Conte Nikula
MV = PQ
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Quindi a questo punto è più sicuro tenere tutto su Binance e Coinbase
No.
Meglio un'altra soluzione di self custody.
[Thread Ufficiale] Ledger Nano S - Hardware wallet
- Creatore Discussione morfeo86ts
- Data di inizio
No.
Meglio un'altra soluzione di self custody.
Ghesbo23
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Indubbiamente, il mio era un commento ironico.
Quali alternative consigli?
listerine
intelligenti pauca
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La logica degli HW non mi ha mai affascinato neanche prima, e dopo questo recente guaio ancor meno. Mi sembra la versione Crypto del tenere i soldi sotto il materasso o nella cassaforte dietro al quadro...
Se devo vivere con la paura che mi fregano il seed, a quel punto torno all-in nelle fiat e asset tradizionali
Se devo vivere con la paura che mi fregano il seed, a quel punto torno all-in nelle fiat e asset tradizionali
alan_^_^
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Se sei Bitcoin only coldcard
Se ti serve altro BitBox02
A dire il vero Io voto se sei molto sul pezzo e ti serve poco generazione con dadi + vecchio pc senza scheda di rete e con tails per l'indirizzo "risparmi che tocchi poco poco". Di fatti simil paper wallet.
Per quelli più movimentati i due sopra. Sto guardando anche Jade ma è diverso.
Edit comunque li useri come conti correnti di transito come quel che sono cioè non harder wallet, termine fuorviante, ma singing device cioè device per firmare in un ambiente più sicuro del PC connesso a internet. Ma comunque meno sicuro di un seed sotterrato sotto terra in un forziere e con indirizzo in watch only e copia anche cartacia degli indirizzi(sia mai il pc da cui guardi abbia un virus che falsifica), a mio modesto avviso.
edit 2 ovviamente le paranoie tendonoa +infinito, ognuno il suo in base a propensione alle seghe mentali e denari in ballo.
Altro tema io comprerei un Ledger a uso studio/didattico da chi vuole sbarazzarsene.
Posso offrire max 100k sats con spedizione inclusa cioè circa 27€ se qualcuno vuole sbarazzarsene
edit 3 bella puntata podcast tema wallet Bitcoin(pre problemi ledger) Il Priorato del Bitcoin • A podcast on Spotify for Podcasters
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PGiulia
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Si, per questo mi piace ngrave zero, che sto studiando.
Si sente spesso dire, con tutti i cryptofuffologi sguinzagliati liberamente per la rete, che i cold wallet non trasmettono le chiavi private.
Sarebbe bello capire in tal caso come la blockchain si possa fidare di una validazione esterna, ma lasciamo perdere!
Detto questo, è ovvio che la chiave privata, in caso di trasferimento in uscita, dovrà sempre e comunque passare per PC e rete, senza se e senza ma. QUALUNQUE wallet si usi.
Il vero problema è la protezione del seed.
A questo punto la questione che devo chiarire, e che chiarirò, è se il codice QR che usano questi air-gapped come ngrave è in grado di trasferire il seed. Perchè è ovvio che in quel QR ci debba essere la chiave privata, esattamente come con cavo, wifi o bluetooth. Ovvero la chiave privata dovrà sempre e comunque passare per PC, applicazione, e rete, con tutte le vulnerabilità che ne conseguono.
Se la risposta è un secco NO, STRUTTURALE, non esiterò a trasferire tutto al più presto. Ma istintivamente e tecnicamente credo invece proprio di si. E quindi torniamo sempre e comunque ad un problema di fiducia.
L'ideale sarebbe un un dispositivo stand alone, mai andato in rete o collegato a PC, dove la chiave privata si dovrebbe copiare di volta in volta da un display. Scomodo, ma il più sicuro immaginabile.
Quel QR Code permette di trasferire la chiave privata.
Certo che passa per il PC, dunque in qualche modo attraversa la rete.
Ma d'altra parte mi sembra difficile poter firmare con chiave privata senza farla passare nel web......
PGiulia
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Certo.
Il problema è se passa il seed, che non è una chiave privata, ma la chiave che custodisce TUTTE le chiavi private del tuo portafoglio.
Proteggere al 100% una chiave privata è impossibile. Proteggere il seed è di primaria importanza.
Altra idea può essere quella di usare molti seed, e diversificare. Ma scomodissimo!
P.S. A questo punto non possiamo fidarci più neanche della procedura di generazione dei seed, maledizione (ma basta un po' di fantasia).
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marchr1us
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Le parole dell'ex CEO di Ledger su reddit:
PERSPECTIVE*
I'm Éric Larchevêque, Ledger co-founder an CEO of the company from 2014 to 2019. My flair here says "Ledger CEO" but I'm not anymore. I'm only a shareholder of the company, not an executive, and all views are personal. My views are not representative at all of Ledger, its management or its board.
What an horrible mess.
I'm devastated to come on this subreddit, that I created nine years ago, to see images of Ledger devices burning, insults and lot and lot of anger. I'm honestly to the verge of tears.
I've given so much to this company, that it's impossible for me not to be highly emotional in this moment.
So much anger, so much hate, and also so much insanity.
My first step is to apologize as a co-founder about how this launch have been handled. I can't help but to wish this had been done differently. I don't have all details, but for sure something went wrong and the Ledger Recover service was put in your face in the worst way possible.
This is obviously a sensitive subject and would have needed a much more prepared communication.
To me, all this meltdown is a total PR failure, but absolutely not a technical one.
Please read this post which is a very good factual take on he situation :
Since 2014 I have been explaining the security model of Ledger and the implications of using a Secure Element (good : very secure, bad : closed source). The security model of any Ledger device relies on the fact that you need to trust Ledger to provide with a firmware doing exactly what it is supposed to be doing.
In the early days, people just had to trust us. The more the company grew, raised money, got customers, the more the incentive to make sure the firmware is sound grew. Hence audits, governance control on the firmware release, the Donjon, etc. The more Ledger had something to lose by doing a mistake, the more things were put in place to prevent this.
Trying to explain the security model to customers with a less and less knowledgable user base became more and more difficult, and it looks like in 2022 a marketing executive tweeted "A firmware update cannot extract the seed from the Secure Element". It's not a lie, but it's missing "as long as you are trusting Ledger".
So people started to think Ledger was a trustless solution, which is not the case. Some amount of trust must be placed into Ledger to use their product. If you don't trust Ledger, meaning you treat your HW manufacturer as an adversary, that can't work at all.
When Recover was abruptly launched, this false sense of trustlessness went into pieces and people started to actually understand how a HW works. At least, that's a positive note.
My mistake as a CEO during my tenure was probably not be relentless enough about explaining the security model, but at some point you just give up as people don't care at all. Until they care again, like now.
The mistake of some of the "power user" community (reddit, twitter...) is to become batshit crazy and start writing stuff like "there is a backdoor from day one" or "the governement has taken over Ledger".
The hard truth, which has been confirmed by many experts who took the time to actually deep dive on the subject, is that nothing changed. Absolutely nothing happened. The security model is the same than before you knew Ledger Recover existed.
What changed is the perspective some of you had on the trustlessness, which appeared to be much more nuanced than you thought, and as this is a very sensible subject, many became extremely angered because they felt lied to.
I understand this point of view, but it's important also to be reasonable, take a deep breath and actually think about the facts.
If you think that Ledger did a terrible thing by not being relentless enough on the security model, and took shortcut when expressing it, if you think that at the time you bought the device, you would never have bought it if you had known this wasn't a fully trustless solution, then yes I get your point of view.
But if your only take is to jump on the hate bandwagon and yell "there is a backdoor" when you don't have any understanding of what you are saying, then it's a free country, but at the end the real victims will be the noobs who in panic will try to offload their crypto from Ledger, make stupid mistakes and lose it all.
Ledger is still safe, there is no backdoor, the Ledger Recover is not a conspiracy, no one will ever force anyone to use Recover.
The Recover code in the firmware is not a malicious code nor does it open a way to arbitrary extract the seed.
If you trust the device to sign a transaction only when you press a button, then you can trust the device to compute a SSS (a shard of the seed) only if you press a button.
I'll now answer questions to the best of my abilities.
(I have posted the same thing in the Ledger subreddit and already answered a lot of questions there
)
Thank you.
Éric
PS : again, this is a personal post, personal views, and I'm not representing the views of Ledger or its management.
My personal view on the PR disaster, from a Ledger co-founder and ex CEO
PERSPECTIVE*
I'm Éric Larchevêque, Ledger co-founder an CEO of the company from 2014 to 2019. My flair here says "Ledger CEO" but I'm not anymore. I'm only a shareholder of the company, not an executive, and all views are personal. My views are not representative at all of Ledger, its management or its board.
What an horrible mess.
I'm devastated to come on this subreddit, that I created nine years ago, to see images of Ledger devices burning, insults and lot and lot of anger. I'm honestly to the verge of tears.
I've given so much to this company, that it's impossible for me not to be highly emotional in this moment.
So much anger, so much hate, and also so much insanity.
My first step is to apologize as a co-founder about how this launch have been handled. I can't help but to wish this had been done differently. I don't have all details, but for sure something went wrong and the Ledger Recover service was put in your face in the worst way possible.
This is obviously a sensitive subject and would have needed a much more prepared communication.
To me, all this meltdown is a total PR failure, but absolutely not a technical one.
Please read this post which is a very good factual take on he situation :
Since 2014 I have been explaining the security model of Ledger and the implications of using a Secure Element (good : very secure, bad : closed source). The security model of any Ledger device relies on the fact that you need to trust Ledger to provide with a firmware doing exactly what it is supposed to be doing.
In the early days, people just had to trust us. The more the company grew, raised money, got customers, the more the incentive to make sure the firmware is sound grew. Hence audits, governance control on the firmware release, the Donjon, etc. The more Ledger had something to lose by doing a mistake, the more things were put in place to prevent this.
Trying to explain the security model to customers with a less and less knowledgable user base became more and more difficult, and it looks like in 2022 a marketing executive tweeted "A firmware update cannot extract the seed from the Secure Element". It's not a lie, but it's missing "as long as you are trusting Ledger".
So people started to think Ledger was a trustless solution, which is not the case. Some amount of trust must be placed into Ledger to use their product. If you don't trust Ledger, meaning you treat your HW manufacturer as an adversary, that can't work at all.
When Recover was abruptly launched, this false sense of trustlessness went into pieces and people started to actually understand how a HW works. At least, that's a positive note.
My mistake as a CEO during my tenure was probably not be relentless enough about explaining the security model, but at some point you just give up as people don't care at all. Until they care again, like now.
The mistake of some of the "power user" community (reddit, twitter...) is to become batshit crazy and start writing stuff like "there is a backdoor from day one" or "the governement has taken over Ledger".
The hard truth, which has been confirmed by many experts who took the time to actually deep dive on the subject, is that nothing changed. Absolutely nothing happened. The security model is the same than before you knew Ledger Recover existed.
What changed is the perspective some of you had on the trustlessness, which appeared to be much more nuanced than you thought, and as this is a very sensible subject, many became extremely angered because they felt lied to.
I understand this point of view, but it's important also to be reasonable, take a deep breath and actually think about the facts.
If you think that Ledger did a terrible thing by not being relentless enough on the security model, and took shortcut when expressing it, if you think that at the time you bought the device, you would never have bought it if you had known this wasn't a fully trustless solution, then yes I get your point of view.
But if your only take is to jump on the hate bandwagon and yell "there is a backdoor" when you don't have any understanding of what you are saying, then it's a free country, but at the end the real victims will be the noobs who in panic will try to offload their crypto from Ledger, make stupid mistakes and lose it all.
Ledger is still safe, there is no backdoor, the Ledger Recover is not a conspiracy, no one will ever force anyone to use Recover.
The Recover code in the firmware is not a malicious code nor does it open a way to arbitrary extract the seed.
If you trust the device to sign a transaction only when you press a button, then you can trust the device to compute a SSS (a shard of the seed) only if you press a button.
I'll now answer questions to the best of my abilities.
(I have posted the same thing in the Ledger subreddit and already answered a lot of questions there
)
Thank you.
Éric
PS : again, this is a personal post, personal views, and I'm not representing the views of Ledger or its management.
marchr1us
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Sono semplicemente vergognosi e le parole dell'ex CEO non migliorano la situazione:
Nel 2022 dicono: un update del firmware non può estrarre il seed dal secure element. E oggi l'ex CEO dice: non è una bugia, è che manca un pezzo: non si può estrarre ma ti devi fidare di Ledger. Punto numero 1 io non mi fido di nessuno e punto numero 2 è una bugia al 100% in quanto omissione deliberata.
Nel 2022 dicono: un update del firmware non può estrarre il seed dal secure element. E oggi l'ex CEO dice: non è una bugia, è che manca un pezzo: non si può estrarre ma ti devi fidare di Ledger. Punto numero 1 io non mi fido di nessuno e punto numero 2 è una bugia al 100% in quanto omissione deliberata.
PGiulia
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Gli asini volano, ma ti devi fidare di me.
SnaKKo
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Di qualcuno bisogna pur fidarsi, effettivamente nel momento in cui puoi scrivere un firmware in un dispositivo hardware, puoi farci ciò che ti pare. Il chip di sicurezza di Ledger in realtà protegge solo da attacchi fisici (il Trezor è infatti vulnerabile, in assenza di chip).
L'open source su questo può aiutare ma devi avere la certezza che il sorgente che vedi su GitHub (o simili) sia ciò che sta girando attualmente nel tuo hardware wallet: come si fa ad esserne certi?
Una "soluzione" che potrebbe mitigare il problema potrebbe essere il multi-signature, però parliamo di cose ben più complicate.
L'open source su questo può aiutare ma devi avere la certezza che il sorgente che vedi su GitHub (o simili) sia ciò che sta girando attualmente nel tuo hardware wallet: come si fa ad esserne certi?
Una "soluzione" che potrebbe mitigare il problema potrebbe essere il multi-signature, però parliamo di cose ben più complicate.
Vista la capitalizzazione e l'espansione internazionale di Binance mi porta a fidarmi piu' che di una chiavetta, anche perchè la dimestichezza di usarla potrebbe essere un problema per chi la eredita
Ho letto che CZ una quota di minoranza in qualche banca la potrebbe acquistare visto che nel suo piccolo offre prodotti simili
marchr1us
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Non si capisce come abbiano potuto pensare che il numero degli utenti interessati al servizio potesse superare quello degli infuriati che non vogliono che il seed vada in giro a comando non appena un hacker o un governo lo vuole.
SnaKKo
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Avrebbero dovuto far uscire un dispositivo hardware apposito per i newbie dove questa funzionalità poteva risultare loro comoda.
La gente che ha deciso di usare un hardware wallet é perché appunto, nonostante la complessità della gestione, vuole più sicurezza vista la diffidenza.
Buying a bank won’t solve crypto’s debanking issue — Binance CEO
a differenza del seed, basta username password e F2A, piu' semplice per gli eredi
PGiulia
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Colpiti, affondati:
https://twitter.com/IOHK_Charles
Charles Hoskinson
@IOHK_Charles
With respect to the Ledger controversy, I say the following:
1) always choose open source software whenever possible that has been audited by numerous sources on a regular basis
2) security comes from simplicity- Design the smallest possible footprint
3) non-updateable firmware is important when a company makes specific promises about their security model. Yubikey for example follows this concept https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708760-YubiKey-Firmware-Is-Not-Upgradeable… while it would be difficult to replicate this idea for cryptocurrencies. Decentralizing the process of updates would greatly enhance security
4) people buy hardware wallets to maximize the personal security of their funds. They don't buy them for daily use or expect an equivalent user experience to hot wallets.
5) the hardware wallet space is the most extreme example of self custody. We could just as easily PGP encrypt some seeds and leave them in Gmail. We choose to use hardware wallets because they guarantee that the private keys stay in one place on hardware that's hard to tamper with
6) don't break social contracts
https://twitter.com/IOHK_Charles
Charles Hoskinson
@IOHK_Charles
With respect to the Ledger controversy, I say the following:
1) always choose open source software whenever possible that has been audited by numerous sources on a regular basis
2) security comes from simplicity- Design the smallest possible footprint
3) non-updateable firmware is important when a company makes specific promises about their security model. Yubikey for example follows this concept https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708760-YubiKey-Firmware-Is-Not-Upgradeable… while it would be difficult to replicate this idea for cryptocurrencies. Decentralizing the process of updates would greatly enhance security
4) people buy hardware wallets to maximize the personal security of their funds. They don't buy them for daily use or expect an equivalent user experience to hot wallets.
5) the hardware wallet space is the most extreme example of self custody. We could just as easily PGP encrypt some seeds and leave them in Gmail. We choose to use hardware wallets because they guarantee that the private keys stay in one place on hardware that's hard to tamper with
6) don't break social contracts
Giulk_Reload
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Mah, al contrario di una chiavetta Binance lo possono bloccare quando vogliono, guarda quello che sta succedendo con la SEC americana, secondo me di sicuro al cento per cento non c'è nulla o quasi, purtroppo è un settore ancora largamente non normato con nessuna o quasi protezione