Fromstudytowork
Se specificato, sostituirà il titolo standard sott
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Allora, io innanzitutto sono preoccupato dal fatto che la BCE de facto sta peggiorando il suo portafoglio titoli... ma appunto come dici tu sono anche curioso: curioso non solo di vedere chi in particolare comprerà quei titoli - anche perchè all'inizio la BCE venderà i titoli considerati migliori, cioè di Germania, Belgio, ecc... - e quindi sarà relativamente un affare acquistare quei titoli piuttosto che i vari titoli di Grecia, Spagna, Portogallo, ecc...
Devo però aggiungere che la curiosità è forse maggiore per la mossa della BCE in sè, visto che mai aveva messo in campo questo CE preferendogli il più conosciuto QE... e provo a spiegarmi visto che mi sono documentato un pò qualche mese fa. In pratica la mossa della BCE non è quella di fare un classico quantitative easing (QE) ma una versione un po' più hard diciamo, cioè un credit easing (CE). Questa nuova versione è nata da un discorso tenuto oltre un anno fa alla LSE da Bernanke: discorso abbastanza importante perchè apppunto prefigura questa nuova pratica monetaria per differenziarla da quella attuata, con i risibili risultati che sono davanti agli occhi di tutti, dalla Bank of Japan negli anni 2001-2006. In pratica - se volete tutto il discorso lo trovate qui - egli afferma che (mi scuso per la lunghezza ma è secondo me importante):
Our approach--which could be described as "credit easing"--resembles quantitative easing in one respect: It involves an expansion of the central bank's balance sheet. However, in a pure QE regime, the focus of policy is the quantity of bank reserves, which are liabilities of the central bank; the composition of loans and securities on the asset side of the central bank's balance sheet is incidental. Indeed, although the Bank of Japan's policy approach during the QE period was quite multifaceted, the overall stance of its policy was gauged primarily in terms of its target for bank reserves. In contrast, the Federal Reserve's credit easing approach focuses on the mix of loans and securities that it holds and on how this composition of assets affects credit conditions for households and businesses. This difference does not reflect any doctrinal disagreement with the Japanese approach, but rather the differences in financial and economic conditions between the two episodes. In particular, credit spreads are much wider and credit markets more dysfunctional in the United States today than was the case during the Japanese experiment with quantitative easing. To stimulate aggregate demand in the current environment, the Federal Reserve must focus its policies on reducing those spreads and improving the functioning of private credit markets more generally.
The stimulative effect of the Federal Reserve's credit easing policies depends sensitively on the particular mix of lending programs and securities purchases that it undertakes. When markets are illiquid and private arbitrage is impaired by balance sheet constraints and other factors, as at present, one dollar of longer-term securities purchases is unlikely to have the same impact on financial markets and the economy as a dollar of lending to banks, which has in turn a different effect than a dollar of lending to support the commercial paper market. Because various types of lending have heterogeneous effects, the stance of Fed policy in the current regime--in contrast to a QE regime--is not easily summarized by a single number, such as the quantity of excess reserves or the size of the monetary base. In addition, the usage of Federal Reserve credit is determined in large part by borrower needs and thus will tend to increase when market conditions worsen and decline when market conditions improve. Setting a target for the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, as in a QE regime, could thus have the perverse effect of forcing the Fed to tighten the terms and availability of its lending at times when market conditions were worsening, and vice versa.
