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segnalo questa breve intervista a Sir John Templeton e Peter Lynch:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1r9kXM5-qUY
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1r9kXM5-qUY
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locco68
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grazie della segnalazione. Io pero' non capisco quasi un piffero....puoi fare un sunto? Ciao.
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azz è un po' lunga da scrivere 
sempre le solite cose sull'investimento azionario: lungo periodo, comprare quando costa poco,ecc ma c'è qualche battutina tipo Templeton che sulla teoria dei mercati efficienti dice "anche in una partita di tennis ci possono essere lo stesso numero di punti vincenti e perdenti ma non è una buona ragione per smettere di giocare a tennis" o "la cosa principale che la gente deve capire è che selezionare gli asset è completamente diverso da qualunque altro tipo di attività. Se vai da 10 dottori e ti danno la stessa medicina è giusto che sia così, se vai da dieci ingegneri per costruire un ponte e ti dicono la stessa cosa è giusto che sia così, ma se vai da tre consiglieri per gli investimenti e ti consigliano lo stesso asset fai meglio a starne alla larga"
sempre le solite cose sull'investimento azionario: lungo periodo, comprare quando costa poco,ecc ma c'è qualche battutina tipo Templeton che sulla teoria dei mercati efficienti dice "anche in una partita di tennis ci possono essere lo stesso numero di punti vincenti e perdenti ma non è una buona ragione per smettere di giocare a tennis" o "la cosa principale che la gente deve capire è che selezionare gli asset è completamente diverso da qualunque altro tipo di attività. Se vai da 10 dottori e ti danno la stessa medicina è giusto che sia così, se vai da dieci ingegneri per costruire un ponte e ti dicono la stessa cosa è giusto che sia così, ma se vai da tre consiglieri per gli investimenti e ti consigliano lo stesso asset fai meglio a starne alla larga"
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articolo di Zweig su Graham e le aziende piene di cassa:
The Intelligent Investor: Why Won't Companies Unlock Their Cash Hoards? - WSJ.com
There is a cash crisis in corporate America—although it comes not from a shortage of the stuff, but from a surplus.
In the first quarter, the five companies with the greatest cash hoards—Microsoft, Cisco Systems, Google, Apple and Johnson & Johnson—added $15 billion in cash and marketable securities to their balance sheets. Microsoft alone packed away roughly $9 billion, or $100 million a day. All told, the companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index are sitting on more than $960 billion in cash, a record.
To be sure, at many companies the cash piling up is at global operations that generate "undistributed foreign earnings" that can't be brought home, under U.S. law, without incurring taxes of up to 35%. But hundreds of billions in cash remain available—and idle.
Meanwhile, the payout ratio—the proportion of earnings paid out as dividend income to shareholders—fell to 28.9% for the past four quarters. That, says S&P senior index analyst Howard Silverblatt, is the lowest level since 1936. Dividends are going up—Intel, UnitedHealth Group and WellPoint have recently raised them—but cash is still piling up far faster than most industrial giants can possibly find a prudent use for it. Of course, investors themselves might have a better use for the cash, if they could get at it.
As Daniel Peris, co-manager of the Federated Strategic Value Dividend fund, says, "The likelihood of spending money poorly is increased by having a surplus of it."
Microsoft's purchase price for the online telecommunications firm Skype, widely criticized as too rich at $8.5 billion, almost precisely matches the amount of cash that Microsoft raked in last quarter. Was that torrent of cash burning a hole in Microsoft's pocket?
"No way," says Bill Koefoed, general manager of investor relations at Microsoft. "We see this as being a very strategic acquisition."
The heart of the problem, as the great investor Benjamin Graham pointed out decades ago, is that the best interests of corporate management and outside investors are at odds. That is especially true for giant companies whose growth has been slowing. "The more dubious the company's prospects…the more anxious management is to retain all the cash it can in the business," Graham wrote. "But the stockholders would be well advised to take out all the capital that can be safely spared, because these funds are much more valuable to them if in their own pockets, or invested elsewhere."
Amnesia is another culprit. In the past, companies paid out vastly more of their profits as dividends, and they should again. "If there were a greater historical sensibility among investors and managers," Mr. Peris says, today's low payouts "would be called out as an abnormal situation that's likely to lead to that money being less well-spent than it otherwise might be."
Dividends have gotten short shrift in recent years as investors have come to favor companies that instead use cash surpluses to buy back their shares. Meanwhile, with the economic recovery barely out of the sickbed, many companies are reluctant to invest heavily in expansion. Others want to keep cash handy for potential acquisitions. So cash sits idle—even as interest rates, after inflation, are so low that cash often produces negative real returns.
Benjamin Graham made three simple proposals in 1951 that deserve to be revived.
First, investors need to realize that a company's cash is a valuable asset, even when interest rates are low; if management won't put it to good use, investors must speak up. As Graham wrote: "When the results on capital are unsatisfactory, it is appropriate for stockholders to…insist that it be returned to stockholders on an equitable basis."
Second, companies should set formal dividend policies. Rather than paying or raising dividends out of the blue, they should state in advance what proportion of earnings they expect to pay out as cash dividends. If, instead, they plan to use excess cash to buy back shares, they should offer hard evidence that the stock is undervalued.
Finally, Graham advocated that leading companies should pay out two-thirds of their earnings as dividends. That rate isn't as radical as it might sound, even though it would amount to more than a doubling from today's levels. The dividend payout, as a percentage of total profits, has averaged 52.3% since 1936 and 46% over the past two decades, according to Standard & Poor's.
If the companies in the S&P 500 raised their payout ratio to 50%, Mr. Silverblatt estimates, that would put an extra $207 billion into investors' pockets—at a time when shareholders' dividend income is taxed at historically low rates.
"Companies are basically earning more than they've ever made before, but their payouts are nowhere near that high," says Mr. Silverblatt. "They're holding their cash really tight. You can call them Scrooges if you want."
The Intelligent Investor: Why Won't Companies Unlock Their Cash Hoards? - WSJ.com
There is a cash crisis in corporate America—although it comes not from a shortage of the stuff, but from a surplus.
In the first quarter, the five companies with the greatest cash hoards—Microsoft, Cisco Systems, Google, Apple and Johnson & Johnson—added $15 billion in cash and marketable securities to their balance sheets. Microsoft alone packed away roughly $9 billion, or $100 million a day. All told, the companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index are sitting on more than $960 billion in cash, a record.
To be sure, at many companies the cash piling up is at global operations that generate "undistributed foreign earnings" that can't be brought home, under U.S. law, without incurring taxes of up to 35%. But hundreds of billions in cash remain available—and idle.
Meanwhile, the payout ratio—the proportion of earnings paid out as dividend income to shareholders—fell to 28.9% for the past four quarters. That, says S&P senior index analyst Howard Silverblatt, is the lowest level since 1936. Dividends are going up—Intel, UnitedHealth Group and WellPoint have recently raised them—but cash is still piling up far faster than most industrial giants can possibly find a prudent use for it. Of course, investors themselves might have a better use for the cash, if they could get at it.
As Daniel Peris, co-manager of the Federated Strategic Value Dividend fund, says, "The likelihood of spending money poorly is increased by having a surplus of it."
Microsoft's purchase price for the online telecommunications firm Skype, widely criticized as too rich at $8.5 billion, almost precisely matches the amount of cash that Microsoft raked in last quarter. Was that torrent of cash burning a hole in Microsoft's pocket?
"No way," says Bill Koefoed, general manager of investor relations at Microsoft. "We see this as being a very strategic acquisition."
The heart of the problem, as the great investor Benjamin Graham pointed out decades ago, is that the best interests of corporate management and outside investors are at odds. That is especially true for giant companies whose growth has been slowing. "The more dubious the company's prospects…the more anxious management is to retain all the cash it can in the business," Graham wrote. "But the stockholders would be well advised to take out all the capital that can be safely spared, because these funds are much more valuable to them if in their own pockets, or invested elsewhere."
Amnesia is another culprit. In the past, companies paid out vastly more of their profits as dividends, and they should again. "If there were a greater historical sensibility among investors and managers," Mr. Peris says, today's low payouts "would be called out as an abnormal situation that's likely to lead to that money being less well-spent than it otherwise might be."
Dividends have gotten short shrift in recent years as investors have come to favor companies that instead use cash surpluses to buy back their shares. Meanwhile, with the economic recovery barely out of the sickbed, many companies are reluctant to invest heavily in expansion. Others want to keep cash handy for potential acquisitions. So cash sits idle—even as interest rates, after inflation, are so low that cash often produces negative real returns.
Benjamin Graham made three simple proposals in 1951 that deserve to be revived.
First, investors need to realize that a company's cash is a valuable asset, even when interest rates are low; if management won't put it to good use, investors must speak up. As Graham wrote: "When the results on capital are unsatisfactory, it is appropriate for stockholders to…insist that it be returned to stockholders on an equitable basis."
Second, companies should set formal dividend policies. Rather than paying or raising dividends out of the blue, they should state in advance what proportion of earnings they expect to pay out as cash dividends. If, instead, they plan to use excess cash to buy back shares, they should offer hard evidence that the stock is undervalued.
Finally, Graham advocated that leading companies should pay out two-thirds of their earnings as dividends. That rate isn't as radical as it might sound, even though it would amount to more than a doubling from today's levels. The dividend payout, as a percentage of total profits, has averaged 52.3% since 1936 and 46% over the past two decades, according to Standard & Poor's.
If the companies in the S&P 500 raised their payout ratio to 50%, Mr. Silverblatt estimates, that would put an extra $207 billion into investors' pockets—at a time when shareholders' dividend income is taxed at historically low rates.
"Companies are basically earning more than they've ever made before, but their payouts are nowhere near that high," says Mr. Silverblatt. "They're holding their cash really tight. You can call them Scrooges if you want."
Leite
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segnalo questa analisi di fondi value di Montier:
Singapore High Yield Income Investing: The Perfect Value Investor
Singapore High Yield Income Investing: The Perfect Value Investor
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un intelligent investor d'altri tempi (l'unico tra i grandi economisti):
The Intelligent Investor: Keynes: One Mean Money Manager - WSJ.com
By JASON ZWEIG
No one is a Keynesian now—at least not among money managers. And that is a shame.
John Maynard Keynes overhauled the global economy decades ago. He also transformed the world of investing - in ways most investors today can only dream of.
A new analysis of the investment performance of John Maynard Keynes proves that the famous economist also was one of the greatest investors of the past century. By understanding what made Keynes such a star, investors can get a firmer grasp on why so many of today's money managers seem so dim.
Regardless of how you feel about his theories on the need for governmental intervention in the economy, Keynes (1883–1946) long has had a reputation as an outstanding investor. Until now, however, no one had ever gone to the trouble of reconstructing his investment track record.
David Chambers and Elroy Dimson, finance scholars at the University of Cambridge and the London Business School, respectively, have spent much of the past few years picking apart Keynes's portfolios.
They have found out that Keynes's returns were extraordinary. How he achieved them was even more remarkable.
From 1924 through 1946, while writing numerous books and overhauling the global monetary system, Keynes also found time to run the endowment fund of King's College at Cambridge.
Over that period, according to Messrs. Chambers and Dimson, Keynes outperformed the U.K. stock market by an average of eight percentage points annually, adjusted for risk.
Such great investors as Benjamin Graham, Peter Lynch, John Templeton and Warren Buffett beat the market by an annual average of three to 13 percentage points over their careers. Most of them, however, didn't have to cope with the Great Depression or World War II.
Flexibility, resilience and independence.
Keynes began as what we would today call a "macro" manager, relying on monetary and economic signals to rotate in and out of stocks, bonds and cash. He traded foreign currencies and commodities. As a director of the Bank of England, Keynes was privy to inside information about interest-rate changes, although there isn't evidence that he traded on it.
But Keynes wasn't a very good macro manager. He lagged behind the British stock market miserably until 1928, and he had 83% of his primary portfolio in stocks going into the fall of 1929.
"It's hard to time the markets," Mr. Chambers says. "Keynes struggled with it, and then he missed the 1929 crash—even with an unrivaled network of information sources."
So Keynes made a series of radical changes: He switched from being a "top down" asset allocator to a "bottom up" stock picker. He tilted sharply toward undervalued small and midsize companies.
Keynes also made titanic bets on industries he thought were cheap; by 1936, he had 66% of his portfolio in mining stocks and not a farthing in bank or energy shares. South African gold companies, he correctly foresaw, would benefit from falling currency values.
Keynes wasn't only a pioneer in owning stocks when most big investors favored bonds. He also relished risk, concentrating as much as half of his assets on his favorite five holdings or, as he called them, his "pets." Keynes clung to his typical stock for more than five years at a time. Only partly in jest, he had proposed making "the purchase of an investment permanent and indissoluble, like marriage." (Today, the average U.S. stock fund has only 19% in its five biggest positions and hangs on to its typical stock for just 15 months.)
The "tracking error" of Keynes's portfolio—the extent to which it behaved differently from the market as a whole—ran nearly four times higher than is typical at institutional funds today, report Messrs. Chambers and Dimson.
Keynes was no mere contrarian. He was the epitome of his own definition of a long-term investor: "eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of average opinion." To emulate Keynes, "you have to be idiosyncratic," Mr. Chambers says. "That's easy to say but much harder to execute."
One of Keynes's biggest advantages, say Messrs. Chambers and Dimson, was that the board of King's College gave him uncontested authority to invest as he wished.
Today, such latitude can be found only in smaller investment boutiques—Fairholme, FPA, Longleaf and Yacktman, to give a few examples—that operate independently and don't kowtow to their clients. That latitude, of course, comes at the risk of horrific returns in the short run and the chance that the best talent might bolt.
At most larger investment firms, meanwhile, portfolio managers must invest in narrow "style boxes" and sheepishly shadow the performance of their peers. The prime directive at today's weak-kneed asset-management companies is to ensure that their portfolios never deviate much from average results. That discourages clients from fleeing and enables firms to keep earning fat fees—maximizing their own returns while minimizing those of the clients.
Even more than in Keynes's day, it is worth hiring an active money manager only if you have the confidence that he or she is a free spirit who will have a completely free hand.
Otherwise, with Keynes no longer available, you might as well buy an index fund.
The Intelligent Investor: Keynes: One Mean Money Manager - WSJ.com
By JASON ZWEIG
No one is a Keynesian now—at least not among money managers. And that is a shame.
John Maynard Keynes overhauled the global economy decades ago. He also transformed the world of investing - in ways most investors today can only dream of.
A new analysis of the investment performance of John Maynard Keynes proves that the famous economist also was one of the greatest investors of the past century. By understanding what made Keynes such a star, investors can get a firmer grasp on why so many of today's money managers seem so dim.
Regardless of how you feel about his theories on the need for governmental intervention in the economy, Keynes (1883–1946) long has had a reputation as an outstanding investor. Until now, however, no one had ever gone to the trouble of reconstructing his investment track record.
David Chambers and Elroy Dimson, finance scholars at the University of Cambridge and the London Business School, respectively, have spent much of the past few years picking apart Keynes's portfolios.
They have found out that Keynes's returns were extraordinary. How he achieved them was even more remarkable.
From 1924 through 1946, while writing numerous books and overhauling the global monetary system, Keynes also found time to run the endowment fund of King's College at Cambridge.
Over that period, according to Messrs. Chambers and Dimson, Keynes outperformed the U.K. stock market by an average of eight percentage points annually, adjusted for risk.
Such great investors as Benjamin Graham, Peter Lynch, John Templeton and Warren Buffett beat the market by an annual average of three to 13 percentage points over their careers. Most of them, however, didn't have to cope with the Great Depression or World War II.
Flexibility, resilience and independence.
Keynes began as what we would today call a "macro" manager, relying on monetary and economic signals to rotate in and out of stocks, bonds and cash. He traded foreign currencies and commodities. As a director of the Bank of England, Keynes was privy to inside information about interest-rate changes, although there isn't evidence that he traded on it.
But Keynes wasn't a very good macro manager. He lagged behind the British stock market miserably until 1928, and he had 83% of his primary portfolio in stocks going into the fall of 1929.
"It's hard to time the markets," Mr. Chambers says. "Keynes struggled with it, and then he missed the 1929 crash—even with an unrivaled network of information sources."
So Keynes made a series of radical changes: He switched from being a "top down" asset allocator to a "bottom up" stock picker. He tilted sharply toward undervalued small and midsize companies.
Keynes also made titanic bets on industries he thought were cheap; by 1936, he had 66% of his portfolio in mining stocks and not a farthing in bank or energy shares. South African gold companies, he correctly foresaw, would benefit from falling currency values.
Keynes wasn't only a pioneer in owning stocks when most big investors favored bonds. He also relished risk, concentrating as much as half of his assets on his favorite five holdings or, as he called them, his "pets." Keynes clung to his typical stock for more than five years at a time. Only partly in jest, he had proposed making "the purchase of an investment permanent and indissoluble, like marriage." (Today, the average U.S. stock fund has only 19% in its five biggest positions and hangs on to its typical stock for just 15 months.)
The "tracking error" of Keynes's portfolio—the extent to which it behaved differently from the market as a whole—ran nearly four times higher than is typical at institutional funds today, report Messrs. Chambers and Dimson.
Keynes was no mere contrarian. He was the epitome of his own definition of a long-term investor: "eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of average opinion." To emulate Keynes, "you have to be idiosyncratic," Mr. Chambers says. "That's easy to say but much harder to execute."
One of Keynes's biggest advantages, say Messrs. Chambers and Dimson, was that the board of King's College gave him uncontested authority to invest as he wished.
Today, such latitude can be found only in smaller investment boutiques—Fairholme, FPA, Longleaf and Yacktman, to give a few examples—that operate independently and don't kowtow to their clients. That latitude, of course, comes at the risk of horrific returns in the short run and the chance that the best talent might bolt.
At most larger investment firms, meanwhile, portfolio managers must invest in narrow "style boxes" and sheepishly shadow the performance of their peers. The prime directive at today's weak-kneed asset-management companies is to ensure that their portfolios never deviate much from average results. That discourages clients from fleeing and enables firms to keep earning fat fees—maximizing their own returns while minimizing those of the clients.
Even more than in Keynes's day, it is worth hiring an active money manager only if you have the confidence that he or she is a free spirit who will have a completely free hand.
Otherwise, with Keynes no longer available, you might as well buy an index fund.
vb_rm
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Per chi fosse interessato, questo è l'articolo al quale si riferisce Zweig.
I punti di contatto tra Keynes e Graham, nonostante le differenze di storia personale e di formazione dei due, sono molto interessanti e forse meriterebbero un approfondimento. A incominciare, ad esempio, dalle definizione molto simili dei concetti di "investimento" e "speculazione".
Buffett lo ha fatto notare con la solita efficacia qualche mese fa (post di Leite qui http://www.finanzaonline.com/forum/...berkshire-hathaway-n-2-a-22.html#post31112040) dicendo che se uno ha letto The Intelligent Investor ed il capitolo 12 della Teoria Generale non ha bisogno di studiare molto altro e "può spegnere la tv" - parlando alla CNBC!.
I punti di contatto tra Keynes e Graham, nonostante le differenze di storia personale e di formazione dei due, sono molto interessanti e forse meriterebbero un approfondimento. A incominciare, ad esempio, dalle definizione molto simili dei concetti di "investimento" e "speculazione".
Buffett lo ha fatto notare con la solita efficacia qualche mese fa (post di Leite qui http://www.finanzaonline.com/forum/...berkshire-hathaway-n-2-a-22.html#post31112040) dicendo che se uno ha letto The Intelligent Investor ed il capitolo 12 della Teoria Generale non ha bisogno di studiare molto altro e "può spegnere la tv" - parlando alla CNBC
!.Allegati
Ultima modifica:
pmc
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se uno ha letto The Intelligent Investor ed il capitolo 12 della Teoria Generale non ha bisogno di studiare molto altro e "può spegnere la tv" - parlando alla CNBC
Peccato sia solo in inglese
Poi alla fine nella traduzione sicuramente molto andrebbe confuso o capito male.
Leite
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grazie, qualche tempo fa avevo letto questo libro:
Justyn Walsh - Keynes and the Market: How the Worlds Greatest Economist Overturned Conventional Wisdom (Repost)
mi era sfuggito. già scaricato, poi magari ne parliamo qui
vb_rm
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"in the short run the market is a voting machine, but in the long run it is a weighing machine." Chi cerca su google questa frase trova centinaia di riferimenti a Ben Graham come autore, e nella lettera agli azionisti di Berkshire del 1993 l'attribuzione è riportata esplicitamente.
Di fatto però una ricerca sulle opere di Graham fornisce solo la prima parte della frase, mentre la seconda manca, anzi Graham ha scritto una cosa abbastanza diversa: "The market is a voting machine, not a weighing machine".
Qualcuno ha chiesto spiegazioni direttamente a Buffett ed alla fine la risposta è stata: Ben lo diceva spesso, ma forse non lo ha mai scritto.
Tutta la storia si può leggere qui:
Bogleheads • View topic - DID Graham say "weighing machine in the long run?"
e questo fatto che può sembrare marginale dice invece molto su alcune diversità di impostazione di fondo tra Graham e Buffett.
Di fatto però una ricerca sulle opere di Graham fornisce solo la prima parte della frase, mentre la seconda manca, anzi Graham ha scritto una cosa abbastanza diversa: "The market is a voting machine, not a weighing machine".
Qualcuno ha chiesto spiegazioni direttamente a Buffett ed alla fine la risposta è stata: Ben lo diceva spesso, ma forse non lo ha mai scritto.
Tutta la storia si può leggere qui:
Bogleheads • View topic - DID Graham say "weighing machine in the long run?"
e questo fatto che può sembrare marginale dice invece molto su alcune diversità di impostazione di fondo tra Graham e Buffett.
Aerodynamik
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Ma su internet si trovano un sacco di frasi, metodi, principi, ecc...che vengono attribuiti a Graham, che se vai e leggi i suoi libri nella sua INTEGRITA' te ne accorgeresti che lui non ha mai detto certo cose...
Tanto per dirti una...In tanti ( perfino esperti ) dicono che il "metodo" di selezione di titoli di Graham era e ed rimasto tale fino alla sua morte quello che molti chiamano net-net, cioè comprare titoli completamente sani. però misteriosamente quotati a 2/3 del working capital...
In realtà lui aveva SUGGERITO anche se non sapeva bene il perchè, che nei SUOI giorni (anni 30, anni 40) non era difficile individuare queste aberrazioni di mercato, ma col passare degli anni (e pure nelle ulteriori edizioni de suoi libri) già dagli anni 50 in poi, lui stesso scrive...che quelle opportunità ed stranezze non esistevano più e se si riusciva a trovare una era perchè l'azienda era veramente ridotta male.
E su internet ti trovi con blogs, ecc...che spacciano che Graham tutta la vita ha cercato tassativamente di scegliere questo tipo di titoli, tanto da coniare il cosidetto "Metodo Graham", "Graham Number" ecc..
Leite
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e nel caso specifico è per fare soldi vendendo un servizio di selezione titoli con il "metodo Graham"
in realtà lui aveva pensato a vari metodi quantitativi molto semplici per comprare e vendere meccanicamente azioni, per esempio in un'intervista a una rivista per medici suggeriva di cercare almeno una trentina azioni con earnings yield (inverso p/e) almeno due volte del bond statale 20ennale e debt/equity < 1; aspettare che entro 2 anni raggiungano l'obiettivo di realizzo (es:50%) e poi venderle
ma credo che nessun medico l'abbia mai messo in pratica
in realtà lui aveva pensato a vari metodi quantitativi molto semplici per comprare e vendere meccanicamente azioni, per esempio in un'intervista a una rivista per medici suggeriva di cercare almeno una trentina azioni con earnings yield (inverso p/e) almeno due volte del bond statale 20ennale e debt/equity < 1; aspettare che entro 2 anni raggiungano l'obiettivo di realizzo (es:50%) e poi venderle
ma credo che nessun medico l'abbia mai messo in pratica
vb_rm
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Mi sono imbattuto in questo articolo che mostra come il P/E calcolato mediando gli utili su un periodo di più anni - come facevano Graham e Dodd - è un predittore delle successive performances di un titolo significativamente migliore del P/E basato su un unico anno.
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sullo studio citato da vb_rm nella pagina precedente:
Keynesian investment: Returns fit for King's | The Economist
IF YOU'RE so smart, why aren’t you rich? That question (which Deirdre McCloskey calls The American Question) exasperates most economists, who model markets better than they play them. One possible exception is John Maynard Keynes, who has always had a reputation as a star-performing investor.
A fascinating new paper by David Chambers of Cambridge’s Judge Business School and Elroy Dimson of the London Business School takes a closer look at his money-making record.
Keynes’s Cambridge college, King’s, put its endowment under his control from the early 1920s until his death in 1946. Exotic tales of Keynes’s highly individual investment strategy have become as legendary as his other exploits, such as earning top marks in the Civil Service examinations after no revision (or his infuriated claim that "I evidently knew more about Economics than my examiners,” after barely scraping into the top ten nationwide in his recently-discovered favourite subject). There are reports of him trading shares from his bed, or buying so much grain that it filled the college’s 15th-century chapel.
Mr Chambers and Mr Dimson buried themselves deep in the archives of King’s College to get a detailed idea of Keynes’s performance and trading strategies. He was indeed a very successful investor, beating the market by 8% on average over the 22 years he was in charge of the King’s College funds. But this performance is significantly less than the 14.5% excess return that previous studies had found. Messrs Chambers and Dimson also shed new light on how Keynes invested the King’s College money - and here his approach truly was revolutionary.
Up until the early 1930s, Keynes invested on the basis of large-scale macroeconomic predictions. No doubt this seemed sensible: he all but invented the field. Unfortunately - and ironically - it seems that where investing was concerned macroeconomics was not Keynes’s strong point. From 1924-32, his buys actually underperformed the market by 4% in the 12 months after purchase.
Fortunately, Keynes had another trick up his sleeve. During the early 1930s he adjusted his strategy towards investing heavily in equities, a radical decision given that it was considered to be an emerging asset class at the time. Mainstream investors in the UK held almost all their investments in bonds, with just 3% in equities in the 1920s and 10% by 1937. American investors were hardly better. Keynes was much more aggressive, with seldom less than half his portfolio in equities and often as high as 85%.
Investing in equities was hugely successful during this period, partly because most rival investors neglected them. In addition, the dividend yield for equities was above that for bonds throughout the period - sometimes as high as 6.2% - so equity investors did not even need to give up on income in their quest for capital gains.
The shift to equities had another beneficial effect, as it allowed Keynes to try his hand at stock-picking. One of the more memorable pieces of Keynes’s writing is his description of financial markets as analogous to a type of beauty contest popular in newspapers at the time. The contests required readers to choose the “most beautiful” from a set of published faces; readers which correctly picked the most popular faces won a prize. The trick was to choose not the faces you found most beautiful, but those likely to gain majority approval.
For Keynes, the job of the investor was similar in that the most profitable stocks were those attractive to the market rather than inherently the most promising companies. Indeed, he argued that trying to make serious long-term forecasts about the condition of companies was impossible. Nevertheless he seems to have been a dab hand at it, building and sticking with large positions in such diverse interests as South African mining and Norwegian whaling firms.
The authors of the paper emphasise the value of an institutional set-up that allows one manager to have free rein over the portfolio. In the case of Keynes at least, this certainly seems to have been a good idea - not least thanks to his extensive network of contacts throughout business and government. He also had the confidence to depart from the current consensus, and take advantage of the new asset class of equities in a way few others dared to. Investors looking for modern-day money managers with a similarly individual view had best hope they put their money with someone of similar acumen.
Keynesian investment: Returns fit for King's | The Economist
IF YOU'RE so smart, why aren’t you rich? That question (which Deirdre McCloskey calls The American Question) exasperates most economists, who model markets better than they play them. One possible exception is John Maynard Keynes, who has always had a reputation as a star-performing investor.
A fascinating new paper by David Chambers of Cambridge’s Judge Business School and Elroy Dimson of the London Business School takes a closer look at his money-making record.
Keynes’s Cambridge college, King’s, put its endowment under his control from the early 1920s until his death in 1946. Exotic tales of Keynes’s highly individual investment strategy have become as legendary as his other exploits, such as earning top marks in the Civil Service examinations after no revision (or his infuriated claim that "I evidently knew more about Economics than my examiners,” after barely scraping into the top ten nationwide in his recently-discovered favourite subject). There are reports of him trading shares from his bed, or buying so much grain that it filled the college’s 15th-century chapel.
Mr Chambers and Mr Dimson buried themselves deep in the archives of King’s College to get a detailed idea of Keynes’s performance and trading strategies. He was indeed a very successful investor, beating the market by 8% on average over the 22 years he was in charge of the King’s College funds. But this performance is significantly less than the 14.5% excess return that previous studies had found. Messrs Chambers and Dimson also shed new light on how Keynes invested the King’s College money - and here his approach truly was revolutionary.
Up until the early 1930s, Keynes invested on the basis of large-scale macroeconomic predictions. No doubt this seemed sensible: he all but invented the field. Unfortunately - and ironically - it seems that where investing was concerned macroeconomics was not Keynes’s strong point. From 1924-32, his buys actually underperformed the market by 4% in the 12 months after purchase.
Fortunately, Keynes had another trick up his sleeve. During the early 1930s he adjusted his strategy towards investing heavily in equities, a radical decision given that it was considered to be an emerging asset class at the time. Mainstream investors in the UK held almost all their investments in bonds, with just 3% in equities in the 1920s and 10% by 1937. American investors were hardly better. Keynes was much more aggressive, with seldom less than half his portfolio in equities and often as high as 85%.
Investing in equities was hugely successful during this period, partly because most rival investors neglected them. In addition, the dividend yield for equities was above that for bonds throughout the period - sometimes as high as 6.2% - so equity investors did not even need to give up on income in their quest for capital gains.
The shift to equities had another beneficial effect, as it allowed Keynes to try his hand at stock-picking. One of the more memorable pieces of Keynes’s writing is his description of financial markets as analogous to a type of beauty contest popular in newspapers at the time. The contests required readers to choose the “most beautiful” from a set of published faces; readers which correctly picked the most popular faces won a prize. The trick was to choose not the faces you found most beautiful, but those likely to gain majority approval.
For Keynes, the job of the investor was similar in that the most profitable stocks were those attractive to the market rather than inherently the most promising companies. Indeed, he argued that trying to make serious long-term forecasts about the condition of companies was impossible. Nevertheless he seems to have been a dab hand at it, building and sticking with large positions in such diverse interests as South African mining and Norwegian whaling firms.
The authors of the paper emphasise the value of an institutional set-up that allows one manager to have free rein over the portfolio. In the case of Keynes at least, this certainly seems to have been a good idea - not least thanks to his extensive network of contacts throughout business and government. He also had the confidence to depart from the current consensus, and take advantage of the new asset class of equities in a way few others dared to. Investors looking for modern-day money managers with a similarly individual view had best hope they put their money with someone of similar acumen.
vb_rm
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Amazon.com: Einstein of Money: The Life and Timeless Financial Wisdom of Benjamin Graham (9781616145576): Joe Carlen: Books
recensita sull'ultimo numero di The Economist
Benjamin Graham: Figuring it out | The Economist
(sullo stesso numero articolo su Seth Klarman e Baupost Group:
Seth Klarman: The Oracle of Boston | The Economist)
Amazon.com: Einstein of Money: The Life and Timeless Financial Wisdom of Benjamin Graham (9781616145576): Joe Carlen: Books
recensita sull'ultimo numero di The Economist
Benjamin Graham: Figuring it out | The Economist
(sullo stesso numero articolo su Seth Klarman e Baupost Group:
Seth Klarman: The Oracle of Boston | The Economist)
Leite
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Grazie (non ho ancora letto l'economist di questa settimana)
Klarman in un'intervista a Charlie Rose postata a suo tempo diceva che si considera un grahmiano "vecchio stampo" come il giovane Buffett, senza quindil'influenza dalle idee di Fisher e Munger sui business eccezionali che possono essere comprati anche a prezzi non eccezionali
Klarman in un'intervista a Charlie Rose postata a suo tempo diceva che si considera un grahmiano "vecchio stampo" come il giovane Buffett, senza quindil'influenza dalle idee di Fisher e Munger sui business eccezionali che possono essere comprati anche a prezzi non eccezionali