Carib ha scritto:
Claudio: adesso capisco a cosa si riferiva il "paradossale".
Come quegli obbligazionisti tedeschi che hanno pagato un 2% di denaro fresco all'ABRA... per ritrovarsi aderenti dell'11a ora all'offerta ladronica, a condizioni uguali agli altri che non avevano pagato... mi pare.
Cross Interests in Argentina?
In the Debt Overhaul, Bondholders Question an Economist's Fees
By MICHAEL CASEY
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
January 21, 2005; Page C14
BUENOS AIRES -- Adam Lerrick's bondholders group turned down Argentina's offer yesterday of 30 cents on the dollar for defaulted Argentine debt. But it is a measure of the controversy surrounding him that other bondholders, who also oppose Argentina's offer, still wonder whether Mr. Lerrick is on their side.
As Argentina presses its creditors to accept its terms on its $103 billion sovereign-debt restructuring, Mr. Lerrick, a Carnegie Mellon University economist and former Salomon Brothers bond trader, is playing a critical and contentious role. He has been paid to organize some 30,000 small bondholders, who own $1.2 billion in Argentine debt, into a single body, called the Argentine Bond Restructuring Agency, to give them the lobbying clout of large institutional investors. Members agree in advance to go along with ABRA's decision on whether to accept the deal, which further strengthens Mr. Lerrick's bargaining power.
Mr. Lerrick's detractors see a bundle of crossing interests. Rather than helping individual bondholders, he is benefitting from their lack of sophistication, they say. The 48-year-old economist doesn't structure his fees so he gets paid more depending on the overall payout. Rather, he gets paid to close the payment gap between ABRA bondholders and large holders -- no matter whether all classes of creditors get less money than Argentina could afford to pay.
"Considering the time and effort that goes into putting together a professional group to represent retail bondholders, it's fair to charge fees," says Hans Humes, manager of a large hedge fund and co-chairman of Global Committee of Argentine Bondholders, a broad coalition of bondholders that is dominated by large holders and includes ABRA among its members. "But the ideal fee structure would be based on the highest absolute return, which would align the interests of all creditors."
Mr. Lerrick says there is no conflict in a fee incentive that rewards improved relative values because big bondholders are seeking to drive up the price of their bonds, which are the benchmark he has to hit. "Once you accept that all investors will have to take losses in this restructuring, the question becomes one of how those losses are allocated among different creditors and how the restructuring process should move forward," he says.
Mr. Lerrick has spent much of his time negotiating what is called a "most favored lender clause," which promises bondholders who accept the deal that they will receive any extra payments that are given to holdouts. But now he believes the final wording is too weak, largely because it excludes out-of-court settlements and bond buybacks by government-owned entities. ABRA's independent board, which is headed by former German Bundesbank President Hans Tietmeyer and which made the decision yesterday, agrees with him.
Mr. Lerrick says that is proof of the checks and balances built into ABRA's structure and that he has bondholders' best interests at heart.
Still, it upsets some large bondholders that Mr. Lerrick could make millions of dollars in fees, even if Argentina doesn't improve the overall value of its offer -- which is less than half the 70-cents-on-the dollar payout that other Latin American countries have managed. ABRA's statement rejecting the Argentine offer focused on the lack of legal protections and didn't criticize the offering's low recovery value.
Before ABRA was formed in May 2003, the big guys' defaulted bonds could fetch as much as 4½ cents more in the secondary market than those of small bondholders. Since ABRA's formation, that gap has disappeared, largely because ABRA was able to bolster the clout of smaller holders.
Based on analyst valuations and ABRA's fee structure, ABRA members would pay fees of $11.6 million if the restructuring is completed according to the current offer.
Representatives of the large bondholders generally don't receive fees tied to the payout. But they do receive bonuses tied to the performance of their portfolios, which include Argentine debt.
Mr. Humes would rather fight than settle. He and his GCAB co-chairman, Nicola Stock, who represents 450,000 small Italian bondholders, took out ads last week in international newspapers urging bondholders to reject the offering because Argentina "can afford to pay more." Mr. Humes's hedge fund, Greylock Capital, formed a coalition with other GCAB members this week to file a lawsuit against Argentina. The move is a shift in strategy for GCAB, whose more-aggressive hedge fund members until now have been dissuaded from filing lawsuits by more-moderate members, including Mr. Lerrick, who had preferred a diplomatic or negotiated solution.