S&P 500 sopravvalutato ?

Will Stock Buybacks Bite Back?
Companies tend to buy their shares in the greatest quantities at the
worst possible time.
By
JASON ZWEIG

As the bull market soars ever higher, investors face big competition
for buying the shares of companies--and it comes from the companies
themselves.
Last year, the corporations in the Russell 3000, a broad U.S. stock
index, repurchased $567.6 billion worth of their own shares--a 21%
increase over 2012, calculates Rob Leiphart, an analyst at Birinyi
Associates, a research firm in Westport, Conn. That brings total
buybacks since the beginning of 2005 to $4.21 trillion--or nearly
one-fifth of the total value of all U.S. stocks today.
There has been a lot of talk in the past few years about how index
funds, which buy and hold stocks regardless of whether they are cheap
or expensive, might be contributing to an overvaluation of the U.S.
stock market. But the companies that make up the U.S. stock market
might be contributing even more. And, if you wanted a signal of when
to get in and out of the market, doing the opposite of whatever
companies themselves are doing would serve you pretty well.
The Russell 3000 returned 33.5% last year, including dividends. At the
end of 2012, the stocks in the index were trading at an average of
16.7 times their net earnings; by year-end 2013, the index was at a
multiple of 20.6 times.
So, even as stock prices rose by a third and became a quarter more
expensive relative to underlying profits, companies bought their own
shares back more aggressively than the year before.
To be sure, corporations should favor a buyback when shares are
trading below the total value of their future cash flows and when
capital expenditures or acquisitions don't appear likely to offer a
higher rate of return. And investors ought to welcome a repurchase,
since it should increase earnings per share--so long as the company
isn't overvalued and can finance the buyback cheaply.
Yet companies tend to exhibit the same perverse timing--buying high and
selling low--as individual and institutional investors. As the market
hit a then-record high in the third quarter of 2007, corporations
bought back more than twice as much of their shares--$214.3 billion
worth--as they did in the depths of the bear market. In the final
quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 combined, repurchases
totaled only $97.3 billion.
"At the bottom, everybody sits on their hands," says Michael
Mauboussin, head of global financial strategies at Credit Suisse.
"They don't do anything when stocks appear to be cheap. But when
stocks are expensive, then they buy back shares hand over fist." The
managers of companies might sometimes seek to offset the issuance of
new shares when stock options are exercised; often, they are subject
to the same fear and greed as anyone else.
Some companies, though, seem to have learned from the financial
crisis. From the first quarter of 2005 through the end of 2006,
between 8% and 12% of all buybacks were made by companies whose shares
were the most expensive, says Mr. Leiphart of Birinyi. Last year,
however, the companies whose shares were the most richly priced
repurchased them at only half the pace of 2005 and 2006.
Moreover, it appears that buybacks aren't about to revisit the peaks
of 2007. So far this year, all U.S. companies have bought back a total
of $15.4 billion, according to Birinyi--about the same level as this
time last year, implying that 2014's pace will roughly match that of
2013.
And last year's total was well below the all-time high of $728.9
billion in 2007, when banks binged on buying back their own shares
right before they collapsed in the financial crisis.
"Over the past couple of years, the thinking has been that once people
got secure with the market, they'd open the coffers and spend
willy-nilly to buy back shares and we'd return to the levels of 2007,"
Mr. Leiphart says. "But companies haven't opened the floodgates like
that."
It is possible, Mr. Mauboussin says, that "maybe they're painted into
a corner and that's all they have to do." If the prospects for the
growth of a business look dim, managers might not want to shell out
for capital expenditures or research and development that won't pay
off for years--preferring instead the instant gratification of buying
back stock.
Taken to extremes, that wouldn't be healthy. In 1924, the pioneering
investment theorist Edgar Lawrence Smith pointed out in his book
"Common Stocks as Long Term Investments" that the ability of companies
to plow earnings back into developing the future growth of their
businesses is "a practical demonstration of the principle of compound
interest."
If share repurchases consume too much of companies' excess profits,
the underlying businesses might end up starved, which could lower
future returns.
So the surge in buybacks is worth watching closely. If companies end
up chasing their own shares as high as they did in 2007, a fall to
earth might not be far behind.

intelligentinvestor@wsj.com; twitter.com/jasonzweigwsj
 
Andrew Smithers riassume parlando con John Authers del FT le sue idee sulla valutazione del mercato azionario, già esposte nei suoi libro "Valuing Wall Street" dei primi anni 2000 e "Wall Street Revalued" di una decina d'anni successivo


Parte I Value with 20/20 hindsight - Authers' Note - Markets & Investing Video - FT.com

Parte II Q is the key to value - Authers' Note - Markets & Investing Video - FT.com

Per gli appassionati del genere, anche una occasione di sentirsi una bella conversazione in un elegante inglese posh:)

In sintesi Smithers parte dalla definizione di una "valutazione a posteriori" del mercato (hindsight value), un indicatore che sintetizza i ritorni che si sono ottenuti nei 30 anni successivi immaginando di acquistare ad una certa valutazione (infatti i grafici si fermano a metà degli anni '80 poichè per gli anni successivi non è ancora possibile calcolare completamente questo valore).
Poi cerca gli indicatori che offrono la migliore correlazione con questo hindsight value che sono appunto, storicamente, il CAPE ed ancora di più il Tobin's Q.
 
...ma non vi sembra che ancora adesso, rispetto a valori storici, il mercato, l' S&P 500 in particolare, sia ancora molto sopravvalutato ? Per esempio mi risulta che attualmente il suo P/E ratio sia oltre 20, ancora decisamente alto.
...

Ci si comincio a chiedere se l'S&P500 fosse sopravvalutato il 2 gennaio 2010, con l'indice a 1133. Oggi siamo a 1912 e non dimentichiamoci di 4+ anni di dividendi (suppergiu un altro +10%)
 
Il p/e può essere anche di 200 se le previsioni di crescita sono adeguate.
 
Ma chi valuta un mercato non prova a prevedere se domani salirà ancora o crollerà, sta solo cercando di identificare i probabili futuri ritorni che il mercato potrà dare nel lungo periodo.

Se compro lo S&P500 con un CAPE di 10 avrò buona probabilità di avere un ritorno elevato negli anni successivi. Finora chi lo ha fatto ha avuto un total return reale annuo a 10aa compreso tra il 3,8% ed il 17%.
Se compro a 20 (nel 2010) o a 25 (ora) i miei ritorni attesi diminuiscono, secondo lo stesso criterio, tra -3,2% e +8,3%.
Nessuno può dire cosa succederà al valore dell'indice domani o tra un anno.
 
Mi sembrano una compilascion di concetti capiti male, esposta da chi vuole a tutti i costi dimostrare che la EMH e' sbagliata. Il che forse e' vero, pero e' solo l'ipotesi come l'ha capita lui.

La conclusione:
l’investitore paziente possiede business di qualità superiore perché la qualità è sistematicamente sottovalutata dai mercati (che sono tutt’altro che pienamente efficienti).

quindi questo "investitore paziente" e' in grado di vedere qualita che tutti gli altri sottovalutano…. pero se continuano a sottovalutarla allora questa qualita non si trasforma in prezzo (cioe guadagno per lui)…mmmh… :mmmm:
L'investitore paziente deve percio essere in grado di identificare una qualita che vede solo lui e che in seguito si trasforma in un' altra qualita che vedono anche gli altri. Naturalmente, nel caso di questa seconda qualita i mercati devono essere efficienti, altrimenti potrebbe non trasformarsi in prezzo.

e questo ci porta a Buffett: E' piu probabile che lui veda cose che gli altri non vedono, oppure che veda le stesse cose ma meglio, dato che puo permettersi di analizzare piu a fondo le compagnie su cui pensa di investire ?
Io dico che fa i risultati che fa non perche abbia un cervello diverso, ma perche ha occhiali migliori.

PS in tutto questo quando mi riferisco agli "altri", intendo gli altri investitori competenti, non quelli dell' analisi tecnica, o del trading col DSL da casa. Ne quelli che leggono il Sole e decido di investire/disinvestire a seconda dei titoli delle prime pagine.
 
Companies tend to buy their shares in the greatest quantities at the
worst possible time.

con i soldi delle aziende sono distratti, ma con i loro molto accorti:
 

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le aziende più grandi da quando ha toccato 1000:
 

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Beccatevi una nota di ottimismo da parte di Hussman:

Make no mistake – this is an equity bubble, and a highly advanced one. On the most historically reliable measures, it is easily beyond 1972 and 1987, beyond 1929 and 2007, and is now within about 15% of the 2000 extreme. The main difference between the current episode and that of 2000 is that the 2000 bubble was strikingly obvious in technology, whereas the present one is diffused across all sectors in a way that makes valuations for most stocks actually worse than in 2000. The median price/revenue ratio of S&P 500 components is already far above the 2000 level, and the average across S&P 500 components is nearly the same as in 2000. The extent of this bubble is also partially obscured by record high profit margins that make P/E ratios on single-year measures seem less extreme (though the forward operating P/E of the S&P 500 is already beyond its 2007 peak even without accounting for margins).

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: Yes, This Is An Equity Bubble - July 28, 2014
 
Beccatevi una nota di ottimismo da parte di Hussman:

Make no mistake – this is an equity bubble, and a highly advanced one. On the most historically reliable measures, it is easily beyond 1972 and 1987, beyond 1929 and 2007, and is now within about 15% of the 2000 extreme. The main difference between the current episode and that of 2000 is that the 2000 bubble was strikingly obvious in technology, whereas the present one is diffused across all sectors in a way that makes valuations for most stocks actually worse than in 2000. The median price/revenue ratio of S&P 500 components is already far above the 2000 level, and the average across S&P 500 components is nearly the same as in 2000. The extent of this bubble is also partially obscured by record high profit margins that make P/E ratios on single-year measures seem less extreme (though the forward operating P/E of the S&P 500 is already beyond its 2007 peak even without accounting for margins).

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: Yes, This Is An Equity Bubble - July 28, 2014
Per una volta, quasi mi trovo a concordare con Swedroe: Swedroe: Why Care What Hussman Forecasts? | ETF.com :p
 
Detto per inciso a Swedroe, Hussman non fa previsioni.
Cosa che invece ha fatto, eccome, Grantham:

The bull market probably won’t end for a year or two, not before the S&P 500 rallies past the 2,250 level, says Jeremy Grantham in his latest quarterly letter.
This year likely will be tough for stock investors until October, adds Grantham, who is the founder of Boston-based money manager GMO. He has a reputation for sniffing out market bubbles early.
“But after October 1, the market is likely to be strong,” especially through April 2015, he writes. Perhaps by the time of the November 2016 election, the S&P 500 will have rallied past 2,250, maybe by a decent margin, according to Grantham.
But then “around the election or soon after, the market bubble will burst, as bubbles always do,” Grantham writes. The stock market “will revert to its trend value, around half of its peak or worse, depending on what new ammunition the Fed can dig up.”

Jeremy Grantham: S&P 500 will rally to 2,250, then stock-market bubble will pop - The Tell - MarketWatch

http://www.gmo.com/websitecontent/GMO_QtlyLetter_1Q14_FullVersion.pdf
 
Prendendo questo grafico (link: S&P 500 Earnings) (utili dello S&P500 corretti per l'inflazione)
e facendo una semplice interpolazione esponenziale si arriva poi in due minuti alle stesse conclusioni a cui arrivano studi presumibilmente costati più di due minuti di lavoro:
1) Gli utili correnti sono al di sopra della media.
2) L'attuale tasso di crescita degli utili superiore al 10% annuo non è sostenibile nel lungo periodo.
3) L'indice tende ad aumentare il suo P/E quando la crescita tende a salire.
4) Gli utili sono un dato estremamente variabile anno per anno, e possono variare MOLTO sensibilmente.
5) Se l'attuale livello degli utili tornasse non sulla linea del trend ma anche sopra del 30% a 80 e il mercato decidesse di valutare l'indice ad un P/E di 15, quindi niente di particolarmente disastroso, lo S&P500 varrebbe 1200 punti.
Da qui si ricava col metodo di spannometria applicata del prof. Occhiecroce la stessa previsione di Grantham: S&P500 sale fino a 2250 e oltre (forward earnings +14% link: P/Es & Yields on Major Indexes - Markets Data Center - WSJ.com), poi -50% o peggio, a seconda di quanto e fino a quando sale l'indice e di quanto poi gli utili tornano nella "norma". Qualcosa di più ottimistico si può ricavare col CAPE di Shiller (link:Shiller PE Ratio) ma sempre qui andiamo a parare. A meno che "this time is different", cosa sulla quale non conterei molto.
 

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