Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... II

[cricket72]

Ciao criket

anch'io ci tenevo in modo particolare ad augurarti buone feste.

Ed anche un 2009 pieno di rivincite

Ciao

ciao pingpong
ti ringrazio
anche a te Auguri di Buone Feste e di Buon Anno 2009
spero tanto che il 2009 possa essere un anno di svolta per me

 

[kuka]

A tutti


auguriiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!!

buon anno!!!

 

[Puravida]

Qualcuno puo' spiegare il drammatico calo delle quotazioni sui matusa???
tipo popolare italiana o milano...d'accordo la subordinazione ma con i tassi che ci sono adesso...che ne pensate...???

saluto di buon anno..

 

[Topgun76]

Qualcuno puo' spiegare il drammatico calo delle quotazioni sui matusa???
tipo popolare italiana o milano...d'accordo la subordinazione ma con i tassi che ci sono adesso...che ne pensate...???

saluto di buon anno..

Credo siano più motivi,primo il fatto che si possono comprare scadenze brevi con ottimi interessi,quindi perchè entrare in un perpetuals?secondo cè il rischio che non vengano pagate cedole,terzo mercato illiquido,quindi le quotazioni crollano

 

[fidw99]

cedola - obbligazione perpetua MPS XS0121342827

Salve a tutti,

ho acquistato recentemente (nel mese di gennaio) questa obbligazione a 52.... ed ho pagato regolarmente il rateo interessi.

L'obbligazione doveva pagare cedola il 7 di febbraio però la mia banca non ne sa nulla ancora. Dai depositari esteri nessuna notizia.

Chiedo lumi a persone più esperte e competenti, è possibile che in base ai prospetti complicatissimi di queste emissioni la società non paghi le cedole ? Mi aspettavo qualche sorpresa per la prossima cedola (visto che probabilmente non verranno distribuiti dividendi), però la cedola in corso che avevo già pagato quasi per intero nel rateo non dovrebbero farla saltare...

Grazie e buona giornata.

 

[bosmeld]

mi spieghi meglio questa obbl. sono interessato?

 

[fidw99]

è una obbligazione particolarmente rischiosa, non ha scadenza e se tutto andrà bene ha dei ritorno particolarmente interessandi; in questi giorni quota intorno a 50. Credo che nel forum se ne sia già parlato, cerca con l'Isin.

Acquistandola è come diventare azionisti privilegiati, l'emissione è di tipo Lower Tier I (in caso di fallimento sei giusto prima degli azionisti).

Può sospendere la cedola in casi particolari (perdite, abbassamento dei coefficienti patrimoniali) e non è necessario recuperarla. Il mio dubbio era solo se può sospenderla senza comunicazioni....

ciao

 

[goldenlegend]

rbs perpetuo

ciao,
scusatemi, ma non ho salvato il bellissimo sito del lussemburgo
ove si possono trovare i regolamenti delle emissioni obbligazionarie.
mi servirebbe il regolamento del titolo rbs xs0205935470

dovrebbe esserci, qualcuno può darmi una mano?

 

[cricket72]

a questo link il prospetto http://www.investors.rbs.com/downlo... Non-cumulative Euro Preferred Securities.pdf

 

[cricket72]

interessantissimo report di fitch



Banks/Global
Fitch Sees Elevated Risk of Bank Hybrid Capital Coupon Deferral in 2009

Fitch Ratings believes that the coupon deferral risk of bank hybrid capital instruments has increased materially for the banks most under pressure in the current crisis. Significantly compressed operating earnings, including the growing universe of companies reporting outright losses, have been the primary factor in elevating the risk of banks being able to service their most subordinated obligations. Some rated entities have added hybrids in recent quarters to help shore up capital in the face of recent operating losses and to provide a buffer to absorb expected future losses or weak earnings. While the additional capital is helpful in some respects, the additional debt service burden created heightens the risk for these entities as well and may hasten the onset of the hybrid instruments exhibiting their equity characteristics
in the form of becoming more permanent (call options not being exercised) or serving as a source of capital preservation via the issuers implementing the deferral feature available. Fitch also considers that the high level of government support provided to banking systems and, within them, to particularly troubled institutions complicates and, indeed, potentially materially increases the risk that coupons on hybrid instruments will be deferred.
Fitch has never assumed that support would be forthcoming for such instruments and included commentary to this effect in its criteria report “Support Ratings and the Rating of Bank Hybrid Capital and Preferred Stock” (July 2005). Fitch stated: “Fitch believes that it would not be prudent to assume that sovereign support will always be forthcoming for hybrid capital instruments” and further noted that
the “introduction of greater discretion under Pillar 2 of Basel II for regulators to intervene proactively to safeguard a bank’s capitalisation potentially increases the uncertainty, and hence the risk, surrounding the imposition of loss absorption.” The motivation and incentives for regulators to “intervene proactively” are undoubtedly greater than at any point in recent history.
Under the July 2005 criteria, banks whose senior debt ratings are driven by support have their hybrid ratings determined by the level of their Individual Rating, under an “additional notching” formula.
Crucial to arriving at the hybrid rating is determining the appropriate starting point for the notching.
The July 2005 criteria make clear that where a bank has a higher support floor than ‘A−’ (as now is the case for several major banking groups), then this has to be discounted back to ‘A−’ as the starting point from which to notch. Fitch is maintaining this approach although is applying it in a more conservative way at the lower levels of Individual Rating (i.e. resulting in lower hybrid ratings). Fitch believes that the current exceptional circumstances merit this more conservative application of the
existing criteria, especially given the fact that the regulatory considerations (see below) in respect of hybrid capital are not fully captured in the Individual Ratings. Fitch will evaluate in due course whether a permanent change in this respect is required. Although the focus of this comment is major developed‐market banks, the major issuers of hybrid capital, the principle of delinking hybrid capital ratings from senior debt ratings where government support comes in to play, or is expected to come into play, applies to Fitch’s entire universe of bank ratings.
Fitch regards a deferral on a hybrid instrument as non‐performance from a ratings perspective, even though the terms and conditions of such issuance allow/require coupon deferral under certain conditions, up to and including full management optionality and regulatory discretion. Deferral will lead to the assignment of instrument ratings consistent with non‐performing obligations, typically in the low ‘B’ to ‘CCC’‐‘C’ range. Loss expectations will be derived from a combination of the expected duration of the coupon deferral and the cumulative versus non‐cumulative nature of the instrument.
In response to the heightened risk of hybrid coupon deferral and, in extreme cases, outright principal loss, Fitch has already taken rating actions that have widened the number of notches between the Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and the rating assigned to the hybrid and preferred instruments for select issuers. In cases where the issuer still exhibits a degree of reasonable financial resources and financial flexibility to
service the obligation, but the ability to service hybrids has been clearly reduced and the potential for adverse regulatory intervention has increased, the hybrid ratings have been lowered. These are cases where weakened financial performance is clearly evident. The level of actual operating earnings is clearly under pressure and the prospect for future levels is weak as well. In most of these cases the government
has already responded with capital injections and other forms of explicit support. The addition of capital from the government certainly helps reduce the risk of insolvency and the risk that market confidence would erode to the point of having liquidity sources evaporate quickly. However, the level of influence that governments and regulators can exert over these institutions has also risen materially, even in the absence of effective control.
Given the level of uncertainty and opaqueness surrounding the deferral decision process, especially as it potentially involves not only regulatory considerations but also political considerations concerning the deployment of taxpayers’ money, and the possibility that the situation regarding bank hybrid capital could change very quickly, Fitch will likely maintain downgraded hybrid capital instruments on Rating Watch Negative. Clearly for those instruments rated in the low‐investment‐grade category, the
Rating Watch Negative indicates that a further downward move into sub‐investment grade is a real possibility.
The following table broadly summarises the way Fitch is currently viewing the large generally systemically important issuers of bank hybrid instruments, and the rating implications for those banks’ hybrids. These are banks which will typically have a Support Rating of ‘1’ and a Support Rating Floor of ‘A−’ or higher.
Central to this matter is the question of the extent to which the government support that has flowed — and will, in Fitch’s opinion, continue to flow — in the world’s banking systems can be relied upon to extend to existing holders of deeply subordinated bank capital instruments. Fitch acknowledges that the current dynamics of the debate over government support are not entirely straightforward, with recent actions varying greatly as to the extent of support provided to hybrid instruments. At the outset of the crisis in late summer of 2007, the German bank IKB imposed losses on its hybrid investors, both in the form of coupon deferrals and principal write‐downs. Northern Rock saw its traditional preference shares nationalised (we still await any indication as to whether any compensation will be paid) while other
innovative hybrid capital instruments remain current despite a full year in state ownership. Fitch understands that the action on the Northern Rock preference shares was more to do with the avoidance of having any minority voting rights in the nationalised entity than any desire to impose losses on a particular level of the capital structure. In the US, the preferred investors in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were materially economically disadvantaged by the injection by the Treasury of preferred stock that ranked senior to the existing preferred instruments; yet in more recent cases of government infusions of capital into banks, coupon deferrals have not been imposed. In Europe there is the additional complication of the
role of the European Commission in approving, and setting conditions on, state aid packages to ailing banks. This appears to have played a role in the decision by Bayerische Landesbank to defer coupon payments on all its bank capital instruments unless contractually obliged to make the payment. It would appear to Fitch to be fair to say that regulators, certainly in the latter part of 2008, were largely, and understandably, reacting to events on a case‐by‐case basis and that the rules of the game were in a state of flux. Although the state of panic that engulfed the market after the collapse of Lehman Brothers has largely abated, the future performance of bank capital instruments remains an open question.
While regulators certainly intended capital investment programmes to result in significant restoration of confidence in individual banks and the market as a whole, such an impact has not been uniformly felt across banks’ capital structures. Fitch appreciates that the capital programmes have the effect of extending support to the entire liability structure of a bank, at least in the short term. Further, many programmes have been implemented through investing at the holding company level, which provides significant evidence that regulators intend to provide support to the entire legal entity structure. The boldness of such support goes beyond Fitch’s base‐line expectations for support. That said, Fitch does not believe investors should view such support as continuing endlessly. Absent evidence that the turnaround is truly taking hold, the regulators may well exhibit some bias toward protecting taxpayer funds. This could include looking to put hybrids into deferral, even to the extent that such a decision could include the instruments the government owns.
Market participants were made aware of the equity‐like characteristics that hybrids carry and how quickly and unexpectedly such can emerge in a recent decision by Deutsche Bank. In mid‐December 2008 Deutsche announced that it was not going to exercise its call option on a Lower Tier 2 issue, triggering the extension risk that most market observers regarded as negligible, despite the warning precedent set by the Italian bank Credito Valtellinese in April 2008. Although Fitch does not rate this extension risk, and the fact that a coupon deferral is a more serious matter, the two topics essentially exemplify the same argument: namely the extent to which bank regulatory capital instruments are expected to behave, at least in part, like equity. In the one case it is the question of permanence (or at least with dated Lower Tier 2 issues, extendability; with Upper Tier 2 and Tier 1 instruments it would potentially be permanence) and in the other case it is “going concern”
loss absorption, both matters which the regulatory community regards as essential characteristics of bank regulatory capital.
The banking regulators, and behind them the political authorities in the finance ministries and treasuries, face a difficult set of conflicting interests in their attempt to formulate policy in this area. On the one hand they have a priority to maintain confidence in an extremely fragile environment, and the imposition of losses on hybrid capital investors would be a severe dent to that confidence as well as having a direct financial impact on those investors. In the longer term, it is argued, such a development would effectively kill the bank capital products and market. This could significantly hinder banks’ ability to raise fresh hybrid capital, either to bolster their current capital position and facilitate the fresh lending that governments want to see to sustain economic activity, or in the medium to longer term to raise fresh hybrid capital to allow them to pay back the government capital injections. However, in the longer term there must be a significant question mark as to whether the banking regulators will allow the continuation of this market in its current form anyway, especially if, in the face of the worst banking crisis in living memory, they fail to impose losses on this form of bank capital.
The picture is further clouded by governments’ responsibility to safeguard the massive amounts of taxpayers’ money that is being deployed into the banking system, whether it be directly in the form of capital injections or indirectly in the form of funding guarantees and extraordinary liquidity provision. By allowing banks to avoid coupon deferral (and to avoid the optionality to extend principal repayment dates), the regulators are essentially permitting a direct transfer of taxpayers’ money to a particular set
of investors. It is not Fitch’s role to say whether this is a valid policy objective, but it does in the agency’s view raise the investment risks that those investors currently face, and in specific cases Fitch considers this risk to be sufficiently material to view these instruments as not investment grade.

 

[joe black]

interessantissimo report di fitch



Banks/Global
Fitch Sees Elevated Risk of Bank Hybrid Capital Coupon Deferral in 2009

Fitch Ratings believes that the coupon deferral risk of bank hybrid capital instruments has increased materially for the banks most under pressure in the current crisis. Significantly compressed operating earnings, including the growing universe of companies reporting outright losses, have been the primary factor in elevating the risk of banks being able to service their most subordinated obligations. Some rated entities have added hybrids in recent quarters to help shore up capital in the face of recent operating losses and to provide a buffer to absorb expected future losses or weak earnings. While the additional capital is helpful in some respects, the additional debt service burden created heightens the risk for these entities as well and may hasten the onset of the hybrid instruments exhibiting their equity characteristics
in the form of becoming more permanent (call options not being exercised) or serving as a source of capital preservation via the issuers implementing the deferral feature available. Fitch also considers that the high level of government support provided to banking systems and, within them, to particularly troubled institutions complicates and, indeed, potentially materially increases the risk that coupons on hybrid instruments will be deferred.
Fitch has never assumed that support would be forthcoming for such instruments and included commentary to this effect in its criteria report “Support Ratings and the Rating of Bank Hybrid Capital and Preferred Stock” (July 2005). Fitch stated: “Fitch believes that it would not be prudent to assume that sovereign support will always be forthcoming for hybrid capital instruments” and further noted that
the “introduction of greater discretion under Pillar 2 of Basel II for regulators to intervene proactively to safeguard a bank’s capitalisation potentially increases the uncertainty, and hence the risk, surrounding the imposition of loss absorption.” The motivation and incentives for regulators to “intervene proactively” are undoubtedly greater than at any point in recent history.
Under the July 2005 criteria, banks whose senior debt ratings are driven by support have their hybrid ratings determined by the level of their Individual Rating, under an “additional notching” formula.
Crucial to arriving at the hybrid rating is determining the appropriate starting point for the notching.
The July 2005 criteria make clear that where a bank has a higher support floor than ‘A−’ (as now is the case for several major banking groups), then this has to be discounted back to ‘A−’ as the starting point from which to notch. Fitch is maintaining this approach although is applying it in a more conservative way at the lower levels of Individual Rating (i.e. resulting in lower hybrid ratings). Fitch believes that the current exceptional circumstances merit this more conservative application of the
existing criteria, especially given the fact that the regulatory considerations (see below) in respect of hybrid capital are not fully captured in the Individual Ratings. Fitch will evaluate in due course whether a permanent change in this respect is required. Although the focus of this comment is major developed‐market banks, the major issuers of hybrid capital, the principle of delinking hybrid capital ratings from senior debt ratings where government support comes in to play, or is expected to come into play, applies to Fitch’s entire universe of bank ratings.
Fitch regards a deferral on a hybrid instrument as non‐performance from a ratings perspective, even though the terms and conditions of such issuance allow/require coupon deferral under certain conditions, up to and including full management optionality and regulatory discretion. Deferral will lead to the assignment of instrument ratings consistent with non‐performing obligations, typically in the low ‘B’ to ‘CCC’‐‘C’ range. Loss expectations will be derived from a combination of the expected duration of the coupon deferral and the cumulative versus non‐cumulative nature of the instrument.
In response to the heightened risk of hybrid coupon deferral and, in extreme cases, outright principal loss, Fitch has already taken rating actions that have widened the number of notches between the Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and the rating assigned to the hybrid and preferred instruments for select issuers. In cases where the issuer still exhibits a degree of reasonable financial resources and financial flexibility to
service the obligation, but the ability to service hybrids has been clearly reduced and the potential for adverse regulatory intervention has increased, the hybrid ratings have been lowered. These are cases where weakened financial performance is clearly evident. The level of actual operating earnings is clearly under pressure and the prospect for future levels is weak as well. In most of these cases the government
has already responded with capital injections and other forms of explicit support. The addition of capital from the government certainly helps reduce the risk of insolvency and the risk that market confidence would erode to the point of having liquidity sources evaporate quickly. However, the level of influence that governments and regulators can exert over these institutions has also risen materially, even in the absence of effective control.
Given the level of uncertainty and opaqueness surrounding the deferral decision process, especially as it potentially involves not only regulatory considerations but also political considerations concerning the deployment of taxpayers’ money, and the possibility that the situation regarding bank hybrid capital could change very quickly, Fitch will likely maintain downgraded hybrid capital instruments on Rating Watch Negative. Clearly for those instruments rated in the low‐investment‐grade category, the
Rating Watch Negative indicates that a further downward move into sub‐investment grade is a real possibility.
The following table broadly summarises the way Fitch is currently viewing the large generally systemically important issuers of bank hybrid instruments, and the rating implications for those banks’ hybrids. These are banks which will typically have a Support Rating of ‘1’ and a Support Rating Floor of ‘A−’ or higher.
Central to this matter is the question of the extent to which the government support that has flowed — and will, in Fitch’s opinion, continue to flow — in the world’s banking systems can be relied upon to extend to existing holders of deeply subordinated bank capital instruments. Fitch acknowledges that the current dynamics of the debate over government support are not entirely straightforward, with recent actions varying greatly as to the extent of support provided to hybrid instruments. At the outset of the crisis in late summer of 2007, the German bank IKB imposed losses on its hybrid investors, both in the form of coupon deferrals and principal write‐downs. Northern Rock saw its traditional preference shares nationalised (we still await any indication as to whether any compensation will be paid) while other
innovative hybrid capital instruments remain current despite a full year in state ownership. Fitch understands that the action on the Northern Rock preference shares was more to do with the avoidance of having any minority voting rights in the nationalised entity than any desire to impose losses on a particular level of the capital structure. In the US, the preferred investors in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were materially economically disadvantaged by the injection by the Treasury of preferred stock that ranked senior to the existing preferred instruments; yet in more recent cases of government infusions of capital into banks, coupon deferrals have not been imposed. In Europe there is the additional complication of the
role of the European Commission in approving, and setting conditions on, state aid packages to ailing banks. This appears to have played a role in the decision by Bayerische Landesbank to defer coupon payments on all its bank capital instruments unless contractually obliged to make the payment. It would appear to Fitch to be fair to say that regulators, certainly in the latter part of 2008, were largely, and understandably, reacting to events on a case‐by‐case basis and that the rules of the game were in a state of flux. Although the state of panic that engulfed the market after the collapse of Lehman Brothers has largely abated, the future performance of bank capital instruments remains an open question.
While regulators certainly intended capital investment programmes to result in significant restoration of confidence in individual banks and the market as a whole, such an impact has not been uniformly felt across banks’ capital structures. Fitch appreciates that the capital programmes have the effect of extending support to the entire liability structure of a bank, at least in the short term. Further, many programmes have been implemented through investing at the holding company level, which provides significant evidence that regulators intend to provide support to the entire legal entity structure. The boldness of such support goes beyond Fitch’s base‐line expectations for support. That said, Fitch does not believe investors should view such support as continuing endlessly. Absent evidence that the turnaround is truly taking hold, the regulators may well exhibit some bias toward protecting taxpayer funds. This could include looking to put hybrids into deferral, even to the extent that such a decision could include the instruments the government owns.
Market participants were made aware of the equity‐like characteristics that hybrids carry and how quickly and unexpectedly such can emerge in a recent decision by Deutsche Bank. In mid‐December 2008 Deutsche announced that it was not going to exercise its call option on a Lower Tier 2 issue, triggering the extension risk that most market observers regarded as negligible, despite the warning precedent set by the Italian bank Credito Valtellinese in April 2008. Although Fitch does not rate this extension risk, and the fact that a coupon deferral is a more serious matter, the two topics essentially exemplify the same argument: namely the extent to which bank regulatory capital instruments are expected to behave, at least in part, like equity. In the one case it is the question of permanence (or at least with dated Lower Tier 2 issues, extendability; with Upper Tier 2 and Tier 1 instruments it would potentially be permanence) and in the other case it is “going concern”
loss absorption, both matters which the regulatory community regards as essential characteristics of bank regulatory capital.
The banking regulators, and behind them the political authorities in the finance ministries and treasuries, face a difficult set of conflicting interests in their attempt to formulate policy in this area. On the one hand they have a priority to maintain confidence in an extremely fragile environment, and the imposition of losses on hybrid capital investors would be a severe dent to that confidence as well as having a direct financial impact on those investors. In the longer term, it is argued, such a development would effectively kill the bank capital products and market. This could significantly hinder banks’ ability to raise fresh hybrid capital, either to bolster their current capital position and facilitate the fresh lending that governments want to see to sustain economic activity, or in the medium to longer term to raise fresh hybrid capital to allow them to pay back the government capital injections. However, in the longer term there must be a significant question mark as to whether the banking regulators will allow the continuation of this market in its current form anyway, especially if, in the face of the worst banking crisis in living memory, they fail to impose losses on this form of bank capital.
The picture is further clouded by governments’ responsibility to safeguard the massive amounts of taxpayers’ money that is being deployed into the banking system, whether it be directly in the form of capital injections or indirectly in the form of funding guarantees and extraordinary liquidity provision. By allowing banks to avoid coupon deferral (and to avoid the optionality to extend principal repayment dates), the regulators are essentially permitting a direct transfer of taxpayers’ money to a particular set
of investors. It is not Fitch’s role to say whether this is a valid policy objective, but it does in the agency’s view raise the investment risks that those investors currently face, and in specific cases Fitch considers this risk to be sufficiently material to view these instruments as not investment grade.

Una piccola sintesi in Italiano sarebbe molto Gradita Grazie

 

[joe black]

Salve Cricket 72 sai spiegarmi com è possibile che queste Preffer Share della RBS abbiano ancora un Rating di A3 e quotano a prezzo di
Grazie


http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/q...&startkey=0&search=3&searchQuery=US7800977131

 

[Encadenado]

Salve a tutti,

ho acquistato recentemente (nel mese di gennaio) questa obbligazione a 52.... ed ho pagato regolarmente il rateo interessi.

L'obbligazione doveva pagare cedola il 7 di febbraio però la mia banca non ne sa nulla ancora. Dai depositari esteri nessuna notizia.

Chiedo lumi a persone più esperte e competenti, è possibile che in base ai prospetti complicatissimi di queste emissioni la società non paghi le cedole ? Mi aspettavo qualche sorpresa per la prossima cedola (visto che probabilmente non verranno distribuiti dividendi), però la cedola in corso che avevo già pagato quasi per intero nel rateo non dovrebbero farla saltare...

Grazie e buona giornata.

Notevoli questi titoli
Non ti vengono mai rimborsati
Non pagano neanche la cedola
Se l'emittente va in default, saremmo sicuri di non recuperare praticamente nulla (visto che sono subordinati)

Mi sono sempre guardato da questi prodotti... e penso che continuerò a tenermi alla larga.

 

[Puravida]

Sicuramente strumenti da prendere con le molle...ma la perpetuals Pop. Bergamo avra' perso tantissimo...ma sono 2 anni che mi gratifica regolarmente della cedola...

 

[Encadenado]

Sicuramente strumenti da prendere con le molle...ma la perpetuals Pop. Bergamo avra' perso tantissimo...ma sono 2 anni che mi gratifica regolarmente della cedola...

Qual'è il tuo gain/loss potenziale?
... in altre parole, se sommi le cedole alla perdita di quotazione hai guadagnato o perso?

 

[Zhelgadis]

L'importante è leggere sempre le indicazioni d'uso ed essere consapevoli di quel che si fa...

1) date le loro caratteristiche particolari, le obbligazioni subordinate e/o perpetue somigliano molto di più alle azioni di risparmio che alle obbligazioni e pertanto sono indicate per chi abbia una propensione al rischio medio/alta e almeno un po' di tempo da dedicare al monitoraggio delle notizie che riguardano l'emittente;

2) data la loro capacità di generare flussi di cedole elevate e stante il fatto che la loro durata solitamente è molto lunga, quando non virtualmente "perpetua", queste obbligazioni sono particolarmente adatte a chi abbia un orizzonte temporale di lungo termine. Non a caso sono molto richieste da assicurazioni e fondi pensione. Chi ha esigenze di breve farebbe meglio ad astenersi;

3) è sempre bene studiare a fondo le caratteristiche proprie di ogni emissione, con particolare attenzione per quanto riguarda le clausole di subordinazione e di cancellazione/differimento delle cedole. Non di rado il grado di subordinazione è così profondo che può portare ad un tasso di recupero dell'investimento pari a zero, in caso ad esempio di liquidazione della società. Per questo motivo è buona regola procedere con cautela, diversificando su più emittenti ed evitando di concentrare su ogni singola società più del 2-3% del proprio portafoglio.

Non rimborsano mai? Forse, ma nemmeno le Lehman senior
Non pagano le cedole? In fondo è quel che è successo alle steepener negli ultimi due anni

Poi, personalmente mi tengo ben al largo dai perpetual (e proprio questo thread mi ha aiutato a non farmi ingolosire dai "cedoloni"), ma non è detto che siano il male assoluto.
Nella peggiore delle ipotesi, sarà come aver comprato azioni della banca in questione. Brutta cosa, ma fino a qualche anno fa le azioni bancarie erano considerate titoli difensivi

 

[Zhelgadis]

Qual'è il tuo gain/loss potenziale?
... in altre parole, se sommi le cedole alla perdita di quotazione hai guadagnato o perso?

Se sommiamo quotazione di mercato + cedole incassate fino ad oggi sono attualmente in loss pure con le mie General Electric comprate prima del crack Lehman...
Insomma, questo è un periodaccio per le perpetual bancarie come l'anno scorso era un periodaccio per le steepener. Alle solite, i conti si fanno alla fine...

 

[Encadenado]

Se sommiamo quotazione di mercato + cedole incassate fino ad oggi sono attualmente in loss pure con le mie General Electric comprate prima del crack Lehman...
Insomma, questo è un periodaccio per le perpetual bancarie come l'anno scorso era un periodaccio per le steepener. Alle solite, i conti si fanno alla fine...

Bravo quoto al 100%, i conti si fanno alla fine... mha... quando sarebbe "la fine" per le perpetual?

Riguardo alle GE, ci hai sicuramente rimesso alcuni punti percentuali, ma con le perpetual avresti perso mooooooooolto di più (mi riferisco alla perdita media delle perpetual, in alcuni casi sporadici potrebbero anche non aver perso).
Addirittura ad oggi, hanno perso meno le obbligazioni Lhemann (quotazioni fuori mercato regolamentato) dei perpetual!!
Un mio socio aveva in portafoglio sia 1 titolo Lhemann che 4 diversi tipi di perpetual (dei quali fortunamente si era già liberato del peggiore rimanendone solo 3). Ebbene, ad oggi, dopo il crack, l’obbligazione lhemann è quella messa meglio...

Io continuo a pensare che un'obbligazione dovrebbe avere per legge, e per buon senso, una precisa data di rimborso.
La definizione stessa di obbligazione si riferisce all'"obbligo" di rimborso ad una certa data. E' poi ovvio che se la data di rimborso corrisponde a diversi decenni, questa è già un'anomalia configurabile come molto simile alla totale mancanza di scadenza.
Che dire dei trentennali tipo i btp? Pur essendo garantiti dallo stato, e pur non essendo dei subordinati, io preferisco starne comunque alla larga.
Rimpiango i tempi in cui c'era l'obbligo di non protrarre oltre i 10 anni qualsiasi tipo di debito/credito. Il mondo del credito e della finanza nascondeva meno ingiustizie e trabocchetti, di quanti ne celi ora, nonostante il progresso sociale e tecnologico dei tempi moderni.

 

[Zhelgadis]

Io continuo a pensare che un'obbligazione dovrebbe avere per legge, e per buon senso, una precisa data di rimborso.
La definizione stessa di obbligazione si riferisce all'"obbligo" di rimborso ad una certa data. E' poi ovvio che se la data di rimborso corrisponde a diversi decenni, questa è già un'anomalia configurabile come molto simile alla totale mancanza di scadenza.
Che dire dei trentennali tipo i btp? Pur essendo garantiti dallo stato, e pur non essendo dei subordinati, io preferisco starne comunque alla larga.
Rimpiango i tempi in cui c'era l'obbligo di non protrarre oltre i 10 anni qualsiasi tipo di debito/credito. Il mondo del credito e della finanza nascondeva meno ingiustizie e trabocchetti, di quanti ne celi ora, nonostante il progresso sociale e tecnologico dei tempi moderni.

Sono per molti versi d'accordo e per gli stessi motivi mi tengo accuratamente alla larga di questi titoli
Ma rimane il fatto che chi le compra sa (dovrebbe sapere... almeno dovrebbe leggere prima di firmare) quali sono le loro peculiarità.
In particolare deve sapere che il termine stesso "obbligazioni" è improprio per questo tipo di titoli, che in inglese vengono spesso definiti (anche se qui si aggiunge confusione a confusione) "preferred shares".
Alla fine, chi compra un perpetual deve essere consapevole che sta comprando qualcosa di appena meno rischioso di un'azione della stessa banca, avendo rispetto all'azionista una garanzia in più sull'esistenza e l'entità della cedola.
L'azionista infatti non sa nè se avrà un dividendo, nè a quanto ammonterà. Chi detiene un perpetual (semplifico al massimo) sa che se ci sarà un dividendo ci sarà anche la cedola, e che essa sarà pari a un'ammontare noto.
Oltre a questo c'è la call, che non è obbligatoria ma se non rispettata porta ad un innalzamento della cedola.

Insomma, possiamo definire questi titoli "fregature"? Secondo me sono titoli ad altissimo rischio ma non fregature tout court, a meno che non si vogliano definire allo stesso modo le azioni bancarie (oddio, se ne potrebbe discutere... )
Stanno chiaramente passando un periodo molto difficile, ma gli azionisti al momento se la passano pure peggio.
Ovviamente cambia il discorso qualora vengano proposti allo sportello a persone non consapevoli di cosa stanno acquistando, ma questa è una lunga storia sulla quale credo siamo tutti d'accordo...

 

[Encadenado]

Sono per molti versi d'accordo e per gli stessi motivi mi tengo accuratamente alla larga di questi titoli
Ma rimane il fatto che chi le compra sa (dovrebbe sapere... almeno dovrebbe leggere prima di firmare) quali sono le loro peculiarità.
In particolare deve sapere che il termine stesso "obbligazioni" è improprio per questo tipo di titoli, che in inglese vengono spesso definiti (anche se qui si aggiunge confusione a confusione) "preferred shares".
Alla fine, chi compra un perpetual deve essere consapevole che sta comprando qualcosa di appena meno rischioso di un'azione della stessa banca, avendo rispetto all'azionista una garanzia in più sull'esistenza e l'entità della cedola.
L'azionista infatti non sa nè se avrà un dividendo, nè a quanto ammonterà. Chi detiene un perpetual (semplifico al massimo) sa che se ci sarà un dividendo ci sarà anche la cedola, e che essa sarà pari a un'ammontare noto.
Oltre a questo c'è la call, che non è obbligatoria ma se non rispettata porta ad un innalzamento della cedola.

Insomma, possiamo definire questi titoli "fregature"? Secondo me sono titoli ad altissimo rischio ma non fregature tout court, a meno che non si vogliano definire allo stesso modo le azioni bancarie (oddio, se ne potrebbe discutere... )
Stanno chiaramente passando un periodo molto difficile, ma gli azionisti al momento se la passano pure peggio.
Ovviamente cambia il discorso qualora vengano proposti allo sportello a persone non consapevoli di cosa stanno acquistando, ma questa è una lunga storia sulla quale credo siamo tutti d'accordo...

Si, mi trovi d'accordo su tutto
A questo punto, concorderai che sarebbe forse stato più opportuno mettere il tread sui perpetual in una sezione più consona. Nella sezione delle obbligazioni e titoli di stato, dove le perpetual non c'entrano proprio nulla, sarebbe bastato un semplice monito a non acquistare inconsapevolmente.