Ciao Aurum, ciao Kuka, ciao Befana, ciao a tutti gli amici del forum,
scusatemi le mie presenze sul forum sono rare, ma ho avuto un grave lutto familiare e non ho la testa per seguire tutto.
Vi segnalo questo articolo dell'Economist che mi hanno inviato e che io non sono capace di tradurre.
Un abbraccio, e a presto.
P.S. Ho letto il comunicato ABI ricevuto da Befana, mi sembra certamente una notizia molto positiva proverò con le mie due banche presso le quali ho acquistato i bond di Glitnir (Unicredit e Credito Siciliano) se ne sanno qualcosa (finora gli impiegati con cui ho parlato non mi hanno aiutato per nulla, neanche sapevano che Glitnir fosse fallita!!!).
PELT TIGHTENING
Jul 23rd 2009
A country staggers back to its feet
TINY Iceland was hit uniquely hard by the credit crisis. Its banks had
assets eight times its GDP. When they collapsed it seemed that a life
of fishing and harvesting pelts beckoned for the country's more
sophisticated inhabitants. Yet Iceland is special in another way: it
did not issue a blanket bail-out to its banks, but rather let bits of
them go bust. That could mean the cost to its public is less
devastating than once seemed possible.
When the government stepped in last October, it only took over the
domestic operations of the three big banks. The latest data have not
been made public, but at the end of 2007 local assets accounted for
just over half of the banks' total. On July 20th the government said it
would inject $2 billion of capital into these "new" domestic banks,
leaving their solvency ratios at robust levels. Most creditors are
stuck in the bankrupt "old" banks, but if any surplus value emerges in
the new banks beyond that of the public capital, they will get bonds or
shares in them as compensation.
The taxpayer's gross bill for the banking mess comes in three bits,
says Fridrik Baldursson of Reykjavik University. There is the capital
just injected. There are the loans to lenders made during the crisis by
the central bank, which must now queue up with other creditors of the
"old" banks. Biggest and most controversially, there is the cost of
honouring the guarantee made to foreigners with "Icesave" deposits at
the old Landsbanki. Include all three and the total cost could amount
to an eye-watering 90% of GDP.
But the government gets some assets too. The stakes in the "new" banks
should be worth something. As a creditor, the state also has a big
claim on the assets of the "old" banks as they are restructured or
wound down. The central bank has just had a stab at forecasting
public-sector debt (excluding a small amount of local-government
liabilities). Gross debt will soar to about 180% of GDP next year. But
after including financial assets, net debt rises to only 40% of GDP,
from about zero before the crisis.
Of course that is cold comfort to the creditors who have lost money.
And other investors are livid too, not least those with funds still
trapped in the country by capital controls. But for the Icelandic
public, whiplashed by the financial crisis, there are at least some
grounds for hope.
See this article with graphics and related items at
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14098340