Venezuela e PDVSA (Vol.176)

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Security

BidPx​
AskPx
ELECAR 8½ 18
7.85​
-​
8.85
PDVSA 8½ 20
80.00​
-​
81.50
PDVSA 9 21
11.50​
-​
12.25
PDVSA 12¾ 22
14.00​
-​
14.75
PDVSA 6 22
8.50​
-​
9.25
PDVSA 6 24
11.00​
-​
11.50
PDVSA 6 26
11.10​
-​
11.60
PDVSA 5⅜ 27
10.60​
-​
11.20
PDVSA 9¾ 35
13.25​
-​
14.00
PDVSA 5½ 37
10.60​
-​
11.20


Security
BidPx

AskPx
VENZ 13⅝ 1818.50-20.00
VENZ 7 1813.50-14.50
VENZ 7¾ 1915.25-16.25
VENZ 6 2014.25-15.25
VENZ 12¾ 2220.00-21.00
VENZ 9 2317.50-18.50
VENZ 8¼ 2417.00-18.00
VENZ 7.65 2516.75-17.75
VENZ 11¾ 2619.85-20.85
VENZ 9¼ 2719.75-20.75
VENZ 9¼ 2817.50-18.50
VENZ 11.95 3119.00-20.00
VENZ 9⅜ 3419.25-20.25
VENZ 7 3816.00-17.00
I prezzi non hanno risentito di nulla....
 

Cabello: María Corina Machado vuole imporre la candidatura di Márquez per nuocere a Rosales​

Il deputato di AN ha assicurato che "María Corina fa movimenti strani, Machado ha avuto una videochiamata con Leopoldo López per circa 40 minuti".
aracas.- Il primo vicepresidente del Partito Socialista Unito del Venezuela (PSUV), Diosdado Cabello, ha riferito che María Corina Machado vuole imporre la candidatura di Enrique Márquez per danneggiare Manuel Rosales.

"Quello che María Corina non sa è che Márquez è stato espulso dall'UNT perché corrotto ed è molto vicino agli scorpioni", ha detto Cabello.

Il deputato di AN ha inoltre assicurato che “María Corina fa movimenti strani, Machado ha avuto una videochiamata con Leopoldo López di circa 40 minuti, durante la chiamata hanno concordato di non seguire gli ordini dell'ambasciatore Francisco Palmieri e hanno deciso di riattivare gli attacchi sui social”. reti contro Rosales, tutte coordinate con il giornalista Orlando Avendaño."

In una lettera letta da Cabello attraverso il programma Con El Mazo Dando, ha affermato che gli attacchi contro l'attuale candidato Rosales mirano a fare pressione sui partiti indecisi della Piattaforma Unitaria affinché non gli diano il loro appoggio.

Infine, Diosdado ha mostrato la fotografia di una riunione dei partiti di opposizione e ha detto: “C'è stata una riunione di coordinamento nel Parque Central alla quale hanno partecipato 11 partiti del MUD, tra cui Un Nuevo Tiempo (…) Lì si è discusso di molte cose "brutte e violentecose (...) María Corina proporrà la candidatura di Enrique Márquez come piano C con l'intenzione di nuocere a Rosales."
 
VENEZUELA: The US Treasury issued General License 44A to replace General License 44 which OFAC says allows companies to wind down some oil activities by 31 May. Read OFAC FAQ related to the action: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932821/download?inline.



DESK VIEW: This is credit neutral to positive. Let us be clear, the ideal, credit positive scenario would have been the full renewal of GL44, and that is not what happened. The message from the US that this is a “wind down” license, is meant as a negative action against the regime of Nicolas Maduro. That said, some things to note:



• This is positive for the business of Western oil companies: On the positive front, the action that OFAC calls a “wind down of transactions” still leaves in place licenses GL8M (which allows oil services companies Halliburton, Schlumberger, Baker Hughes, and Weatherford International to do business in the country) and GL41 (which allows Chevron’s operations in the country). This means that, aside from the expiration of GL44, Chevron – the largest oil operator in the country – can continue to do work to further increase oil production in Venezuela. OFAC also notes in its FAQs that any companies that have been engaging with Venezuela more recently can seek their own licenses on a case-by-case basis. This suggests that PDVSA will need its private sector partners (aside from Chevron) to get licenses approved by OFAC now and in the future, arguably making PDVSA more dependent on those partners to produce and sell its oil. This also explains why many companies moved quickly to farm into projects and why companies such as Repsol received increased acreage in Venezuela recently, just ahead of the 18 April deadline. One question that remains unclear is which other Western companies have already secured such special permits from October until now, and that is a piece of information we will get only gradually.



• This is still positive for oil production, but limited: We should note that of the 840,000 barrels a day produced in February, roughly 49% was generated by state owned PDVSA, and 51% by the joint venture partners, of which 155,000 barrels a day was produced by Chevron alone, and the rest by Russian oil companies, China’s CNPC, European companies (Repsol, ENI, M&P, and Perenco) and an India’s ONGC, as per estimates by oil economist Francisco Monaldi. In Monaldi’s middle-ground scenario of no GL44 renewal, but Chevron keeping its license and Europeans getting additional licenses, the country’s production could surpass 1m b/d by 2025 but decline from that point on if no new investment is forthcoming. This scenario appears achievable given that rising oil production as of March stood at 874,000 barrels a day, based on direct communication data from OPEC’s monthly.



• No more secondary bond trading restrictions: Another positive is that yesterday’s action did not bring about the reimposition of secondary bond trading restrictions and this means in our view that those are unlikely to return any time soon, likely because they do not hurt or impede the Maduro regime in any meaningful way. This should help put away the fear of some folks in the market that Venezuelan debt could face another trading ban if the relationship with the U.S. worsens.
 
VENEZUELA: The government of Nicolás Maduro has reportedly mandated Rothschild as a financial advisor to help review its debt obligations, REDD intelligence reported yesterday. Read REDD article: Home.



DESK VIEW: This is credit positive, if accurate. As per the REDD coverage, Rothschild has been formally retained by the government which could be seen as a credit positive signal that the current administration is considering a scenario of an eventual debt restructuring. In our view, the current state of affairs with the ongoing presidential elections cycle (with a vote set for 28 July) and Congressional and regional elections likely to happen sometime next year, make less likely that a restructuring happens in the near term.



In our view, the incentives for an eventual restructuring under the current Maduro regime may include: a) reengaging with markets in order to affirm Maduro’s political legitimacy, b) reengaging with the market hoping this can prompt the U.S. to ease sanctions further, as per the request and lobbying of bondholders, and c) reengaging hoping to limit sanctions risk to new oil fund flows. We should note that for any debt restructuring to happen, the U.S. would have to lift its restriction of primary debt issuance for Venezuela which is another hurdle still pending. Assuming Venezuela is looking into addressing its debt situation, a question that merits asking is the relative ease of a future restructuring negotiation under a hypothetical opposition government where consensus of various stakeholders is needed
 
apri il pdf è datato

Updated on April 17, 2024
 
VENEZUELA: The government of Nicolás Maduro has reportedly mandated Rothschild as a financial advisor to help review its debt obligations, REDD intelligence reported yesterday. Read REDD article: Home.



DESK VIEW: This is credit positive, if accurate. As per the REDD coverage, Rothschild has been formally retained by the government which could be seen as a credit positive signal that the current administration is considering a scenario of an eventual debt restructuring. In our view, the current state of affairs with the ongoing presidential elections cycle (with a vote set for 28 July) and Congressional and regional elections likely to happen sometime next year, make less likely that a restructuring happens in the near term.



In our view, the incentives for an eventual restructuring under the current Maduro regime may include: a) reengaging with markets in order to affirm Maduro’s political legitimacy, b) reengaging with the market hoping this can prompt the U.S. to ease sanctions further, as per the request and lobbying of bondholders, and c) reengaging hoping to limit sanctions risk to new oil fund flows. We should note that for any debt restructuring to happen, the U.S. would have to lift its restriction of primary debt issuance for Venezuela which is another hurdle still pending. Assuming Venezuela is looking into addressing its debt situation, a question that merits asking is the relative ease of a future restructuring negotiation under a hypothetical opposition government where consensus of various stakeholders is needed
Questo è un credito positivo, se accurato. Secondo la copertura REDD, Rothschild è stato formalmente mantenuto dal governo, il che potrebbe essere visto come un segnale positivo sul credito che indica che l'attuale amministrazione sta considerando uno scenario di un'eventuale ristrutturazione del debito. A nostro avviso, l’attuale situazione con il ciclo elettorale presidenziale in corso (con voto fissato per il 28 luglio) e le elezioni congressuali e regionali che probabilmente si terranno l’anno prossimo, rendono meno probabile che avvenga una ristrutturazione nel breve termine. Dal punto di vista economico, gli incentivi per un'eventuale ristrutturazione sotto l'attuale regime di Maduro potrebbero includere: a) un nuovo impegno con i mercati per affermare la legittimità politica di Maduro, b) un nuovo impegno con il mercato sperando che ciò possa spingere gli Stati Uniti ad allentare ulteriormente le sanzioni, come da richiesta e lobbying sugli obbligazionisti, e c) impegnarsi nuovamente nella speranza di limitare il rischio di sanzioni sui nuovi flussi di fondi petroliferi. Dovremmo notare che affinché qualsiasi ristrutturazione del debito avvenga, gli Stati Uniti dovrebbero eliminare la restrizione sull’emissione di debito primario per il Venezuela, che rappresenta un altro ostacolo ancora in sospeso. Supponendo che il Venezuela stia cercando di affrontare la propria situazione debitoria, una domanda che merita di essere posta è la relativa facilità di un futuro negoziato di ristrutturazione sotto un ipotetico governo di opposizione in cui è necessario il consenso di varie parti interessate.

In pratica una mossa di nicolino.
 
VENEZUELA: The US Treasury issued General License 44A to replace General License 44 which OFAC says allows companies to wind down some oil activities by 31 May. Read OFAC FAQ related to the action: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932821/download?inline.



DESK VIEW: This is credit neutral to positive. Let us be clear, the ideal, credit positive scenario would have been the full renewal of GL44, and that is not what happened. The message from the US that this is a “wind down” license, is meant as a negative action against the regime of Nicolas Maduro. That said, some things to note:



• This is positive for the business of Western oil companies: On the positive front, the action that OFAC calls a “wind down of transactions” still leaves in place licenses GL8M (which allows oil services companies Halliburton, Schlumberger, Baker Hughes, and Weatherford International to do business in the country) and GL41 (which allows Chevron’s operations in the country). This means that, aside from the expiration of GL44, Chevron – the largest oil operator in the country – can continue to do work to further increase oil production in Venezuela. OFAC also notes in its FAQs that any companies that have been engaging with Venezuela more recently can seek their own licenses on a case-by-case basis. This suggests that PDVSA will need its private sector partners (aside from Chevron) to get licenses approved by OFAC now and in the future, arguably making PDVSA more dependent on those partners to produce and sell its oil. This also explains why many companies moved quickly to farm into projects and why companies such as Repsol received increased acreage in Venezuela recently, just ahead of the 18 April deadline. One question that remains unclear is which other Western companies have already secured such special permits from October until now, and that is a piece of information we will get only gradually.



• This is still positive for oil production, but limited: We should note that of the 840,000 barrels a day produced in February, roughly 49% was generated by state owned PDVSA, and 51% by the joint venture partners, of which 155,000 barrels a day was produced by Chevron alone, and the rest by Russian oil companies, China’s CNPC, European companies (Repsol, ENI, M&P, and Perenco) and an India’s ONGC, as per estimates by oil economist Francisco Monaldi. In Monaldi’s middle-ground scenario of no GL44 renewal, but Chevron keeping its license and Europeans getting additional licenses, the country’s production could surpass 1m b/d by 2025 but decline from that point on if no new investment is forthcoming. This scenario appears achievable given that rising oil production as of March stood at 874,000 barrels a day, based on direct communication data from OPEC’s monthly.



• No more secondary bond trading restrictions: Another positive is that yesterday’s action did not bring about the reimposition of secondary bond trading restrictions and this means in our view that those are unlikely to return any time soon, likely because they do not hurt or impede the Maduro regime in any meaningful way. This should help put away the fear of some folks in the market that Venezuelan debt could face another trading ban if the relationship with the U.S. worsens.
L’eterno ritorno dell’identico…gli USA hanno un disperato bisogno del bitume venezolano….Maduro se lo faranno piacere!
 
Allora ragazzi come state?
Quand'è che (ri)diventiamo ricchi?
Bene grazie e ben rivista.
Mi contento che le VVV siano tornate almeno vendibili a prezzi non malaccio.

Per la grande ristrutturazione temo che, visto che zio Nicola sembra non essere minimamente disposto a farsi da parte lasciando la scelta agli elettori, occorrerà pazientare.
 
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