farm at Egmond aan Zee. The move gives Shell the opportunity to enter the supply chain at any point — it does not have to own power stations any more than it now owns drilling rigs or helicopters. The third key factor is that the electricity market is not homogenous. The business of supplying power can be segmented. The retail market — supplying millions of households — may be under constant scrutiny with suppliers vilified by the press and governments forced to threaten price caps but supplying power to industrial users is more stable and predictable, and done largely out of the public eye. The main industrial and commercial users are major companies well able to negotiate long-term deals.
Given its scale and reputation, Shell is likely to be a supplier of choice for industrial and commercial consumers and potentially capable of shaping prices. This is where the prospect of a powerful new competitor becomes another threat to utilities and retailers whose business models are already under pressure. In the European market in particular, public policies that give preference to renewables have undermined other sources of supply — especially those produced from gas. Once-powerful companies such as RWE and EON have lost much of their value as a result. In the UK, France and elsewhere, public and political hostility to price increases have made retail supply a risky and low-margin business at best. If the industrial market for electricity is now eaten away, the future for the existing utilities is desperate. Shell’s move should raise a flag of concern for investors in the other oil and gas majors. The company is positioning itself for change. It is sending signals that it is now viable even if oil and gas prices do not increase and that it is not resisting the energy transition. Chief executive Ben van Beurden said last week that he was looking forward to his next car being electric. This ease with the future is rather rare. Shareholders should be asking the other players in the old oil and gas sector to spell out their strategies for the transition.
 
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